TRANSLATION THEORIES EXPLORED

Stylistic Approaches to Translation

Jean Boase-Beier



Series Editor: Theo Hermans

ROUTLEDGE

Translation Theories Explored

Continuing *Translation Theories Explained*

Translation Theories Explored is a series designed to engage with the range and diversity of contemporary translation studies. Translation itself is as vital and as charged as ever. If anything, it has become more plural, more varied and more complex in today's world. The study of translation has responded to these challenges with vigour. In recent decades the field has gained in depth, its scope continues to expand and it is increasingly interacting with other disciplines. The series sets out to reflect and foster these developments. It aims to keep track of theoretical developments, to explore new areas, approaches and issues, and generally to extend and enrich the intellectual horizon of translation studies. Special attention is paid to innovative ideas that may not as yet be widely known but deserve wider currency.

Individual volumes explain and assess particular approaches. Each volume combines an overview of the relevant approach with case studies and critical reflection, placing its subject in a broad intellectual and historical context, illustrating the key ideas with examples, summarizing the main debates, accounting for specific methodologies, achievements and blind spots, and opening up new perspectives for the future. Authors are selected not only on their close familiarity and personal affinity with a particular approach but also on their capacity for lucid exposition, critical assessment and imaginative thought.

The series is aimed at researchers and graduate students who wish to learn about new approaches to translation in a comprehensive but accessible way.

Theo Hermans
Series Editor

This page intentionally left blank

Stylistic Approaches to Translation

Jean Boase-Beier

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group
LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 2006 by St. Jerome Publishing
Second edition published 2009
Third edition published 2010

Published 2014 by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, USA

R*outledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business*

© Jean Boase-Beier 2006, 2009, 2010

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

Notices
Knowledge and best practice in this field are constantly changing. As new research and experience broaden our understanding, changes in research methods, professional practices, or medical treatment may become necessary.

Practitioners and researchers must always rely on their own experience and knowledge in evaluating and using any information, methods, compounds, or experiments described herein. In using such information or methods they should be mindful of their own safety and the safety of others, including parties for whom they have a professional responsibility.

To the fullest extent of the law, neither the Publisher nor the authors, contributors, or editors, assume any liability for any injury and/or damage to persons or property as a matter of products liability, negligence or otherwise, or from any use or operation of any methods, products, instructions, or ideas contained in the material herein.

ISBN 13: 978-1-900650-98-4 (hbk)
ISSN 1365-0513 (*Translation Theories Explored*)

Typeset by
Delta Typesetters, Cairo, Egypt

British Library Cataloging in Publication Data
A catalogue record of this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Boase-Beier, Jean.
Stylistic approaches to translation / Jean Boase-Beier.
p. cm. -- (Translation theories explored ISSN 1365-0513)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 1-900650-98-3 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Translating and interpreting, 2. Language and languages--Style.
3. Style, Literary. I. Title.

P306.2.B63 2006
418'.02--dc22

2006023861

Contents

Acknowledgements **vii**

Introduction: Style in Translation **1**

1. The Role of Style in Translation **4**
1.1 Reading and writing style in translation 4
1.2 Before stylistics: the spirit of a text 6
1.3 Universals of style and creative transposition 12
1.4 Contextual, pragmatic and cognitive aspects of style and translation 15
1.5 Relativity and thinking for translation 21
1.6 Translating literary and non-literary texts 26

2. Theories of Reading and Relevance **31**
2.1 Reading, style and the inferred author 31
2.2 Implication, relevance and minimax 39
2.3 Relevance theory and translating for relevance 43

3. The Translator's Choices **50**
3.1 Style and choice 50
3.2 Clues, games and decisions 58
3.3 Recreated choices in translation 64

4. Cognitive Stylistics and Translation **71**
4.1 The cognitive turn in stylistics and translation studies 71
4.2 Translating the mind in the text 75
4.3 Ambiguity and textual gaps 82
4.4 Foregrounding, salience and visibility 89
4.5 Metaphor, mind and translation 95
4.6 Iconicity, mimesis and diagesis 101
4.7 Cognitive stylistics and the pretence of translation 108

5. A Stylistic Approach in Practice **111**
5.1 Elements of a stylistic approach to translation 111
5.2 Using style to translate mind 114
5.3 Ambiguous translation 119
5.4 Attracting attention: patterns and other deviant structures 127
5.5 Metaphorical thought translated 133
5.6 Keeping the echo: translating for iconicity 138

6. Conclusion **146**

Bibliography **149**

Index **170**

Acknowledgements

I have been helped, directly and indirectly, by a large number of people in the writing of this book, and I would like to thank them here. For examples from languages in which I am not competent, I wish to thank in particular Tim Adès, Funda Isbuga Erel, Hilal Erkazanci, Karla Guadarrama and Gabrina Pounds. I am grateful to them for their ideas as well, and also to Veronika Bowker, Maria-Venetia Kyritsi and Chantal Wright. I should also like to thank all past and present students of the MA in Literary Translation at UEA, for class discussions, inspiration and their kindly interest in this project. Many thanks, too, to Theo Hermans for his useful comments. Finally, I am extremely indebted to Dieter Beier, my husband, for typing up the first version and enduring my compulsive need to rewrite. If there are still errors, then they are all mine.

Jean Boase-Beier
June 2006

The author and the publishers are grateful to the copyright-holders of the following material for permission to reprint poems. Full details of all publications can be found in the Bibliography.

Bloodaxe Books, for 'BC. Of course there was no serpent …' by R. S. Thomas, reproduced from *Collected Later Poems: 1988-2000*; copyright © 2004.

Carcanet Press Ltd., for 'To His Love' by Ivor Gurney, reproduced from *Severn and Somme & War's Embers*; copyright © 1987.

Elisabeth Kuhn, for the English translation of Robert Gernhardt's 'Bekenntnis', reproduced from a handout of a talk given at the Poetics and Linguistics Association conference, 2004.

NordSüd Verlag, for 'The Two Donkeys', the English translation, by Anthea Bell, of Christian Morgenstern's 'Die Zwei Esel'; copyright © 1992.

Rimbaud Verlag, for 'Entschlafen' and 'Das Geflimmer' by Ernst Meister.

Verlag Klaus Wagenbach GmbH, for 'Beim lesen der Zeitung' by Volker von Törne, reproduced from *Im Lande Vogelfrei. Gesammelte Schriften*, copyright © 1981.

W.D. Jackson, for 'He Shall be Called Jewel', the English translation of Sarah Kirsch's 'Edelstein wird er genannt'.

Yale University Press, for ‘Die Zwei Esel’ by Christian Morgenstern, and its English translation, ‘The Two Donkeys’ by Walter Arndt, reproduced from *Songs From the Gallows/Galgenlieder*; copyright © 1993.

Introduction: Style in Translation

From the earliest writings about translation, such as those of Cicero or Horace, style has often been mentioned but, as Snell-Hornby (1995:119) notices, its role has rarely been systematically explored. Yet style is central to the way we construct and interpret texts. We can consider its effects upon translation and the study of translation in at least three ways. Firstly, in the actual process of translation, the way the style of the source text is viewed will affect the translator's reading of the text. Secondly, because the recreative process in the target text will also be influenced by the sorts of choices the translator makes, and style is the outcome of choice (as opposed to those aspects of language which are not open to option), the translator's own style will become part of the target text. And, thirdly, the sense of what style is will affect not only what the translator does but how the critic of translation interprets what the translator has done.

Besides being equated in a general sense with those aspects of language which are optional, and therefore reflect the writer's or translator's choices, style can also be seen as characteristic of a particular author (e.g. by Ohmann 1962), or translator (Malmkjær 2004) or of a particular register, a variety of language whose stylistic characteristics are determined by its situation of use. In particular, style is often seen, for example by Jakobson (1960), as defining the difference between literary and non-literary texts.

Those writers who have made some attempt to explore these issues as they relate to the translation of style, such as Koller (1979), Munday (2001) or Baker (2000) have not done so in much detail. Even Fawcett, in his book on *Translation and Language* (1997), does not deal to any great extent with style, and the recent guide by Williams & Chesterman (2002) to research in translation studies does not mention it at all, although studies of style and translation are extremely popular with PhD students[1]. Exceptions are Tabakowska (1993) and Parks (1998), and these and other writers on style and translation will be referred to throughout this book.

If we were to try and find a common denominator of the various views, anecdotal or more sustained, it would probably be that what a concern with style means for translation studies is paying attention to what is unique to the text and its choices, being aware of patterns in the text, and paying close attention to the essential nature and function of the text. Increasingly, style

---

[1] Current PhD students at the University of East Anglia are working on topics such as the translation of heteroglossia, the impossibility of translating Russian poetry or the translation of poetic metaphor, all of which relate closely to concepts of style and its translation. I realise, of course, that these topics partly reflect my own interests, but there are many students at other universities working on similar topics.

has ceased to be viewed only in terms of its linguistic features and has come to include such issues as voice, otherness, foreignization, contextualization and culturally-bound and universal ways of conceptualizing and expressing meaning. To pay attention to style in translation study means to consider how all these factors are reflected in the text and its translation. This is not to make the assumption that stylistic theory or translation theory will be available to practising translators. When we describe a system of knowledge – in the case of this book, stylistic knowledge – and how it affects translation practice, we are not necessarily describing how every translator translates; theoretical approaches to translation are theories of what we know, not just of what we do.

And yet, though theories offer descriptions of existing situations, knowledge and practice, there is still a sense in which they can be used as tools to aid practice. Such statements might be seen as a failure to distinguish between description and prescription. But in fact theoretical studies can have very different effects on practice, not all of which are prescriptive. The descriptive-prescriptive distinction is at best an oversimplification of the relationship between theory and practice.

In terms of describing practice, we can list and name what we find, or we can offer explanations as to how the phenomena came about. For example, we can note that X uses a large number of similes in his translation of Y's metaphors, or we can explain this on the basis of norms in the target language or of cognitive differences or of different contexts of translation. In terms of affecting practice, we can simply prescribe, detailing how translation is to happen, as contracts sometimes do, or – and this is a relationship that is fundamental to this book – we can suggest that a practitioner might be aware of theoretical stances, and translate with this awareness. For example, a translator who is aware that language can be iconic – can do as it says – will be more likely to try to capture instances of iconicity in her translation. Knowledge of theory is simply part of the knowledge translators build up through an interest in their subject, and it affects what they do.

When considering theories and their descriptive relation to practice or their effects on practice, we can look at approaches historically, we can look at current approaches, or we can try to synthesize approaches into one that best suits our own concerns, and all of these methods have their place in this book. I focus in particular on a number of questions about style and translation which can be summarized as follows:

i) What exactly do we mean by style and how has this view changed over time?
ii) What is its place in translation theory?
iii) What is its place in the process of translation?

The first and second questions will form the basis of Chapter 1, where I will attempt to trace some early views on the importance of style and how it relates to translation, going on to look at later views and considering how they have directly or (more often) indirectly affected our views of translation. The second question is further pursued in the next three chapters. Chapter 2 focuses on the style of the source text and how it is interpreted, especially in reader-orientated views such as reader-response theory and relevance theory. Some of these views were specifically formulated for translation, many were not, but all have something interesting to say about the role of style in understanding the source text. Chapter 3 focuses on the choices a translator makes in recreating the target text, always with reference to the choices seen to be embodied in the source text. Chapter 4 looks at some of the more recent developments in stylistics, especially in cognitive stylistics, and relates them to the issues discussed in the first three chapters. Cognitive views are often concerned with the relation between what is universal and what is culture-specific in language and for that reason alone are of great interest to translation theory. But they are also a natural development of earlier formalist and later contextualized stylistics. It is my aim in these first four chapters both to look at those ideas from stylistic approaches which translation studies has used and, especially in Chapter 4 where I consider the very latest developments, to look at those ideas which it could use. Chapter 5 then looks at the other side of the relationship between theory and practice, by asking how the knowledge of theory presented in the first four chapters might affect practice. Though I have aimed in the first three chapters to explore existing theories and approaches rather than developing my own, Chapter 4 and the first section of Chapter 5 do to some extent represent a synthesis of earlier views, including my own, and an integration of these into an overall approach. Chapter 5 thus starts by bringing together some of the ideas discussed in the first four chapters to see how they can inform what is termed a "stylistic approach" to translation. The rest of Chapter 5 is an attempt to answer more concretely the third question posed above: it consists of case studies of actual texts in translation. Many are taken from poetry, but other literary and non-literary genres are represented, too.

A note on words and meanings

Throughout the book, I have used brackets, or, if appropriate, single inverted commas for meanings. Double inverted commas indicate words or phrases quoted, and italics are for lexical items, actual or potential, which are not quoted.

1. The Role of Style in Translation

1.1 Reading and writing style in translation

The concept of style is a complex one, and there are many different views of its nature, several of which will be discussed in this chapter. But a prerequisite for any such discussion is a basic definition of the term. For this purpose, the "simplest" definition – "the perceived distinctive manner of expression" – given by Wales in her *Dictionary of Stylistics* (2001:371) will be perfectly adequate. As will become clear throughout the course of this book, this simple definition hides many complexities to do with what "perceived" means (whether by a reader, a critic, or a social group, for example) and what "distinctive" means, among other things. The role of style in translation is made even more complex by the fact that there are the styles of two texts, the source text and the target text, to take into account. And in each case, the style of the text can be seen in its relationship to the writer, as an expression of choice, or in its relationship to the reader, as something to be interpreted and thereby to achieve effects.

On the one hand, the translator is a reader of the source text, and so the effects of its style upon the translator need to be examined. Important issues to consider here are how style is read, how it achieves its effects upon the reader, and what its relationship to various factors in the creation of the source text is seen to be. For example, the style of the source text may be seen as "a set of choices driven by commitment to a particular point of view" and in this sense "it is style, rather than content, which embodies the meaning" (Boase-Beier 2004a:29) or provides "a direct link to the work's basic thematic concerns and the kind of experience it attempts to convey" (García & Marco 1998:65). If this is the view held by the translator of a literary text, on the grounds that the text is by definition fictional, then s/he is likely to focus on the style of the source text as a clue to its meaning. And yet many of the approaches to reading to be discussed in Chapter 2 emphasize how meaning is constructed by the reader, and therefore, in the case of translation, by the translator. So there is no straightforward relationship between the style of the source text and what the text means. And if we assume, as do many writers on stylistics and literary pragmatics such as Verdonk (2002) that to construct meaning in reading a text, just as in any other act of communication, is to attempt a reasonable reconstruction of authorial intention, it seems clear that the author to whom such intention is imputed is a figure inferred from the text. Different translators may hold different views on these arguments, or hold no view at all. But irrespective of whatever view the translator holds and whatever arguments s/he is aware of, the relationship of author to

intention and intention to meaning in the text is no more straightforward than the relationship of style to meaning.

On the other hand, the translator writes a new text in translating, and so the style of the target text is an expression of the translator's choices. Some studies of translation consider how the style of the target text conforms to certain norms (of the genre, of the target language, or of the linguistic, literary or cultural system into which the target text fits). In the Descriptive Translation Studies of Holmes (1988) or Toury (1985, 1995), the focus is on the description of both process and product of translation, but especially upon actual translations and their relationship to the target culture. In the functionalist approach of Vermeer (1978), which sees translation as "purposeful activity" (Nord 1997), the focus is to a large extent on the target culture as a determinant in the process of translation, and so such studies have sometimes been seen as reducing the role of the translator to "a functionary of the target group" (Kohlmayer 1988:147; my translation). Other studies look for traces of the translator in the target text (e.g. Baker 2000; Millán-Varela 2004; Marco 2004; Malmkjær 2004); Hermans (1996:42) is insistent that the translator's presence must be posited in all translations.

Taking all this into account, we can thus consider style in translation from at least four potential viewpoints:

i) the style of the source text as an expression of its author's choices
ii) the style of the source text in its effects on the reader (and on the translator as reader)
iii) the style of the target text as an expression of choices made by its author (who is the translator)
iv) the style of the target text in its effects on the reader.

It is important that translation studies overall should not focus on either the style of the source text to the exclusion of the target text or vice versa, nor on the author of either text to the exclusion of its reader. But different types of study will focus on different aspects. The emphasis of the discussion in this book will be on points (ii) and (iii) above: the style of the source text as perceived by the translator and how it is conveyed or changed or to what extent it is or can be preserved in translation. This is because most discussion of style in translation has been concerned with the translation process, and the process necessarily most closely involves these two factors. Assumptions made about stylistic choices in the text, (i) above, are largely seen in the light of how their effects are experienced and understood by the translator. But there is a further reason for this focus, and it has to do with the relationship between theory and practice. Stylistics, and especially cognitive stylistics, the study of how the production and, especially, understanding of

style are affected by the structure of the mind, has contributed a great deal to our understanding of how texts are read and interpreted (cf. Stockwell 2002a:15). If stylistic approaches to translation are to be examined in their possible relation to practice, then it is the issue of how translators understand their source texts which will be of most immediate concern. This is not to say that the reception of the target text – (iv) above – has no influence on the outcome; the studies by Toury and Vermeer mentioned above (and see also Hermans 1999) have shown clearly that it has. But, because of its focus on style as it affects the process of translation, the perspective taken in this book is that, though facts to do with the target language, culture and (in the case of literature) the target literary system do have an important influence on the process of translation, it is through the part they play in the translator's awareness of them, which forms part of the context of operation. Because stylistics includes, today, a broad understanding of context as what we know, there is no difficulty in potentially accommodating target text factors in a stylistic view. But it is not the main focus.

Most of the book's main concern, then, is with the translator and the translator's task, and encompasses the source-text author and the target-text reader to the extent that they impact upon this task.

A focus on the translator and the act of translation opens up the following question: is there a relationship between theory and practice which goes beyond a theoretical extrapolation from the description of practice? Though we can indeed use stylistic data from source text and target text to try and reconstruct the role of style in the translation process (cf. Toury 1985:18), and can consider statements from writers, readers, translators and scholars as data from which to construct an overall view of the role of style in translation, we can also argue that knowledge of theories and approaches can and should be part of a translator's toolkit, a position also argued for by de Beaugrande (1978:7). This is not to say that a translation will (or should) be undertaken in accordance with a theoretical view. And it is certainly not to say that theory is under any obligation to offer guidelines for practice. The most we can expect, as Toury (1985:34-35) says, is that a description of process might allow us to draw tentative conclusions for practice. But I wish to suggest something at once less rigid and more profound: knowledge of possible and actual theories and views, of language, literature, translation or style, is as helpful to the translator as any other knowledge about the world in which s/he lives and operates.

1.2 Before stylistics: the spirit of a text

Strictly speaking, it does not make sense to say that approaches to translation were based on or influenced by stylistics when we are talking about

approaches which were formulated before stylistics itself, as the study of language and style in texts, usually literary texts, had become a recognized and established discipline. And this has only happened fairly recently, since the 1960s according to Wales (2001:269). Views of translation before this might therefore have been influenced by concepts of style, or have focussed on style, but they could not justifiably be called "stylistic approaches" if what we mean by this description is approaches based on or involving the discipline of stylistics.

It becomes clear how and why the study of style gained in importance from around the 1960s if we consider the twin strands of literary and linguistic theory from which it developed: (i) structuralist (and subsequently early generative) linguistics and (ii) the close-reading methods of literary study. Structuralist linguistics began with Ferdinand de Saussure's *Cours de Linguistique Générale*, published in 1916, a few years after his death (Saussure 1959). The influence of another structuralist, Roman Jakobson, was central to the development of stylistics. Jakobson was a founding member in 1915 of the formalist Moscow Linguistic Circle, whose members included Eichenbaum and Shklovsky (see Lemon & Reis 1965), and in 1926 of the structuralist Prague Linguistic Circle, which included Mukařovský and Havránek (see Garvin 1964). Jakobson not only had a central role in the development of stylistics but also in the study of translation. In both Russian Formalism and the more functionally-orientated Prague Structuralism there was not the strict separation of literature and linguistics which we have tended to see in recent times (cf. Sell 1994:9). In the 1970s and 80s, functionalist theories of translation like the skopos theory of Reiß & Vermeer (1984), which maintains that the translation process is determined by its purpose, were strongly influenced by Russian Formalism and Prague Structuralism (Kohlmayer 1988:146). Structuralism was primarily a development in linguistics, concerned with identifying and classifying linguistic data in the greatest detail, but it had its parallels and influences in literary study, in the work of writers such as Roland Barthes (e.g. 1966; here 1977) and Jonathan Culler (e.g. 1975) and later in the post-structuralist theory of critics such as the later Barthes (e.g. 1976), Hillis Miller (e.g. 1982) and Derrida (e.g. 1988), who took up the structuralist arbitrariness of signifier and signified and explored the instability of meaning which results (cf. Barry 2002:65). Structuralism also led to the concentration on "literary codes and conventions" (Pilkington 2000:22) known as semiotics (e.g. Eco 1981). In the 1960s and 70s, structuralist literary approaches shared the aim of structuralist linguistics to classify and describe data; works such as Culler (1975) or Riffaterre (1970) can be regarded as early examples of stylistics proper, the study of style in language.

It is important to realize that a major change took place in linguistics

with the development of generative linguistics, initially proposed by Chomsky in 1957. Sometimes translation scholars seem to have a rather inadequate understanding of the difference between structuralist linguistics and generative linguistics, but this difference is crucial. Generative linguistics arose from the conviction that classifying linguistic data in structuralist manner for individual languages and following an inductive approach to explanation, which derived underlying regularities from those data without offering explanations (other than the functional ones which appeared in later developments of structuralism), was insufficient to explain language. Generative grammar was concerned with the human mind, and how language reflected it. It proposed universal cognitive principles and aimed to explain, deductively, how the data were derived from them. This is a very basic distinction which is essential to an understanding of both developments in stylistics and much of the later discussion of linguistics in translation studies, and I would advise all readers of this book to bear it in mind. Generative grammar, like structuralist grammar before it, had a very strong influence on stylistics, especially through the work of scholars such as Freeman, whose book *Linguistics and Literary Style* (1970) offered examples of the stylistic study of literary texts, aiming to show how their literary effects could be explained in terms of their linguistics.

The other development I have noted as important for stylistics, (ii) above, was the text-based criticism of writers such as Richards (1924), Empson (1930), or Wimsatt (1954a). These are sometimes grouped together under the heading "New Criticism" though the term is often, and more properly, reserved for its American proponents such as Wimsatt & Beardsley (1954; see Krieger 1956).

Though generative grammar, in its concern for the mind as a source of linguistic explanation, was very different from structuralist linguistics, both approaches have a common feature which they share with text-based literary criticism: an understanding that the formal features of language are important. In text-based criticism this was reflected in a focus on "the words on the page" of a literary text, to use a phrase made famous by I.A. Richards (1942:41) and, to a greater or lesser degree, on a separation of the actual visible, measurable features of language from such issues as history, background, and context in all but its most immediate senses. It is a common criticism (e.g. by Fowler 1975; Burton 1982:196) that both structuralist and generative linguistics ignore all surrounding detail, including questions of appropriateness in context, such as are studied in pragmatics. And it is also a common criticism of text-based literary approaches that they ignore the author's background, and perhaps above all the reader's background, ideology and active involvement in creating readings of texts (Birch 1989:71). To some extent this is a justified criticism: if you focus on the form of the words

in a text it is indeed all too easy to forget what is outside the text. On the other hand, it is only a partial view. One of Richards' main concerns was the psychology of writer and reader (1924). And many linguists and stylisticians worked to counteract the narrowness of earlier approaches with pragmatic studies of language and of literary texts which are concerned with the circumstances under which language is used (e.g. Sell 1991), including their historical and sociological aspects. Because such contextualized studies have existed for around thirty-five years (see e.g. Halliday & Hasan 1976; Chapman 1973), the criticism sometimes made quite recently by translation scholars such as Venuti that "linguistics-based" (1998:21) approaches to translation define language "as a set of systematic rules autonomous from cultural and social variation" (1998:21, 29) must be understood as resulting from an inadequate knowledge of the state of play in areas bordering on their discipline, a knowledge which has not really gone beyond structuralism to take in modern linguistics or stylistics. And even if we go back to an early structuralist writer such as Jakobson, we see that his views, though indeed concerned with the form of the text, nevertheless take in such notions as the cognitive (e.g. 1959; here 2000), the cultural and the pragmatic (e.g. 1978b, 2000).

But there is another reason why one should be wary of dismissing what Venuti calls "linguistics-based" (1998:21) views of translation, and this is that those writers on translation, such as Catford (1965) or Nida (1964), who did indeed focus on its linguistic basis, also placed at least as strong an emphasis on function and use as they did on form. This means that their work was concerned with the individual and idiosyncratic in addition to the systematic and universal.

However, though we cannot equate stylistic views with linguistic views, nor linguistic with structuralist, nor structuralist with purely formalist views, the growing realization that language involves the mind and the mind is concerned with culture and context has not until recently had much effect within translation theory on views of the style of the source text. Though Snell-Hornby (1995), one of the few translation theorists to consider style in detail, is keen to show that meaning cannot simply be read off from the source text, and that therefore we need to have a sense of what the style might convey, her description tends to rely on early stylistic theories (Leech & Short 1981) and functionalist approaches (e.g. Reiß & Vermeer 1984), so it cannot offer an explanation for the sort of inferences a translator might make. It is only when such inferences are taken into account that an alternative to the old structuralist code-model of language can begin to be made available (e.g. Gutt 2000).

Stylistics with a stronger social orientation, such as that by Fowler (1975) or Burton (1982), has had relatively little direct effect on translation theory, though it has indirectly influenced the work of scholars such as Snell-Hornby

(1995) and Malmkjær (2005). But stylistics with a cognitive element, which has taken up insights from both psychological critics such as Richards, and cognitive linguists such as Lakoff & Turner (1989) or Langacker (1987), has recently had rather more of an impact on translation, especially in the work of scholars such as Tabakowska (1993), Gutt (2000), or Dahlgren (2000), and my own studies (e.g. 2003a, 2004a, 2004b). Because cognitive stylistics, through its concept of context as cognitive entity, involves a concern with social and cultural factors, it has been able to develop, in ways relevant to translation, what might be seen to make up what Tabakowska calls the "human factor" (1993:10) in the study of language.

Some of these approaches will be considered in more detail later but for the moment it is enough to be aware that the current development of a stylistics which aims to embrace both social and cognitive factors is still underway, and that even the more formal, limited type of stylistics which preceded it did not develop until around the middle of last century. We cannot therefore expect to be able to trace the influence of stylistics proper on translation studies until recently. This is not, though, to say that the notion of style played no role in the study of translation before there was an identifiable discipline of stylistics. On the contrary, style has frequently been a factor in even the earliest works on translation, as a few examples will serve to show. It is not my intention here to trace the history of the various uses of the term, but merely to indicate some of them briefly; the references in the text will provide suggestions for further reading.

Cicero and Horace saw as important the "style and effect" of the original text, according to Qvale (1998:9), and both were concerned with their preservation in translation. As Bassnett (1991:43) points out, translation was extremely important for these Roman writers and their views inevitably coloured later ones, especially in their distinction between word-for-word and sense-for-sense translation. Their views on style were in part based upon Aristotle's theories of rhetoric and poetics, which he had formulated about 300 years earlier.

During the Renaissance in Europe around the sixteenth century "the search for individual expression and meaning" (Carter & McRae 1997:60) became important, and there was a huge increase in experimentation and innovation in form and style, at a time when translation had gained in importance after the invention of printing in the fifteenth century (Bassnett 1991:53). Dolet, in 1540, was concerned that the translator should keep the "dignity and richness" of source and target languages, accepting that every language had its own particular linguistic properties (Robinson 2002:95-97). Du Bellay, writing in 1549, also emphasized that the translator should recognize stylistic differences between languages (Robinson 2002:102; Lefevere 1992:22). Peletier du Mans, writing in 1555, said that the translator should

be aware that the author's "spirit and intention are often bound up with his style and choice of words" (Lefevere 1992:53). This expresses a particular concern that is now being addressed several centuries later by cognitively-orientated views on the role of style: its relation to what the reader or translator takes to be the cognitive state of the original author. The notion of intention is a very tricky one, not just for translators, but also for critics in general; scepticism about its validity or discoverability was expressed by Wimsatt (1954b), who spoke of the "intentional fallacy". I will take up this question of intention and its importance for the translator in Chapter 2.

Dryden, in 1680, referred to the style, or something like it, as the "genius" of a text. He spoke of style as the author's "particular turn of thoughts and expression" (Lefevere 1992:104). Pope, similarly concerned with the translation of classical authors, spoke of the "spirit" and "fire" (Lefevere 1992:64f) of the text, while at the same time noting that, in literature, "the sound must seem an echo to the sense" (1963:27). Denham, too, spoke of its "spirit" (Robinson 2002:156), a concept echoed in the concern of a modern translator of spiritual poetry like Rowan Williams to keep the "energy" of the source text (2002:8). And in 1790 Tytler spoke of the need to keep the "style and manner of writing" (Robinson 2002:208ff.) as one of his many prescriptions for good translation. Some twenty-five years after Tytler, Schleiermacher, like Dryden, spoke of the need to pay attention to "the spirit not only of the language but also of the original author" (Robinson 2002:233).

Arnold, in 1861, writing on the translation of Homer, emphasizes the close link between content and style (see also Malmkjær 2005:12), a concern shared by later theorists such as Gutt (2000; cf. MacKenzie 2002:39-40).

But beyond noting that the translator should be aware of the style of both source and target language, what this meant or how it should be taken into account was apparently seen by most writers until after the start of the twentieth century as self-evident. And yet it was obviously an important issue: the fact that so many writers on translation mentioned style (whether perceived as the style of a language or of an individual author of a source text or a target text), suggests a concern with what goes beyond content, and especially with the manner in which it is expressed. This is at odds with standard dictionary definitions, which suggest that to translate is to transfer content, to "express the sense" (Concise Oxford Dictionary 1976:1232), as though the manner in which the sense is expressed was irrelevant.

As stylistics grew and defined itself as a discipline from around the middle of the twentieth century, there were many attempts to explore the exact nature of style. A good example is Püschel (1980), who lists many different ways in which style has been seen, including "style as connotation", "style as choice" and "style as ornament" (1980:305-6; see also Crystal & Davy 1969:9-12).

Of these, the latter view has probably been least important for translation. It is a view which goes back to Aristotle's distinction between rhetoric and poetics. But in fact rhetoric and poetics can never be entirely separated (Preminger 1974:702), suggesting that style is never purely ornament, and it is even likely that the notion of "style as ornament" might itself result from a mistranslation (see Vickers 1988:314-315; Fahnestock 2005:218). Though rhetoric was about persuasion and so stylistic features in rhetoric served as tools to bring about desired effects, the distinction between literary and non-literary texts was in classical rhetoric nowhere near as obvious as it was later seen to be (Fahnestock 2005:219). Writers such as Fowler (1981) have also stressed the similarities between these different types of text, as have cognitive stylisticians. Classical rhetoric was concerned with the mind and for this reason Turner refers to cognitive stylistics as "cognitive rhetoric" (1991:238). But Fahnestock (2005:216) draws attention to an important distinction: rhetoric was concerned with the production of texts, whereas stylistics generally looks at the understanding of texts.

Definitions of style will vary according to whether their authors wish to make links with rhetoric, with structuralist linguistics, with generative linguistics, or with any other subsequent development in linguistics or literary studies. But recent translation theory has not been concerned with the actual definition of style, any more than earlier views of translation were; the main stylistic issues have been to do with questions of relativity, universality, and literariness. This is because they relate intimately to the question of what is translatable.

1.3 Universals of style and creative transposition

We have established thus far that stylistic approaches can look at different parts of the translation process, and that style itself can be seen to mean different things in relation to language, and therefore in its relation to translation. A third area about which there are very different views is the relationship of language, and specifically of style, to the universal and the particular. On the face of it, translation would seem to demand that at least something is universal, and for stylisticians concerned with the translation of style, an important question will always be this: which aspects of style are universal and which are inextricably linked with a particular language? In considering this question, it is worth looking at Jakobson's work. Though one of the criticisms commonly made of his work in stylistics by what Bradford (1994) refers to as the anti-Jakobson School of the 60s and 70s, typified by Fowler (e.g. 1975), is that it is overly formalist, and ignores the effects of situation and the reader, he makes rewarding reading for those working in translation, even today.

Jakobson was particularly interested in what made texts literary. In common with many structuralist and text-based writers (including American New Critics such as Wimsatt and Brooks and English proponents of close-reading such as Richards) he preferred to work with poetry, because he felt that its close and easily observable link between form and content embodied the essential nature of literature (1978b). However, according to Tabakowska (1993:11), all his work is based on the "assumption that 'normal' language is not qualitatively different from 'poetic language'", a view shared by Fowler (1981:162-179). Nevertheless, while he pointed out that all language uses the same resources, Jakobson saw literary (and specifically poetic) language as being functionally different in that it used these resources differently in order to meet the "poetic function". In a 1960 article on poetics he states that this function "projects the principle of equivalence from the axis of selection onto the axis of combination" (1960:358). In other words, if a non-poetic utterance might choose to say "the cat lay on the rug", a poetic one would select or insert words in the syntactic structure of the sentence in a way governed by their similarity to one another: the cat sat on the mat.

According to Bradford, who traces the life and views of Jakobson, the underlying theme in all his work (whether on phonology, film, aphasia, translation or poetry) was that "the material substance of the sign is never fully distinguishable from its signifying properties" (1994:3). If this is so, then it does not bode well for translation, which by its nature needs to transport the sign into another language and situation, where its "signifying properties" will be different. So is that unity between form and meaning doomed to be lost in translation? Or worse, does it render translation impossible?

Jakobson's answer, in a 1959 article on translation, was that translation in a strict sense is not possible, at least for poetic texts, but "creative transposition" is possible because "cognitive experience" is universal, as are certain characteristics of poetry such as its concern with style and pattern (2000:118, 115). In focussing on the poetic function of language, Jakobson differed from the common structuralist view (e.g. Saussure 1959) that language is arbitrary. Poetic language was non-arbitrary, governed by its sound patterns, partially hermetic, and ambiguous, and thus functionally distinct not just from non-literary language but also from non-poetry.

Jakobson's concern, like that of Richards, went far beyond the formal aspects of poetry. He saw stylistic figures such as metaphor and metonymy as psychological processes (1987:100) and in this was the forerunner of later cognitive stylistics, to be discussed in section 1.4 and in Chapter 4. However, the linguistics on which his stylistics was based was essentially a structuralist, inductive linguistics, and did not, therefore, place the human mind at the centre of linguistic explanation. Nevertheless, Jakobson's identification of common "cognitive values" (2000:115) of language, which, unlike the close

bond between form and meaning in poetry, were translatable, emphasizes the interaction between universal and specific as the basis for translation. This is an interaction noticed by many translators who distinguish the form-meaning relation fixed by the linguistics of a particular language from what Levine, for example, calls the "secret bonds among all languages"(1991:8). The latter make translation possible.

Such bonds might be lexical: Goddard & Wierzbicka (1994), for example, identify "semantic primitives" such as "big", "small", "think", "live", "now" and "like" (cf. Wierzbicka 1997:26). They might also be stylistic. For van Peer (1993:73), foregrounding is an example of a universal stylistic characteristic of literature. He finds support for this view in Miner's study *Comparative Poetics*; Miner (1990:38-40) argues that what he calls estrangement (foregrounding) is central to all literature, echoing the Russian Formalists. Other writers such as McCully (1998:23) and Goldsworthy (1998:40) have argued for the universality of linguistic patterns such as rhyme, rhythm and parallelism in literature, and in an earlier book (Boase-Beier 1987) I suggested that figures such as metaphor, iconicity or ambiguity have the nature of stylistic principles, implying that they are in fact universal. Besides lexical or stylistic universals, there could be semantic ones, that is, what Catford (1965:50) calls common "features of situation substance", suggesting universality of experience. Such universality, which Assman calls "the regulative ideal of the One" (1996:85) has often been considered an essential prerequisite for translation. For Assman, this view of translation has been a hindrance; postmodernism has allowed the "fundamentalization of plurality" (1996:99), a view which he sees as deriving from Hofmannsthal (see e.g. 1979). Plurality, for writers such as Assman, is the only way to respect otherness in translation, and here he voices a suspicion of universalism common to many recent writers on translation, especially of a poststructuralist or postmodernist persuasion (see e.g. Venuti 2000:124).

But there is nothing wrong with universalism *per se*, as long as it is combined with an awareness of its possible shortcomings (cf. Miner 1990). And indeed, it could be argued that Venuti, though he disparages universal views for ignoring cultural relativity, is himself universalizing about the nature of literature. If his notion of foreignizing (1995:20) is more about preserving what constitutes the literary rather than merely mimicking the foreignness of the original text, then it is based on a universalizing notion of the literary, such as Jakobson held. Furthermore, if some types of universals can be shown to have a biological basis, there would be little point in denying them. Malmkjær (2005:51), for example, points to work done in the late 1960s by researchers such as Berlin & Kay (1969) on colour, which suggests a universal set of concepts that vary in each particular language. Such work emphasizes the "commonality" (Malmkjær 2005:50) of languages.

Or, as Crane & Richardson put it, though "the link between the word red and the colour is … arbitrary … the experience of redness is not" (1999:128). And Goldsworthy's reasons for positing the universality of literary features is that they arise from the "biology of literature" (1998:39).

A view of universality based on biology was simply not available to Jakobson; his sense of common cognitive values was empirical, intuitive and perhaps ideological, just as a postmodernist emphasis on difference is all these things.

Jakobson's concern with the universal underlying the specific was not just a view of language and style, but also affected how he saw the similarity of literature to other genres, and the connections between different types of translation. If Jakobson's quest was for "The Magic of a Common Language" (Toman 1999), then that common language underlies also what he describes as different types of translation in his 1959 article. Here he famously distinguished intralingual translation (rewording in the same language), intersemiotic translation (such as a film based on a novel) and "translation proper", or interlingual translation, whereby an "entire message" is transposed into another language (Jakobson 2000:114). Just as everything can be translated, so too different types of transposition, rewording or adaptation are forms of translation.

The strong universalizing tendency of structuralism, combined with its attention to linguistic detail, has been linked to close-reading criticism (Bradford 1994:4). But it would be simplistic, as I have suggested, to equate structuralism (or close-reading) with universalizing and poststructuralism and postmodernism with difference. All these approaches are concerned, to a greater or lesser extent, with both universalism and difference.

At the time Jakobson wrote his early work, structuralist linguistics found regularities behind the detail of individual languages which appeared to point to common characteristics, but could not be given any explanation. Once linguistics began to focus on the mind, and to explain linguistic data as the result of the structure of the mind, what Jakobson saw as the two defining factors of languages – their individual spirit and their unifying aspects – could be formulated as characteristics of the mind. In particular, the notion of context as a cognitive entity in recent theories of style such as Semino (1997) allows for both Jakobson's factors, and thus for the main concerns of translation.

1.4 Contextual, pragmatic and cognitive aspects of style and translation

In the previous two sections we saw how the formalist approaches of scholars such as Jakobson to the concept of style, while offering descriptions

which could begin to explain some of its perceived importance for translation, nevertheless tended to decontextualize the literary text. For early writers on stylistics such as Culler (1975) or Riffaterre (1970) – as for the New Critics twenty years earlier – this decontextualization was in part a reaction to the overcontextualization of previous literary criticism with its emphasis on the author's life and circumstances. While such decontextualization enabled the first detailed studies of style and provided a useful basis for the development of stylistics, it was not especially helpful for translation studies. And early translation studies such as Levý (1969) do – as historically they were bound to – suffer to some extent from such decontextualization and the concomitant danger of universalizing. But such generalizing tendencies continued to be countered by a concern with the individual contextual meaning which is "rarely the same in any two languages" (Catford 1965:36). Nevertheless, the notion of context was not particularly well-developed in these early writers. This lack can be seen broadly to have four aspects:

i) the sociological, historical and ideological aspects of the genesis of source and target text are largely ignored;
ii) there is sometimes little consideration of psychological aspects of the production and interpretation of texts;
iii) pragmatic aspects, that is, aspects which have to do with the way people speak and understand texts beyond their actual linguistically-determined structures, are not taken into account; and
iv) there is little consideration of the role of the reader.

These are all problems for a study of style in general and especially for the study of style in translation. As I suggested above, there were some attempts even in the 1960s, but especially in the 1970s and 1980s, to broaden stylistics away from formalism to encompass sociological, historical, psychological and pragmatic aspects (see e.g. Ohmann 1962; Chapman 1973; Traugott & Pratt 1980). And this has made stylistics much more attractive to translation studies. D'haen, comparing the two stylistics anthologies by Donald Freeman of 1970 and 1981, notes that the former "concentrates on style in the more narrow sense" whereas the later collection is concerned with "the functioning of literature in society" (1986:1). D'haen goes on to locate the development of Translation Studies by Toury (1980) in Israel and by Bassnett (1991, but with a first edition in 1980) in England within these later developments in stylistics, thus signalling a convergence of stylistics and translation that had earlier not been possible.

As far as sociological aspects of style are concerned – (i) above – the integration of these issues, which involves "viewing a text as a cultural

process" (Verdonk 1988:6), is still being developed today. Much as did the Marxist criticism of literary theorists like Eagleton (1976), work by stylisticians such as Fowler (e.g. 1977, 1996) emphasized the sociolinguistics of style, taking into account that factors which determine social identity "have an influence on the way in which language is used, and ... language ... exercises a dominant influence on our perception of social structure" (Crystal 1987:17). If language use is not autonomous, then neither literature itself nor literary style can simply be seen as closed off from the influences of society; this latter view is described by Burton (1982:197) as "merely naively supporting and demonstrating the (largely unseen and unnoticed) political bias of the status quo." For Burton, as for writers such as Mills (1992, 1995), one way to counteract such naivety is with feminist stylistics.

Stylistics with such sociolinguistic awareness can be seen as "the variety of discourse analysis dealing with literary discourse" (Leech 1983:151) where discourse is language used in context (Carter 1997:xiii ff.) Discourse, and therefore also literary discourse, is seen as "a social and political phenomenon", and its effects are viewed within the context of "larger social patterns" (Carter 1997:117) which go beyond the micro-context of the text in question. For translation, this has meant an increasing concern with ways in which texts are "concretised and rewritten" (Lefevere 1986:218).

The study of literature as discourse could be seen to fall within the remit of Critical Discourse Analysis, a further development of stylistics in a broader sense which takes especially ideology into account. As Verdonk shows, Critical Discourse Analysis does not necessarily make a distinction between literary and non-literary texts, because all "can be construed as social documents in which ideological positions are implicitly or explicitly expressed" (2002:74). Such ideological influences might be unconscious and uncovering them is an aim that Critical Discourse Analysis shares with poststructuralist theory (cf. Derrida 1976). Awareness of ideological influence is obviously important in translation, where not only analysis but an actual translated work could suffer from its lack. Tourniaire (1999), for example, shows how an understanding of the censorship imposed in Greece in 1969 when the poems of Rhea Galanaki were written can have profound effects on the way the poems are understood and translated. Similar considerations are behind the use of annotations and footnotes giving historical and political background in translations such as Seidensticker's (1976) rendering of Murasaki Shikibu's 11th century Japanese novel *The Tale of Genji*. But there is a danger in such attempts to situate translations historically, sociologically or ideologically: annotations can "narrow the domestic audience to a cultural elite since footnotes are an academic convention" (Venuti 1998:22).

For Lefevere, writing in the 1980s, a time D'haen calls "very much the decade of discourse analysis" (1986:20), a broad sociolinguistic basis meant

that "linguistically inspired literary research" was now in a position to consider "the world view (or co-existing world views) of a given society at a given time" (1986:219), including ideologies, opinions of what was acceptable in literature and other types of writing, what made a text successful, and other views of literature and the world in general.

Such constraints, argues Lefevere, are not only present but are "actually enforced, or at least applied" (1986:219) by people and institutions within society which have the power to determine how texts are written or translated. For Lefevere, the constraints which apply to all texts include the world view of source-text and target-text communities and the constraints imposed by the different languages themselves. Sociolinguistic literary research might take Jakobson's example of a Russian child's incomprehension at finding death, feminine in Russian, portrayed as an old man in German tales (2000:117), and show not only how an audience's understanding of the translated text depends on overcoming such linguistic differences, but might in addition consider death as differing in social value depending upon whether it was sought, accepted, meted out or observed.

Sociological, historical or ideological circumstances include issues of gender and its effects on style. There have been a number of such studies, such as Mills (1995) and Threadgold (1988). Gender, like other sociological characteristics, might also affect translation strategy more deliberately: a feminist translator might for example intervene in the translation "on a political level" (von Flotow 1997:6).

These and other contextual aspects of style were relatively easily integrated into a stylistics increasingly concerned with its origins in the mind of the writer and its effects upon the mind of the reader. Thus the second limitation of early stylistics, (ii) – that it ignored psychology – ceased to be a problem once stylistics had started to take context, in the form of sociological and historical background, into account. Background is knowledge, so context in the sense of background is a psychological entity. Earlier theorists such as Richards (e.g. 1924:87ff.) had in fact emphasized the psychological aspects of literature, but at that time there was no real sense of the psychological nature of contexts. But Fowler, in particular, was concerned with how society, ideology and attitude contributed to what he called mind style: the "distinctive linguistic presentation of an individual mental self" (1977a:103), a notion which depends upon Halliday's "ideational function" (1971:332), through which a writer embodies in language her or his experience of the world. Though some writers (e.g. Weber 1996:4) have seen the development of stylistics into social and critical stylistics as a trend at odds with the development of cognitive stylistics, there is no real opposition, but merely a difference of emphasis, because the social and the psychological always interact. "Cognitive" can mean rather different things but in its broadest

sense it means having to do with knowledge and the mind, and to this extent, generative grammar, poststructuralism and sociolinguistic criticism all take more interest in the cognitive than structuralism did.

In the approach of Fowler, Semino (2002) and others who have used the notion of mind style, reading a literary text is seen as giving access, not just to whatever meaning is attachable to the linguistic structures, but also to a state of mind. This was a view suggested as early as 1962 by Ohmann, who had said "stylistic preferences reflect cognitive preferences" (1962:2), and it is inherent in all approaches which see pragmatics – those aspects of understanding language which go beyond the strictly linguistic – as "a capacity of the mind" (Carston 2002:4). Pragmatics of this persuasion could be called "cognitive pragmatics" (ibid.)

Tabakowska's 1993 book, entitled *Cognitive Linguistics and Poetics of Translation,* uses the term "cognitive" to mean something rather different from its use a decade earlier, as exemplified by Winograd in his *Language as a Cognitive Process* (1983). Winograd was speaking in particular of processes for producing and understanding language based on models from computer science, and it is on this basis that he decides "the cognitive approach" has not produced much of interest for poetic language or its "emotive dimension" (1983:29). Winograd's assumption appears to have been that knowledge structures were irrelevant to the processing of poetic and stylistic effects. And yet insights from computer science which help explain how we organize knowledge and create contexts have become commonplace, especially in discourse analysis, in talking about the way we understand texts, including literary ones; an example is Cook (1994). For Tabakowska (1993:4), the notion of "cognitive" is much broader than either Winograd's or Cook's view; her concern is with what we know, and how the study of what we know can help make clear the universal-individual distinction mentioned in the previous section. She expresses this in terms of an interaction of "sameness", arising from "the universal in human cognition" with the difference in the "infinite variety of products of cognition processes". It is at the point where sameness and difference interact that she locates both style and translation.

Cognitive stylistics, then, following the way in which linguists such as Fowler linked psychology and society, has made it possible to integrate aspects (i) and (ii) above with aspect (iii): the pragmatics of style. Theories of pragmatic inferencing, such as Sperber & Wilson's (1995) Relevance Theory, are dealt with in Chapter 2. What they share with cognitive theories based directly on cognitive linguistics, such as cognitive theories of metaphor and foregrounding, both considered in Chapter 4, is an emphasis on psychology and the view that meaning is not autonomous from thought but is constructed by human minds (cf. Ortony 1993:2). This implies an emphasis on the reader, point (iv) above. Relevance Theory can be seen to combine pragmatic and

cognitive aspects of style in a way which fills a number of the perceived gaps in formalist approaches. It has even been suggested, by Gutt (2000:1-23), that if one takes this cognitive pragmatic development as the basis for translation, then no independent translation studies is needed because all the facts fall out from the theory of relevance. That this cannot be so is shown by the rather cursory treatment of style in Gutt's book. A fuller treatment of style would in fact require a fuller treatment of cognitive and pragmatic issues, as Chapters 2 and 4 in particular attempt to show.

The notion which links pragmatic aspects of stylistics with the sociological and cognitive aspects, and with the reader's role, is "context". Context can be defined as the psychological and social circumstances under which language is used (Stockwell 2002a:60); pragmatics focuses on how we interpret utterances in context (cf. Blakemore 1987:30), and thus could be defined as "the study of meaning beyond that which is encoded in the linguistic structures themselves" (Watts 1991:26). If semantics is the study of truth conditions, then pragmatics is non-truth-conditional aspects of meaning, and covers those aspects which depend on the reader's inferences (as in relevance theory) as well as those which depend on the relationships between the text and its context, including its sociolinguistic and psychological content.

For Lecercle (1990), an important aspect of a pragmatic view of language is that it stresses the "remainder" (1990:6), the "linguistic equivalent of the Freudian unconscious" which is "not interested in rules" (Butler 1993:70). Lecercle sees both generative grammar and structuralism as incomplete because neither can deal with the remainder, especially as it is used in literary texts. Venuti has taken up Lecercle's notion of remainder, but confusingly says that views based on pragmatics are "diametrically opposed" (1998:21) to his own, a statement which can only be understood if one assumes Venuti is using "pragmatics" in a narrow sense, perhaps to refer exclusively to the now outdated work of Grice (1989).

Using an image from the sort of computer-science model of knowledge that Winograd rejected for poetics, Enkvist sees literary pragmatics as showing that "the interpretability of discourse depends on the receptor's ability under prevailing circumstances to build a scenario, a text world around the text, a world in which that text makes sense" (1991:11). Thus pragmatic approaches to literature invariably stress, according to Watts (1991:27) the open-endedness of the literary discourse and the plurality of readings it allows. It is this open-endedness which allows for a study of the reader's response, something which will be discussed in Chapter 2.

Pragmatics, with its emphasis on context, also touches on one of the central problems of translation: to what extent is the understanding of texts, especially literary texts, dependent upon a particular cultural background? An approach to style which focuses on its universal aspects will obviously

see fewer problems. For Watts, cultural references which are clearly incomprehensible to members of another culture are unproblematic, as they can be explained by "editorial notes" (1991:28). But we recall that Venuti (1998:22) pointed to the limiting effect of such notes. And cultural differences may be less obvious, and have to do with, for example, "cognitive orientation" towards literary texts in terms of what is perceived to be their place and value in a particular culture (Watts 1991:28).

Cognitive stylistics can be said in general to have brought together the pragmatic concern with what goes beyond a text's relation to an observable reality with a concern for context as a cognitive construct (cf. Semino 1997:9) which takes in the social and historical aspects of the production and understanding of texts. It is one of the assumptions made throughout this book that the study of translation will need to consider all these factors, and that a cognitive stylistic approach seems the one most likely to make this possible.

1.5 Relativity and thinking for translating

The cognitive, context-based view of style we have just considered allows translation studies to link universality (as discussed in section 1.3) with the individual choice in style which we shall consider further in Chapter 3.

If we go back for a minute, and retrace our steps in reverse through cognitive to sociological stylistics, to structuralist stylistics and the structuralist linguistics on which it was based, we can find there the origin of another strand of linguistic thought which developed the notion of the particular, as opposed to the universal, but which has followed a different path from the concern with individual stylistic choice. It will be mentioned here because of its relevance to translation, especially the translation of style, and because it is not mentioned much in most current works on translation. This is the strand of linguistics which sees language and thought as closely intertwined, so that "a style of speech is an hypothesis about how the world is" (Goodman 1971:171) or even, in its extreme form, so that language is seen to actually determine thought. This concern for the close link between language and thought is also seen in the anthropological structuralism of writers such as Levi-Strauss (1966), or the literary structuralism of Barthes (1977) or Culler (1975), and can be seen in part as a development of the philosophy of 19th century writers such as von Humboldt (e.g. extract in Mueller-Vollmer 1985).

When linguists and translation scholars consider the language-thought link, they usually think of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, based on the work of these two linguists (see Sapir 1949; Whorf 1956). Sapir and Whorf were concerned to classify the details of particular languages; the hypothesis is characterized succinctly by Crystal (1987:15) as consisting of both linguistic determinism (that language determines thought) and linguistic relativity

(each language encodes different distinctions). Examples for such linguistic relativity and the potential problems they cause for translation are given in Malmkjær (2005:42-43). But it must be remembered that both the deterministic and relativistic aspects of the hypothesis only cover part of Sapir's and Whorf's views. In common with von Humboldt they maintained that, while each language involved a unique way of seeing the world, some aspects of language were in fact universal; this interplay of universal and culture-specific has, as we have seen, been of particular concern to later writers as diverse as Jakobson, Catford, Fowler or Tabakowska.

The consequences for translation of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, according to Hyde (1993:67), are that, because it suggests that a text is intrinsically bound to be untranslatable, it emphasizes the source-target relationship and a view of the target text as inferior to the source text. However, says Hyde (1993:67), such a view fails to take into account the relationship between source language and source text (and between target language and target text) which were so important for Jakobson, especially in literary texts. It is Hyde's view – and here he is presumably drawing on the Russian Formalist notion of "making strange" – that literature is made up of devices which help circumvent the limitations of whatever particular way of seeing a language embodies, a notion similar to Lecercle's (1990) or Venuti's (1998) remainder. Hyde does not, then, deny that different languages embody different ways of thinking, but he sees this as, on the one hand, not a barrier to translation if pragmatic and contextual factors are taken into account and, on the other, not a problem for literature because literature by its very nature resists such limitation.

Throughout the recent decades of generative linguistics, with its emphasis on the universality of grammar, it has become common to dismiss the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis as leading to too great a relativity. For translation studies, it is easy to see why such a rejection might be welcome.

And yet, as Wierzbicka (1997:7) suggests, it is not clear why generative linguistics has rejected relativity and determinism so completely. Pinker (1994) rejects not only the strong version of Sapir-Whorf but also the weaker view that language and thought may affect one another in ways that distinguish different languages. She herself strongly supports the view that there is "a very close link between the life of a society and the lexicon of the language spoken by it" and goes on to show that the "old insight that the meanings of words from different languages don't match" is supported by empirical data. These differences "reflect and pass on" not only ways of living but "ways of thinking" (1997:4-5). Wierzbicka is perfectly clear about whether words merely reflect (relativity) or indeed shape (determinism) ways of thinking: that "and pass on" in the quotation above clearly shows that, in her view, they do both (cf. Steiner 1992:91). Arguing against Pinker, she

maintains that some areas of language "may be innate, [while] others may indeed be imposed by culture" (1997:6). Common elements include the distinction between *who* and *what*, and the lexical realization of concepts such as "big" and "small", as I mentioned in section 1.3. But she sees other concepts as peculiar to an individual language (*Bruderschaft* to German) or simply different in different languages": "the concept of 'anger' is no more universal than the Italian concept of 'rabbia' or the Russian concept of 'grev'" (1997:9, 26).

Wierzbicka's point here goes beyond merely arguing for a limited acceptance of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. She maintains that what people like Pinker end up doing is "'deifying' some words from their own native language and reifying the concepts encapsulated in them" (1997:9). She is thus arguing that a view in which there is no room for relativity is ethnocentric. It is an argument similar to Venuti's rejection of the universal as ethnocentric.

Interestingly, a number of other linguists have maintained that universality and relativity are not entirely opposed. Slobin (2003), for example, argues that there is an activity of "thinking for speaking", when "thinking takes on a particular quality, in that "one fits one's thoughts into available linguistic forms" (1987: 435); to take up Schopenhauer's notion, one "thinks differently in every language" (Robinson 2002:248). In other words, when getting ready to speak a particular language it is necessary to adopt (or one cannot help adopting) the mindset of that language. For translation, this suggests that, though individual languages may not represent an implacable, unique, untranslatable reality, they may nevertheless tend to relate to a particular mindset. For this reason Slobin (2003:164) posits a "thinking for translating". He mentions research by Ervin (1964:506), which suggests that bilingual speakers in general "reveal different 'personalities' in using each of their languages". It is a view in fact quite compatible with Schleiermacher's notion of the "spirit" of a particular language (Robinson 2002:208), or Ortega Y Gasset's "style" of a language (1992:96). In section 5.5 we will look at an example where the mind style in a text can be linked to an intrinsic feature of the language, and will consider the consequences this has for translation.

Both Hyde's observations and Slobin's have potentially profound consequences for translation. Hyde would see a mitigation of the effects of cultural relativism not in universality, but in the particular nature of literature which circumvents the potential hindrance of an indissoluble culture-language tie. And Slobin would want to mitigate against universalism not by dint of a fixed cultural relativism but because of a pragmatic, momentary, speech-situation relativism. Where both these views tend is towards seeing translation, especially of literature, and especially if it is a literary, estranging, foreignizing translation in Venuti's sense, as a way of both recognizing the culture-boundedness of language and also being free from it.

In particular, Slobin's "thinking for translating" could lead us to speculate that, just as we take on a particular thought mode when about to put thoughts into words, so we must do when reading a text with the specific intention of translating it. And, just as elements of "thinking for speaking" must be stored in the mind to be used whenever one speaks (Slobin 1996), so a translator might store knowledge of how to read for translation. There are no studies of such a phenomenon, though think-aloud protocols (TAPs; e.g. Tirkkonen-Condit 1991, Jääskeläinen 1996) may go some way to furnish data, so the idea of such a mode of thought remains purely speculative. There are many studies that suggest different modes of reading: literary reading (Miall & Kuiken 1998; van Peer 1995; Zwaan 1993) involves reading for style, suspending disbelief, or reading for maximum relevance (see Chapter 2), whereas these issues play less role in non-literary reading. So it seems reasonable to posit a type of reading especially adapted to translation; indeed, both de Beaugrande (1978:34) and Bell (1998:186) provide evidence for this view. Such "reading for translation" might involve critical, literary reading (if the text is literary) but also an awareness of how what is said in the source language could be said in the target language, and of the differences between the two, including the sort of stylistic differences documented so meticulously by Vinay & Darbelnet (1995).

"Thinking for speaking", "thinking for translating" and "reading for translating" thus all suggest that language influences thought at least momentarily. These notions also suggest that human minds are flexible enough to change mode and to see the world from different points of view, and also to know that others are doing so. And they appear to avoid both a narrow interpretation of Sapir-Whorf relativism and too great an emphasis on universalism.

If we were to project the notion of modified interlingual relativism on to the intralingual situation, the result would be to accept that different genres and text-types, while sharing universal features with other types of language, can be distinguished linguistically. This is in fact the common view of writers such as Reiß (1981). But we could also extend such intralingual variation to take in translation itself, seeing translated texts as embodying a separate language, a different kind of writing from untranslated texts, a "third code", in Frawley's (1984:257) words. It is a view that is backed up by the observations of critics: Bayley, for example, says of Cohn's Rilke (1992) that it invents a new language, "the language of 'Rilke-in-English'" (1992:18).

The poet Michael Hamburger has developed such a style in translation partly as a way of respecting the original, not using it "as a springboard" (Honig 1985:177) for his own work. So his English translations of Hölderlin use a peculiarly Hölderlin-influenced English: "Into water, the holy-and-sober" (1994:393).

It is often said of Pound that he wrote *Homage to Sextus Propertius* (see Pound 2003) "in a distinctive kind of 'translatorese'" (Hyde 1993:10). And indeed the very notion of translatorese or translationese suggests, usually in a pejorative sense, that translations have a language all of their own (Gellerstam 1986). There is empirical evidence for this in studies which have shown that translation tends to obey certain norms irrespective of those that might obtain in source language and target language: Ben-Ari (1998), for example, shows that repetition is avoided in the translation into French (Bianquis 1965) of Mann's Buddenbrooks (1985), even though it serves a distinct literary function. French textbooks on stylistics do indeed exhort the writer to avoid repetition, but then so do German ones, e.g. Reiners (1990). Ben-Ari concludes (1998:78) that "[a]voiding repetition is such a predominant norm that it seems to be found in all translated texts".

Seeing translation as a separate type of writing from non-translation can be dependent upon the translator's voice, which Schiavi (1966:3) argues is a composite of the source-text author's and the translator's own. This intuitive sense of translation as a distinctive text-type has been borne out by corpus studies such as Kenny (1998). Following Benjamin's view (see Venuti 2000:15-25), translation can be seen as an experimental literary practice, which enables a translated text to distance itself from the norms of both source language and target language, thus becoming an "independent form of writing" (Venuti 2000:215; see also Korsak 1992:ix).

In fact, Venuti's description of a translated text stylistically defamiliarized not by an author's personal style but by heterogeneity and marginal uses of language (1998:8ff.) is very close to Pilkington's description of the literary text itself as using "strange language, archaisms, 'phonetic roughening'" (2000:18). This suggests that a literary translation is, above all, consciously literary in that it is defamiliarized. Defamiliarization might thus serve not only to circumvent the differences between languages as Hyde (1993) suggested, but also to make literary translation more literary than non-translated literature.

In sum, then, we need to be aware that, though the consequences of linguistic and stylistic relativity could be that translation is impossible, most proponents of linguistic relativity such as Wierzbicka (1997) or Slobin (1996) are actually arguing for an interaction of universal and language-specific meanings in any particular language, a view we met in discussing Jakobson in 1.3. Intralingually, different registers and genres also exhibit such interaction. Translationese can be viewed positively as a way of doing justice to the notion of translation as a particular type of text, especially for literary, overt translation.

1.6 Translating literary and non-literary texts

Much of the study of style in texts just outlined in the previous sections of this chapter assumed almost as a matter of course that style meant literary style. Jakobson (e.g. 1978a) and Mukařovský (e.g. in Garvin 1964) set out the differences between literary and non-literary texts in terms of the function of language used but Fowler (1977a), Pratt (1977), and Short (1986), emphasizing literature's position as a type of social discourse, denied such differences.

Many recent writers on cognitive stylistics have suggested a way out of this apparent dilemma: literary texts must use the same linguistic devices as non-literary texts but they are read differently. This is the view of Fabb (1997:20), Stockwell (2002a), Cook (1994), Simpson (2004:39) and many others.

The distinction between literary and non-literary texts, however it is formulated, is crucial to translators and translation researchers for an understanding of the factors that influence translation. For literary texts, says Kohlmayer (1988:150), the translator cannot simply concentrate on the target language to the extent that functionalist theories such as Reiß & Vermeer (1984) suggest, because literary translations work by allowing readers to see the effects of the original, even if they do not experience them directly or in the same way. This must surely be true of literature in general: we do not, nowadays, throw down a Hardy novel in horror at the transgressing of convention, yet nevertheless we can see that contemporary audiences might have done so. This suggests that both translated literature and original literature do not depend for their effects wholly upon the expectations of a particular audience, and also that the contexts we create when reading are cognitive entities: they do not have to reflect our current situation or even what we have personally experienced.

As soon as the narrow formalist stylistic view of textual meaning, so deplored by Fowler, was expanded to take in the reader, and to consider pragmatic and cognitive elements, the question of the nature of literature again took on more importance, but as a way of reading rather than of writing. Sperber & Wilson (1995) and Zwaan (1993:123ff.) formulate the distinction in terms of whether a text is regarded as true in a truth-conditional sense (that is, in the sense that it can be measured against the world and found true or not) or as a fictional text. But even the notion of fiction is not straightforward. Sebald, for example, emphasizes the moral responsibilities of literature, which, especially when it is about catastrophic events, must avoid "aesthetic or pseudo-aesthetic effects", because its legitimacy comes from "the ideal of truth inherent in its entirely unpretentious objectivity" (in Bell's translation; Sebald 2003:53). Fiction, in this view, is true in so far as it

subscribes to an "ideal" of truth. So the reader of literature cannot be simply described as a reader who knows what s/he is reading is not true. The notion of truth is, however, important, because a reader's perception of lack of truth (in a truth-conditional sense) shifts the emphasis in reading from what the text is about to how it expresses itself: that is, to the style. A reader looks for meaning in style when fulfilment of truth-conditions is not the main focus of the text, because the text is perceived as literary. For Fodor (1983:44) literary reading reflects an intention on the part of the writer to have the text read thus; this is what Bakhtin (1986:92) refers to as "anticipatory dialogism".

Intuitively, besides the context of reading, there seems likely to be something in the text itself which signals to the reader that literary reading is required; that "distinctive kinds of mental representations and mental processes" (Pilkington 2000:2) were at work in its writing as they will need to be in its reading. Such clues (discussed further in the next chapter) help us read a literary text in such a way that it can change our "mental representations of the world" (Cook 1994:4). This mind-changing quality of literature possibly conveys an evolutionary advantage, according to Hernandi (2002) and Dawkins (1998:285). So we have to translate in a way which does justice to it (Boase-Beier 2004b).

However the style signals the specifically literary nature of a text, the distinction between literary and non-literary texts has consequences for the translator. These may vary from whether s/he will take on a particular commission, to whether a translation is evaluated as adequate, and even to the question of where postgraduate degrees in Translation Studies should be located in the structure of a particular university. For this book, one consequence of the question as to what constitutes a literary text is whether and to what extent the views of style here discussed can be applied to both literary and non-literary texts.

One way in which the difference between literary and non-literary translation can be seen is in terms of function. According to Nord (1997) it is possible to see literary translation as having a different skopos – or aim – from non-literary. This may take the form of an attempt to make the target text work as a literary text (what Nord calls "instrumental translation" 1997:5ff.), with the same openness as had the source text to various interactions and interpretations by the reader. Secondly, it is possible to say, as Gutt does (2000:130), that a literary translation has a closer link to the source text than non-literary, in that it preserves the style and not just the message; in this sense, a literary translation is "documentary" (Nord 1997:138): it documents the source text.

Thirdly, it is possible to view literary and non-literary translation as different types of communication. If poetic communication is different from non-poetic, as Pilkington (2000:10) maintains, then its translation must also

represent a type of communication different from that represented by a non-literary translation, irrespective of the relationship between source text and target text. And in fact, one way of avoiding the apparent conflict as to whether literary translation is documentary or instrumental (in Nord's terms) is to say that it achieves its instrumentality by virtue of being documentary. That is, literary translation works not merely as a literary text, but as a special type of literary text, one whose relation to a source text plays a role in its interpretation. Such a view is backed up by the studies mentioned in the previous section which point to specific features of translated literature (like Hamburger's Hölderlinian English) which distinguish it both from non-translated literature and from translated non-literary texts. A literary translation is both literary *and* a translation, often overtly so. In non-literary translation, the target text may be only covertly a translation (in the sense described by House 1981), and therefore not read as such. Taking all these factors into account, there are four possible ways in which a translated text might be read:

i) as a literary text, overtly a translation
ii) as a literary text, but a covert translation
iii) as a non-literary text, overtly a translation
iv) as a non-literary text, covertly a translation

An example of (i) would be the translation of poems by Elsworth from the Danish poet Michael Strunge (Elsworth 2000), presented in a bilingual edition, with a translator's preface and occasional footnotes, which appeared in a series of translated poetry books. An example of (ii) would be a popular children's book such as Johanna Spyri's *Heidi* (1880; here 1986) or the Bible, usually not viewed as a translation. Korsak's (1992) translation of Genesis, however, would belong to category (i), because it consciously and overtly echoes the Hebrew original.

An example of a non-literary text which is to be read as a translation, (iii) above, would be a translation of a philosophical work which aimed to show as clearly as possible, by means of footnotes and words from the source text in brackets in the text, what the original said, or a literal version of a foreign advertisement, produced for internal use in an advertising company, and designed to show how the original achieved its effects.

And (iv) would include most examples of non-literary translation, where, as Gutt (2000:57) points out, the fact that the text was originally in another language is of no relevance. A tourist brochure for Rome translated into English or instructions for a laptop from China might be examples. The fact that it is covert does not of course mean that the reader cannot recognize it as a translation, but only that its relation to an original text is unimportant; it could simply have been written by someone whose native language is not

the target language.

These categories are not absolute. Many texts, such as philosophical texts, might be in any of the four categories, depending on the translator's aim and how the target text is marketed and regarded by the receiving culture. It should also have become clear that, though most translations will fall roughly within category (i) or category (iv), there will still be a large number in the other two categories.

Reading a text as non-literary does not mean that it can be seen as an unbiased statement of fact and reading it as a covert translation (i.e., not as a translation) does not mean that the world view of the author of the original has no relevance. However, at the opposite end of the scale, to read a text as both literary and overtly a translation does mean that the style could be expected to reflect the views and ideology of both author and translator to quite a high degree. When I speak of literary translation in the course of this book I will generally be referring to overt literary translation, unless otherwise noted. Similarly, most examples of non-literary translation will be assumed to be (relatively) covert.

Much of the work of stylistic analysis will involve explaining how texts have the effects they have (on the analyst in question or on others) and why they are understood in the way they are, by uncovering views, stances and states of mind not immediately obvious without such analysis. This applies to both literary and non-literary texts, and is helpful to the translator in both cases. Just as a reader can be stylistically aware in order both to be open to the full effects of a text, and less vulnerable to being unwittingly manipulated, so a translator who is stylistically aware is likely to be able more fully to appreciate both stylistic effects and the state of mind or view that informs them. Studying style to ascertain such a state of mind is often of particular importance in non-literary texts such as the news, where it is easy, otherwise, to take as fact what is inevitably opinion. And there may be elements of an author's choices, personality, mind style, in a scientific text.

For the author of a non-literary text, for example an academic text such as this book, being open about one's own position can be helpful in avoiding the suggestion that one is pretending to put across unadulterated facts. So let me state clearly my own position as regards the distinction between literary and non-literary translation, as it affects decisions taken by the translator.

I am assuming throughout this book that there is a difference in the way we as readers, and therefore as translators, approach texts to be translated depending on whether we regard them as literary or not. We will be given a certain amount of context before beginning a translation, for example being told that the work in question is a novel, or an autobiography, or judging it to be such. Similarly, discussions of translated texts will generally provide enough context for the reader to judge whether the texts discussed are being

seen as literary or not. The role of style in this distinction is that it marks out a text as a poem, a piece of literary prose, a drama, and therefore, in all these cases, a fictional text. This has consequences for the way the translation is done and what we can say about it. The style of a text, then, is one source of evidence for the type of text it is.

In addition, the style of a literary text involves the use of such figures as metaphor, ambiguity, and repeated patterns. These figures may be present in any type of text but they will often be less frequent, less complex and less subtle in non-literary texts. Such figures or devices will interact with other principles governing the form of certain texts: repetition will have a more obvious link to position in a text such as a poem which is written in lines. The translation of such devices will generally demand greater care in a literary text than in a non-literary text. Furthermore, style in literary texts produces poetic effects of the type to be discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4, which involve the reader in a great deal of mental work but also provide for the experiencing of emotions, affective states or other emotional and cognitive effects, which vary from reader to reader. One of the reasons for attempting to capture the style of any text, but especially of a literary text, is to provide the possibility for such effects upon the reader of the translated text. A non-literary text is not, in the first instance, usually assumed to be fictional. So, too, a translated non-literary text will usually be assumed in a very basic sense to be true. This does not seem to be the view put forward in Gutt (2000); he says that a non-literary translation merely resembles another text, just like a literary one does, and so its author (the translator) does not vouch for its truth. But there is a difference between relocating a novel set in Berlin to Birmingham and translating statements about traffic in Berlin as though they applied to traffic in Birmingham.

But these also are not absolutes. Fictional texts, especially memoirs, literary biography or verbatim theatre will have elements of non-fictionality. This is a question I shall not address in detail in this book, but in fact there seems much potential for research on the effects of degrees of perceived fictionality upon the processes of translation.

2. Theories of Reading and Relevance

2.1 Reading, style and the inferred author

As we saw in the previous chapter, studies of style in translation have looked at the role of style in the source text, the recreation of style in the target text, and, to a lesser extent, the analysis of target-text style. The latter aspect will be taken up in section 3 of this chapter and section 3 of the next chapter. The first two aspects are of most direct relevance to the process of translating, and I will focus mainly on these because I want to emphasize (and illustrate in Chapter 5) that a translator's knowledge of analytical and theoretical work on translation can affect translation practice.

Cluysenaar, one of the few writers on stylistics besides Freeborn (1996) to consider translation, maintains it "must, to be faithful in any worthwhile way, work on the basis of a prior stylistic analysis" (1976:41). However, reading the style of the source text and recreating it in the target text are not two entirely separate things. Scott (2000), for example, feels that acts of reading and recreation are not temporally sequenced and wants to avoid any suggestion that reading produces a definitive, single interpretation, which could then in a subsequent stage be subjected to an act of translation. Reading, for Scott, is something much more dynamic, "the process of activating the text" (2000:183-84). Not all translation scholars would avoid the notion of temporal sequencing; Diaz-Diocaretz, using a model of language in which meanings are encoded in the source text, sees the "decoding" or reading process and the "encoding" or translation process as "stages performed in a consecutive order" (1985:21), whose distinction from one another is essential. This seems to be the view inherent also in Barnstone's description of translating poetry in "two distinct stages" (1993:49), in Wilss' description of a two-stage process (1996:123), and in Bassnett & Lefevere's pronouncement that, in the translation of poetry "the first stage is intelligent reading of the source text" (1998:60). All these views support Cluysenaar's notion of "prior stylistic analysis". But translators themselves often seem to agree with Scott in not separating the process of reading from that of translating. For example, Jones, in his 'Process Model of Poetic Translation', says that the stages he describes are to be seen as "helical rather than unilinear" (1989:188), and Trask maintains that he does not read a book completely before starting to translate it; translation is "in what happens while you do it" (in Honig 1985:14; see also Paz in Honig 1985:162). It is thus possible that many translation scholars are simply idealizing when separating reading and translation into two sequentially ordered tasks, and do not mean this ordering to reflect actual procedure; indeed, in Reiß (1981:123-24) this point is made explicit.

Scott's second point – that there is not "an interpretation" hidden in the text which the translator can get at by reading – is addressed by many recent stylistic and critical approaches, and in this we can see a major difference between these current theories and earlier ones. Recent stylistics (e.g. Stockwell 2002a) has to some extent followed the deconstructionist views of critics like de Man (1983) in questioning the clear relationship of forms to meanings. Current views recognize that Jakobson and early structuralist stylisticians as well as many early generative stylisticians had an overly formal approach based on a view of texts, and especially the details of their style, as encoding a message, which could be decoded and (in translation) re-encoded (see e.g. Fairley 1975). One major change resulting from the perceived inadequacy of the code model has been the increasing contextualization of stylistics, which views as less straightforward the link between the world, the text, and the minds of those involved in its creation and reading. According to Weber the view that "that there is no direct mapping between words and the world" (2005:45) is the basic premise of cognitive linguistics. Indeed, there cannot be a direct mapping if one accepts Sperber & Wilson's (1995:226) view that utterances do not directly encode but merely resemble thoughts. Because no such direct mapping exists, cognitive poetics involves thinking "about what we are doing when we read" (Stockwell 2002a:2). In terms of Wales' definition of style as the perceived distinctive manner of expression (2001:371), given at the start of this book, we need, then, to focus on the word "perceived". It is the reader's perception of style which matters. If this is so, then what both cognitive stylistics (or poetics, and its bordering discipline of cognitive linguistics) must be telling us about finding meaning in a text has at least these two aspects:

i) meaning is not encoded in the text so it cannot be decoded but is constructed according to the cognitive context of the person reading, and while the context may contain shared, communal elements, there will also be individual ones; and further
ii) the relationship between whatever meaning is constructed and the outside world is not, especially in literary texts, such that we can expect to measure the information gained from the text against the world and declare it true or false.

What these insights mean for the translation of style is to suggest that the process of reading a source text is not something which involves analysing all details of content and style until a meaning is got at and then stopped, and the (uncontroversial) meaning transferred through translation into another language (or medium, if it is intralingual translation). On the contrary, if reading is a dynamic, active, participatory, open-ended process, where a text

has to "mean whatever it can – to any reader" (Hughes 1994:261), then reading is unlikely, in translation practice, to be clearly separated from the act of recreation in another language.

Views of the nature and importance of reading vary greatly, however, in the degree of open-endedness they envisage, and the role they assign to stylistic features of the text. Put simply, the question for translation is this: if meaning cannot simply be read off from the source text ((i) above) and measured against the real world ((ii) above), how does the translator find it? Whatever answers we give to this question will apply equally to the readers of the target text. The answer a formalist critic such as Jakobson would have given would have been that, for any text, meaning was put there by the author (cf. Hirsch 1967; Dowling 1999:x), whose intention drove a set of linguistic choices. These choices, which constituted the style, could be uncovered in the text by the reader. Through close stylistic analysis of the text, such as was also favoured by English close-reading critics like Richards (e.g. 1924) or American New Critics such as Wimsatt (1954a), the reader could then decode the meaning which in every sense preceded the text. Dowling's parallel is the Rosetta Stone, which, he says, had meaning before it was decoded (1999:16). The comfortable notion that meaning was put into a text by its author, to be decoded and re-encoded by the translator, makes the job of a translator, if not straightforward, at least clearly defined.

But though the New Critics shared with the formalist critics the view that meaning resides in the text, they did not necessarily equate it with the meaning intended by the author. Beardsley (1982:189), for example, states explicitly that knowledge of an author's intentions will not help the reader or critic to interpret a text; the belief that it will is the "intentional fallacy" (Wimsatt 1954b). It is not what the author intended, but what a text actually says, that makes interpretation possible. The author's choices which underlie style thus become less important: the translator must pay close attention to the style itself and it will reveal the meaning to be transferred into the target language.

A writer like Fish to some extent opposes both these views: it is the reader who creates the interpretation; however, the reader always tries "to discern and therefore to realize …. an author's intention" (1980:161). But "intention" is here not to be understood in a narrow sense; it is simply a recognition that readers "are dealing with intentional beings" (ibid.) when they read a text. This does not, in Fish's view, lead to a notion of concreteness or stability of meaning; but there is a "community" (ibid.) of readers who will agree to some extent. This suggests that a translator must be aware of such commonality of interpretation, a view endorsed by Snell-Hornby, who emphasizes the role of "group convention" (1995:24), particularly in specialized texts.

Most recent work both in stylistics and the translation of style has turned its focus away from the question as to who creates textual meaning to what sort of assumptions author and reader make. We may, as readers or listeners, not be able to access the intention of a writer or speaker, but we may assume that we can, while still being aware that we are merely making an assumption. Knowing the author's intention thus becomes what Lecercle calls a "necessary illusion" (1990:127). This appears, according to Gutt (2005:33), to be true of any "higher order" act of communication, that is, communication about some other communication. Gutt is arguing in his 2005 article (as he did in his 1991 book; here 2000), that translation is such a higher order act of communication. However, one could argue that all literary communication is like this: all writers pretend, all readers pretend. This notion of assumption or pretence forms the very basis of cognitive stylistic approaches. Verdonk, in his survey of stylistics (2002:9) says that effects produced by the stylistic features of texts "depend on the reader assuming that those features are a matter of motivated choice on the part of the writer". The most important words here for a structuralist would have been "motivated choice on the part of the writer". For a cognitive stylistician, however, the important words are "depend on the reader assuming". If, in stylistics and translation, we focus on the assumptions made by readers, we can consider both what guides these assumptions (stylistic features, knowledge of literary conventions, knowledge of the world, etc.) and also what the reader does with the assumptions, whether it is to read a text in a particular way, to relate textual elements to the world, to judge the text a poem, a scientific article, or a translation, or to translate it in a particular way.

The current focus in stylistics, and especially cognitive stylistics, on the reader and the reader's assumptions makes it possible to avoid the "intentional fallacy". Yet it is important to be aware that (notwithstanding Crane & Richardson 1999:124) Wimsatt was not arguing against the *existence* of intentions, either in his earlier or his later work, but merely against the possibility of the reader knowing them. This does not prevent us from ascribing them; Carston (2002:43) states that we do this in all our dealings with others. And with good reason. If, as archaeology suggests (Mithen 2003:183ff.), it was the coming together of intention and communication in our history that made art possible, then to deny intention would be to interpret artistic signs as being on a level with natural ones or traces left by animals. This cannot be how a translator views a source text. The sense of the intention behind a text, though, may be vague, and, if it is a literary text, will by definition be open-ended. For a literary source text we may want to frame that intention as being to create a text which does what literature does – to secure the reader's engagement with it – rather than as something personal and more specific. Such a realization is both useful to the translator and liberating, even if it

does render problematical a translators' code of conduct which says that translators should ensure "fidelity of meaning and register" (ITI Code of Professional Conduct).

In the rest of this section I will look at some of the ways in which both the study of style and the study of translation have taken the reader's position into account. In the next section (2.2), I will turn my attention to Relevance Theory as a cognitive pragmatic theory of communication which focuses on the reader and what the text tells the reader, and is thus potentially of much interest, directly or indirectly, to the study of style and translation. Then, in section 2.3, I will consider the work done so far in the actual application of Relevance Theory and other reader-centred views to translation, in so far as they are related to style, concentrating mainly on what such approaches tell us about the translator's relationship with the source text, and how a similar relationship between the reader of the target text and that text itself can be made possible.

Diaz-Diocaretz, in the book mentioned above, bases her approach to translating on a combination of a Jakobsonian communication model with aspects of Reader-Response Theory. Translation consists of decoding and encoding, performed consecutively (1985:21), and the reader of the translated text is an "omniscient reader", a figure who has knowledge of cultural, linguistic, historical, "textual and extratextual" elements of the text's background (1985:26, 16). This reader is a figure drawn partly from other writers such as de Beaugrande (1978), Eco's (1981) "model reader", Riffaterre's "superreader" (1970:204), and Fish's (1980) "informed reader" (see Diaz-Diocaretz 1985:15-33). Though the omniscient reader's initial act of decoding (cf. Nida 1964:146) does not necessarily entail that there is a single valid interpretation, it certainly suggests it: Diaz-Diocaretz speaks of a "pre-existent message", of "true meaning" (1985:2, 50) and this in turn suggests that "the meaning of a text is the author's meaning " (Hirsch 1967:25). Such pre-existent messages are reached by the making of "probability judgements" (Hirsch 1967:207), which ultimately are right or wrong. An approach to translation which follows this view would also see the translation as right or wrong, according to how close it has got to recreating the author's meaning. Translation can thus be "aberrant" (Diaz-Diocaretz 1985:3) or "diverge from the author's intention" (Snell-Hornby 1995:81) in this view, or "construe meanings that are different" from that of the source-text author (Wilss 1996:25).

A strong view of meaning as the author's suggests the simplest view of translation: meaning is discoverable by close analysis of the style and content of the text, and all three are transferable into another language. But this view is also the least fruitful, as it denies the translator, as reader, much involvement in the process. It appears to be the view which tacitly lies behind

much marketing, reviewing and criticism of translation; a statement such as the following is typical: "With searing prose, Courtemanche delivers a profound exploration of life's fragile foundations (Good Book Guide 2004:7). Courtemanche is the author of the source text, the searing prose that of the translator, Patricia Claxton.

According to such views, then, interpretation can be right or wrong, measured by how closely it matches the writer's intentions, which it is the translator's job, partly by stylistic analysis, to establish and recreate. However, even close attention to stylistic nuances of the source text will not allow meaning to be read "straight off from form" (Montgomery *et al* 2000:292); what guides interpretation are "weakly implied meanings" which "may or may not be intended by the author" (2000:292). These are open-ended, tend to be implied by stylistic nuances of the text, and embody the facility of texts to involve the reader (cf. Brooks & Warren 1960:xiii). For example, in a headline such as "Mikrowelle gegen Alzheimer" (microwaves against Alzheimer's; *Stern* 6.1.06), the primary meaning of the words is lexicalized but the connotations of the phrase as a whole – what is weakly implied – will vary from reader to reader. The phrase can suggest a cure as in "Kortison gegen Gelenkentzündung" (cortisone for inflamed joints) or a weapon against an enemy which cannot be defeated but only held back, as in "Mütter gegen Atomkraft" (the group "Mothers Against Nuclear Power"). These meanings, one could argue, are both weakly implied but the meaning the reader assigns will depend on her or his background knowledge of the illness and its treatments, acceptance of ambiguity, and so on.

Weakly implied meanings are similar to the meanings Dowling (1999: xii), following Katz (1990), calls "second-order", as distinct from primary meanings determined by the lexicon or syntax. Second-order implied meanings arise out of collocations, and various elements of style, and are the point of greatest interaction of the reader (and, in our case, the translator), with the text, because they allow for her or his personal interpretation. Lecercle links such interpretive activity with Benjamin's view of translation as "an increase in meaning" (Benjamin 1992; Lecercle 1990:20), a view which for Benjamin had religious overtones. For Benjamin, however, the interest lay less in finding such further meaning than in striving for it. This is something I shall take up again in Chapter 4.

So how do such weakly implied meanings engage the translator as reader? Even Scott, though keen to resist the notion of determinate meanings, presumably recognizes some sort of fixed meanings which are assigned to words such as "douleur" in the Baudelaire poem 'Receuillement' (2000:185ff.). He assumes there is a sense in which the fact that it means "sorrow" or something like that is not an issue. And though the choice of the English word may depend upon a complex "fidelity to the text as a choreography of effects"

(ibid.) including its various acoustic effects, this complex of stylistic factors does not change the basic meaning of the French word "douleur". In this sense there is no radical (practical) difference here from the view of critics such as Dowling, who speak of a move from a more linguistically-based reading to a more personal one which must, however, follow a correct first-order reading (1999: 14-15; cf. Appiah 2000:423, 426). (Ideologically, there is a difference, because a deconstructionist view such as Scott's might question exactly such basic, apparently unequivocal meanings; see e.g. Miller 1991).

The view that there are two levels of meaning splits the task of the translator effectively into two: there is the discovery of determinate meaning, embedded in the linguistics of the text, which demands background cultural and linguistic knowledge of the source language, probably augmented by the use of a dictionary or other tools, and there is the necessary sensitivity to the "weakly implied" or "second-order" meanings, to be found mainly in the style. Perception of these weakly implied meanings, including their effects upon the reader, can hardly be separated from the act of recreation, and it is in the realm of such meanings that much of what stylistics has to say is of special relevance for translation.

Weakly implied meanings firmly place the burden of meaning-making on the reader or translator. But how do we judge the meanings thus made? For Lecercle (1990), interpretations of a text cannot be true, but only "just", in that they make sense: to interpret the German headline given above as though it meant that people with Alzheimer's were to be given microwave ovens to cook their food would presumably not be just, nor would the interpretation of "douleur" in the Baudelaire poem to mean joy. Such meanings would simply be false, but false meanings would also include interpretations which claim to have found the author's intention (1990:33). This is because interpretation, for Lecercle, following Freud (1953-66), is construction and intervention, an idea at the centre of all approaches which focus on the reader, and which is often seen to apply not only to weakly implied meanings but also to those aspects of meaning which the linguistic detail of the text might seem to determine; even these are not "innocent" (Engler 1990:16).

Whether or not the distinction between these two levels of meaning is maintained, there are varying degrees to which the reader is seen as free. Scott's view, as we have seen, is a radical one. Views based on Reader-Response Theory, such as Iser (1974), by contrast, tend to be more conservative. Iser's work, like Ingarden's (e.g. 1973) owes much to the phenomenology of Husserl, to Schleiermacher's view of textual gaps (Schleiermacher 1977) and to the hermeneutics of Gadamer (e.g. 1988; see Iser 2006:15, 28). All have in common that, like the Freudian view of interpretation just mentioned, reading is seen as a constructive activity (Scholes 1989:49) rather

than reconstructive, but is nevertheless an activity closely tied to the text, which has points at which the reader can "climb aboard". This property of texts is called by Iser its "virtuality" and it is this which "gives rise to its dynamic nature" (1974:275, 277). There is no meaning without the reader (1979:19), and for Diaz-Diocaretz this means that a translator is a "co-producer" (1985:1) of the target text, and in this her book partially anticipates cognitive stylistic approaches to text and translation, where the active translator is seen as constructing something which might reasonably be the author's intention, while fully aware that this is a construct.

One way that critics and writers on translation have explained the apparent conflict between the author's textual choices and the reader's freedom is to postulate an author who is not the real author; this is Booth's "implied author" (1961), a notion which suggests a figure who can be reconstructed by close examination of the text (cf. also Montgomery *et al* 2000:285), an approach taken up by Schiavi who sees the translator as reconstructing the implied author in accordance with norms that apply in the target language through "re-processing and negotiation" of the norms that governed the production of the source text (1996:17). A more reader-centred view might speak here of an "inferred author" (Boase-Beier 2004a:279; see also Chatman 1990:74), a figure constructed (rather than reconstructed) by the reader, but with direct reference to the style of the text, especially using such notions as mind style and cognitive state, which will be examined in Chapter 4.

In translation it makes sense to speak of an inferred author. If there is a point in translating, it must be to communicate a source text, in the broadest sense, in another language and situation. Translators thus, as I have said elsewhere (Boase-Beier 2004a:279), have no choice but to make such assumptions or inferences about what the author meant, if translation is to be possible. Though there is a sense in which, especially for a critically sophisticated reader, it does not "matter who is speaking" (Foucault 1988: 197), it does matter if the reader is also a translator, because who is speaking will influence both initial decisions to translate and, in the act of translation, decisions on how to treat the style of the text.

The translator is not simply free to construct the author as s/he wishes, because the presence of the source text imposes constraints. If reading, to take up Engler's notion (1990:161), is not innocent, neither is the text; the reader is "positioned" by it (Montgomery *et al* 2000:271ff.), though such positioning leaves the reader some freedom; s/he "is not passively shaped" (Turner 1990:16). Both Montgomery *et al* 2000:271) and Iser (1979:34) speak of an "implied reader" who is the person the text is aimed at.

This shaping or positioning of the reader can be done by direct address, by implied assumptions about the addressee, by clues to the attitude of speaker to addressee given by the style. Sometimes, the address may be direct: "Go

back to the beginning and read it again for yourself", a genially hectoring Stockwell (2002b:76) tells us, thus placing us as readers in a position of either subservience or determined resistance. Literary texts are not often quite so direct, but a novel might start "People think …" (Myerson 2003:1), suggesting that you, the reader, are to be told something different. Or the reader may be invited into interaction with a question: *A Tolerant Country*? (Holmes 1991) suggests that the reader must give an answer, at least once the book has been read. But the positioning of the reader might be more direct, even in a literary text. The opening lines of the poem 'Email' by Julia Darling (2004:16) read "How are you? I had a test, but they couldn't find the vein / How's your pain?", so the reader assumes the position of the email addressee, someone who is also ill and suffering the same sort of situation as the speaker.

In this sense, the text manipulates its reader. We may read in such a way as to take up the position implied by the "dominant reading" (usually the "you" addressed directly in a text), but we can also resist, by consciously taking a different position (Montgomery *et al* 2000:279). We might refuse, when reading the Darling poem above, to take the position of a fellow-sufferer, and read the poem determinedly as addressed to someone else. Similarly, we can produce stylistically resistant translation, "weakening or heightening a particular style" (Diaz-Diocaretz 1985:27). For example, Steiner's phrase "there is a strain of femininity in the great interpreter, a submission … to the creative presence" (1992:27) suggests a particular view of the world which a translator might well want to resist, while feeling that there is nevertheless something of value being said which makes the text as a whole worth translating. A translation might say something like "there is a strain of submission in the great interpreter", thus leaving out Steiner's peculiar gender bias (see also Chamberlain 2000 on this).

In a general sense, then, a focus on the reader presupposes responses to the stylistic detail of a text, but responses which take into account the reader's own particular context (Iser 1974:213). In the interaction between the text and the mind of the reader, the latter's picture of the world is "continually modified" (Iser 1974:215), a view also held by Richards (1970:47), which has much in common with Piagetian genetic epistemology (Piaget 1968), and which will also be encountered again in Relevance Theory in the next two sections.

2.2 Implication, relevance and minimax

From what has been discussed in the previous section, we can conclude that any view of translation based on Reader-Response Theory, whether viewing textual meaning as more or less open-ended, and author's meaning as more or less inaccessible, will see the translator as a reader, constrained by the

text, actively participating in the construction of meaning. Thus the meanings in a translated text are initially the translator's, though they will be replaced, later, by the constructed meaning of the target text. So a reader-centred theory, by placing the onus of creating meaning on the translator in her or his relation to the source text, also to some extent takes away that responsibility as soon as the target text has been created.

As we saw above, an important aspect in Reader-Response Theory and most reader-orientated theories is the notion that there are aspects of meaning which are weakly implied, usually by the style of the text. This notion is also of central importance in Relevance Theory. The basic premise of Relevance Theory is that a code model of linguistic communication – in which a coded message is decoded by a hearer or reader to get at meaning – is incomplete, because it "disregards … inference" (MacKenzie 2002:16). In fact it does not entirely disregard inference, as Diaz-Diocaretz' (1985) focus on the reader shows. But the notion of inference is not central. In a view in which inference is central, the semantics of languages, just as for Katz (1990) and Dowling (1999), will still encode those aspects of meaning which the linguistics determines. These are explicatures (Blakemore 2002:74). But meaning in its entirety is by nature underdetermined by semantics, and it is pragmatics, rather than semantics, which helps interpret whatever the explicatures do not say. Such further interpretation is by inference rather than decoding, and depends upon implicatures. There is an important difference between implications and implicatures. Implication is in the text, but an implicature is attributed to a speaker: it is taken to involve an intention to suggest something. Relevance Theory thus takes for granted that we assume there is a speaker who has intentions. Montgomery *et al*'s "weakly implied" meanings (2000) become, in Relevance Theory, weakly implicated meanings. Style is particularly important because it tends to carry the attitude of the speaker to what is said (Boase-Beier 2004b), and allow other implicatures which enable pragmatic inferences about situation, mental state and so on, to be made. Especially literary texts would be expected to carry a large number of such weak implicatures. But this is also true to some extent of non-literary texts. So, for example, a *New Scientist* article "Going, going, gone" (26 November 2005), about the disappearance of native grasses as a result of the overuse of artificial fertilizers, does not specify an agent in its title, but it might be argued that there is an implicature that someone is, in effect, playing the role of auctioneer and a further one to the effect that the motivation behind the use of artificial fertilizers is financial gain.

The text will thus, while leaving the translator free to construct weakly implied meanings according to her or his own pragmatic context, nevertheless exert some sort of cognitive manipulation. However much a translator might want to resist a particular view, once it has been read it has become

part of her or his cognitive makeup. So a translator of the *New Scientist* text into another language might find it difficult to resist using verbs which suggest the act of auctioning off the countryside, even though these are not used in the original.

But much of the work done in Relevance Theory and other cognitive pragmatic views of translation sees the forces exerted by the text in less negative terms than are suggested by talking of manipulation. Gutt (2000: 101ff.), for example, speaks of "communicative clues", that is, clues to the communicative intention (see Hatim 2001:102ff.) of the speaker, provided by stylistic features. Such clues might also indicate text-type (Furniss & Bath 1996:13; Reiß & Vermeer 1984:177) or the cognitive state embodied in the text (Boase-Beier 2003a).

These clues lie in the style because style is how rather than what is said (Wales 2001:371) and all theories of (literary) meaning agree that "linguistic signs never coincide with intended or interpreted meanings" (MacKenzie 2002:196). But here we come up against the notion of "intention" again. Who is the agent of "intended" in the statement quoted above? The Relevance Theory answer is that the gap between the actual utterances in a text and the thought behind it "is filled by the hearer's inferential recognition of speaker's intention, guided by contextual clues" (MacKenzie 2002:16). In this sense the intended and interpreted meanings are the same. This notion of speaker's intention does not need to be "predicated on an unchanging authorial intent" (MacKenzie 2002:45), because the author is inferred by the reader to fit the latter's own context. MacKenzie points to the affinities between this view and Schleiermacher's notion of the translator's reconstruction of authorial intention (2002:45). In Carston's view, such pragmatic inferencing is a direct result of the speaker's or writer's decision to leave the text open to inferences (2002:117). Hatim (2001:104) stresses how important it is that this typical quality of literary texts should be preserved in literary translation. The notion of inferencing accords well with the translator's sense that what a translation produces is a text which fuses the original author with the author of the translation, a sense expressed by Scott when he wonders what "Baudelaire sounds like in my voice" (2000:1).

If meanings are thus open, then to some extent every reading is potentially a misreading (see de Man 1983; Eco 1994; Bloom 1975). But this is not a particular problem for Relevance Theory as it has no reason to distinguish between readings and misreadings. For translation, a Relevance-Theory view will not need to distinguish between correct and incorrect translations, and it will not need to spend time deciding what is meant by equivalence: equivalence is what the translator thinks it is. Critics of the translation may argue about an equivalent translation but the fact is that what the translator has written in place of the original text must be, in his/her view, equivalent to

it, or be considered likely to be accepted as equivalent (cf. Toury 1995:61).

The signifiers on the page are merely a "starting point" (MacKenzie 2002:5) and the meanings that readers construct will differ not only from reader to reader but from situation to situation. So "reading for translation", as discussed in 1.5, may mean reading with a different sort of awareness from that needed in other sorts of reading and constructing different meanings.

Some work linking Relevance Theory with translation (such as Fawcett 1997:135ff.) has, in my view mistakenly, focussed on the concept of relevance itself. This concept was first put forward by Sperber & Wilson in 1986 (here 1995:158) in their book *Relevance*. Communication, for Sperber & Wilson, presupposed optimal relevance, that is, that an utterance is relevant enough to the addressee to be worth processing and that what is said is the most relevant way of saying it.

This "minimax" principle (cf. Carroll & Tanenhaus 1975:51; Boase-Beier 2004a:277) is not just a principle for understanding interesting utterances, nor for understanding in general, but characterizes how we live and function. It is used, for example, by Lyall Watson to explain animal behaviour: "[a]nimals are systems which struggle to find a balance between energy output and input" (1995:47-48). From this basic assumption of minimax Watson concludes that what appear to be acts of altruism or perhaps the opposite, malevolence, in animals are the result of choosing "the course of action which produces the target net benefit" (ibid). For Sperber & Wilson, too, relevance is a general cognitive principle (1995:260-1). But if this seems too utilitarian a view to be of much use in understanding literary communication, even if it makes sense for, say, advertising or the speeches of politicians, it should be remembered that, as MacKenzie (2002:31) points out, the second edition (1995) of Sperber & Wilson's book focuses more on the "maxi-mization of relevance". This 'maxmax' principle is more important for both literary texts and translation (of any type of text) than optimal relevance. Optimal relevance is simply a given of communication, "a process that is automatically triggered by every utterance" (Smith & Wilson 1992:7). But maximum relevance is something we cognitively strive for by seeking contexts in which it can be achieved (MacKenzie 2002:31; Trotter 1992:11). Maximum relevance involves getting the greatest possible effects from what is heard or read. Such "particular stylistic effects" (Pilkington 1996:158) might be achieved by the author (or translator) of a text "by creating special kinds of processing difficulties for the addressee" (ibid). In focusing on the difficulties a text may pose to a reader, Pilkington is here echoing the work both of Benjamin (e.g. 1992), who, as we saw in the previous section, said that literary understanding focussed on the search, and structuralists such as Riffaterre, who argues that certain points in a text, and especially a poem, serve as focal points for converging stylistic patterns; difficulty in processing

at such points "holds up" (1970:204) the reader. The result of this is that the reader searches for significance. There are examples of such instances in Chapter 4 and 5, but as a brief illustration, here is a passage from a poem by R.S. Thomas (1990:12):

> Are they surfaces / of fathoms which mind / clouds when examining itself / too closely?

The phrase "mind clouds" is difficult to process because "mind" could be a verb or a noun; depending on which it is seen to be, "clouds" will also be either a verb or a noun. As a noun, "mind" echoes "God's mind" in the first line of the poem, but as a verb it echoes "discover", three lines later, and "examining" in the passage quoted. There are echoes of sound between this passage and "mirrors", "image", "virginity", and so on, at other points in the poem. It is not possible to read these few lines without spending a great deal of time on constructing linguistic, philosophical and acoustic contexts for their interpretations.

The notion of relevance as maximization is thus not new; and the notion of optimal relevance is only interesting for non-literary translation. Sperber & Wilson's view that stylistic and poetic effects are achieved by the reader working out what can be done with weak implicatures (1995:236-7) has much in common with Ingarden's (1973) notion of realization or Iser's (1979) notion of gap-filling. But, importantly, the "wider the range of potential implicatures" (Sperber & Wilson 1995:236; see also MacKenzie 2002:24) the more poetic the text. In the following section we will look at what this has meant in concrete terms for translators and what it could potentially mean.

2.3 Relevance Theory and translating for relevance

Gutt (2000), first published in 1991, is the book most translation theorists associate with the application of Relevance Theory to translation. Gutt's aims were laudable: to show that we can explain (rather than merely classify and describe) the facts of translation without the need for a special translation theory, focussing on translation as communication. Like all good theories, that put forward in Gutt's book aims not to drive but to explain its subject. Thus Gutt said, quite rightly, in a recent contribution to the Relevance-Theory email list, that "I do not advocate any particular translation approach" (2004). But Gutt's book is both dense and a little disorderly; it is sometimes difficult to make out a clear line of argument. And the notion that translation does not need its own theory, while clearly a strong argument for Relevance Theory, in the sense that it is shown to explain data outside the range of those it was originally called on to clarify, has been viewed with surprise or wariness by

translation theorists such as Malmkjær (1992), though others such as Hatim (2001) have acknowledged its usefulness for translation. Gutt made a number of suggestions about how translation could be explained using Relevance Theory. The most important of these are:

i) translation, as communication, works under the assumption of relevance (that what the translator intends to communicate to the audience is relevant enough to them to make processing it worthwhile);
ii) a translated text is an instance of interpretive, as opposed to descriptive, use (the translator is saying what someone else meant);
iii) texts in which the way of saying – the style – plays an important role require direct translation, as opposed to indirect translation, which, like indirect quotation, just gives the substance.

In English-speaking countries comparatively little work has been done with Relevance Theory and translation. Exceptions are Boase-Beier (2004a, 2004b), Hatim & Mason (1990), Hatim (2001). The latter, in particular, discusses the difference between notions such as direct and indirect translation, but does not consider how this distinction affects the translation of style in very great detail. In Spain, on the other hand, there are more studies that directly apply a Relevance-Theory approach, such as Dahlgren (1998), Dahlgren (2000), Edwards (2001). As I suggested in the previous section, it may be the focus on relevance itself which has rendered the approach less useful than it might be for translation. Taking relevance as given, here are some insights from Relevance Theory and cognitive pragmatics more generally (the first four are adapted from Boase-Beier 2004a) which might be useful for studying what happens to style when we translate:

i) The notion of mind style (see Chapter 1) can be integrated into translation theory as a set of weak implicatures which are communicative clues to a cognitive state.
ii) Relevance Theory allows for the importance of a cognitive state as that which a translator will try to recreate, rather than meaning in a truth-conditional sense.
iii) By allowing a view of style as weak implicatures, Relevance Theory provides a framework and a legitimation for the translator's interpretive freedom and the creativity of the translation act.
iv) By tying poetic effect to the extra work, in terms of maximal relevance, that stylistic features call for, a Relevance Theory view can help explain the common intuition of translators that preserving style helps recreate the effects of the source text on the target reader.
v) An important difference between the way literary and non-literary texts

> are translated is that the former will tend to require direct translation (which preserves the style) while the latter will tend to require indirect translation (see Gutt 2000:68ff.).

In the previous section, we saw that weak implicatures are a way of formalizing the notion of meaning which goes beyond "primary" lexical or syntactic meaning (Katz 1990). If such implicatures, with the openness that their description as "weak" entails, serve to provide clues to a state of mind, then the elements of style and in particular those aspects which are consistent enough to constitute a 'mind style' in the sense of Fowler (1977a) will be a starting point for creating a reading which captures something of what writers like Pope and Denham must have meant (see 1.2) by the "spirit" of the original text. This suggests that in many cases a translator will need to start with the style, not the content of a text. As an example, consider the following lines, from the poet Ernst Meister (1979:102):

> Die meisten
> *the most*
> Sterne
> *stars*
> sind leblos.
> *are lifeless*

These are translated (Boase-Beier 2003c:113) as

> Most of
> my stars
> are lifeless.

In this translation, it is the cognitive state suggested by the semi-anagram of the poet's name in 'meisten Sterne' which has led to the inclusion of "my" in the English translation. A full explanation of how this poem has been read and translated is in Chapter 5 (see also Boase-Beier 2004a), but it is enough here to note that the final stanza, which these three lines make up, is seen as introducing the way the poet might see himself, his usefulness, his afterlife. It would not be easy to introduce an anagram of the poet's name into an English version, but it is not necessary: what is needed is a reference to the subject, the voice in the poem. That 'my stars' echoes in its sound 'Meister' "sufficiently for the reader to infer a connection" (as I maintain in the article in question) may not be convincing to every reader, but it will not be disputed that the introduction of the "my" in a poem which up to now has only addressed a "you" will be noticed. And it is this link to the cognitive state of

the poet which is the decisive factor. This is what "starting with the style" is taken to mean. Meister's name is not actually there, but, for this translator, is implicated. The translator can exercise the freedom to include it or not, or include some other clue to the cognitive state the poem is seen to suggest. It will take a certain amount of reading and re-reading to see 'Meister' in 'my stars'. But this is true of the original, too, because it is the way poetry works: stylistic features demand engagement with the text. This is what I take direct translation to mean, but the distinction between direct and indirect translation does not correlate exactly with the literary / non-literary distinction; a translator will almost certainly want to do justice to the style of a critic such as Wilson Knight (e.g. 1961) or a medical historian such as Roy Porter (e.g. 1997). And the distinction is a question of degree, rather than an absolute opposition. One translation may be more direct (pay more attention to the style) than another, but still both may attempt to give more than just substance. Erkazanci, in an as yet unpublished thesis, explores how Turkish translators, bowing to target culture pressures, fail to do justice to heteroglossia in English texts as diverse as *Lady Chatterley's Lover* (Lawrence 1961) and *Trainspotting* (Welsh 1994), but do make some inconsistent attempts to indicate stylistic variety. Such translations are largely indirect, and could therefore be adjudged unsuccessful as examples of literary translation.

As Erkazanci (unpublished) points out, both domesticating and foreignizing translation practices could in fact be seen as instances of direct translation, because both render the style of a text in one way (to fit target expectations) or another (to violate target expectations), but in neither case is style ignored.

As Sperber & Wilson (1995:38f.) make clear, not all interpretations of a text are available to all readers in all contexts. Assuming that the text will work subject to relevance (not because the author obeys the relevance constraint consciously but simply because this is the way communication works) then the more literary the text is (in the sense given in 1.6, of being a text whose style carries much of the meaning), the more readers will look for maximal relevance, as opposed to the "optimal relevance" (Sperber & Wilson 1995:57ff.) of non-literary communication situations.

Following the assumption of maximal rather than optimal relevance involves accepting that the input to the reading of a text may be enormous. It may not extend to selling one's house or turning one's back on society (though even this is possible), but it might well mean we want to maximize output to such an extent that we are prepared to devote to the reading of a poem, or a sacred text, or the work of a philosopher, a whole afternoon, a year, or a lifetime, because the output is equally limitless. And if the output is limitless, as in the reading of such texts it might be, then we would expect the effort to be correspondingly great. This view of literary texts offers one way

of explaining the Reader-Response view that a literary text is often "a cascade of possibilities" (Iser 2004:14) for the perceiver. It also suggests that Venuti (2000:334) misinterprets Gutt when he says that the reader is "characterized by an overwhelming desire for minimal processing effort." This is in fact not what Gutt says: on the contrary, he emphasizes the "reward" (2000:156) that the processing of weak implicatures brings.

So what is the reward of reading for maximum relevance? Several writers (MacKenzie 2002, Gutt 2000, and Pilkington 2000) have defined it as "cognitive gain" (Boase-Beier 2004a:276). It is important to realize that "cognitive" is not used here in the sense in which it is used by Iser (or Winograd 1983; see section 1.4), to contrast with what is apprehensible by "the human senses" (2004:10). As will be discussed in Chapter 4, cognition as used in cognitive stylistics is not meant in this narrow sense; because the body, especially in metaphor theory (e.g. Lakoff & Turner 1989) is seen as the basis for cognition, the latter could be said to depend on the results of sensory perception.

As the example from R.S. Thomas given in the previous section suggests, Relevance Theory would not bemoan the impossibility of locating definite meaning, but would celebrate it (cf. MacKenzie 2002:3). In this particular case, it is linked directly to the need for the reader to explore the religious and philosophical possibilities the poem gives rise to.

A translator, on attempting to translate a text, will make a distinction (whether in the terms favoured by Katz (1990) or Dowling (1999) or Gutt (2000) does not matter) between what the words mean in a basic (lexical-semantic) sense, on the one hand (the meaning of "cloud" as a noun and as a verb), and what they implicate (for example in the ambiguous structure "mind clouds") on the other. The first is sometimes referred to in pragmatics as "utterance meaning" or "sentence meaning" (Mey 2001:43) and the second, unhelpfully for our purposes, as "speaker's meaning". Assuming that as translators we are consciously constructing what we assume (and know that we merely assume) to be an inferred speaker's or author's meaning (or that of the voice in the text, which may not be the author's), I would prefer to call this "reader's meaning". If a literary text in particular "is deliberately organized in such a way as to almost compel readers to read, as it were, their own concept of the thing meant" (Wilss 1996:27) into the text, and bearing in mind that the translator's concept of "the thing meant" will be affected by reading for translation (see section 1.5), I propose to use "translator's meaning" for the extended meaning which goes beyond what can be assigned to the text or passage on the basis of semantics. Looking at the passage from Thomas' poem, utterance meaning would be the sort of thing that goes into a gloss, including information on possible word categories and semantics, whereas the translator's meaning would include the further religious, philosophical and stylistic meanings that the text implicates. Such meanings are

not finite; as Pilkington (1996:159) points out, there is both "the problem of saying exactly what range of implicatures are communicated" and the problem that "sources of poetic effects are difficult, if not impossible, to translate" (ibid).

Yet the fact that these are the "weakly implied" meanings, the gaps which, as a literary text, these lines invite me to fill, means that the other side of the difficulty is that I could in fact proceed to do a translation based on a gloss without any further knowledge of the source text than that gives. I would simply have more gaps to fill and fewer clues and guidelines to shape the process. In fact, this is what frequently happens, when translators translate out of languages they do not speak. It is how Hughes himself produced the poem 'The Prophet' (Weissbort 1989:15), a translation of Pushkin's poem. It is also the way we judge translation, especially when we cannot fully appreciate the nuances of the source text. In these cases, the easy part to judge is primary or utterance meaning, and this is frequently the basis for evaluations of translation, especially within a language-learning situation or in reviews. Similarly, the straightforward part of a translator's task (and a machine could do it) is the primary meaning. The interesting part, the real translation, is those second-order meanings, the translator's meanings which reside largely in the style, and take on particular importance for the act of literary translation. In his 1998 book *Translating Style*, Parks notices that the passages in translations which show most stylistic deviation from the original "point to the peculiar nature of [the author's] style and the overall vision it implies" (p.vii). Style will be less important in a non-literary text and such texts, by their nature, will not encourage the reader to maximize relevance. The sound repetition in an advert, such as "you can – Canon" will serve a mnemonic purpose, and will provide a pleasurable reading experience, thus encouraging purchase. But it is not likely that it expresses anything else and the reader is unlikely to try and get further effects from it. If the text were constructed in such a way as to encourage a "maxmax" rather than "minimax" reading, then it might well fail in its object.

So what are the cognitive effects that "maxmax" reading engenders? Pilkington (2000:184) points particularly to the affective use of language in literature: "[o]ne can come to have the feeling as a result of reading the words". And yet we should be aware that the experiencing of emotion is in part also precognitive. According to Crisp (2003:379), "you may react with fear to a half-perceived shape *before* you infer that it is or is not a snake", and indeed experiments have supported this view, as a recent article 'All in the Mind' (*Wellcome Science* 1, 2005) shows. This suggests that even superficial reading may trigger emotions, which are then heightened or prolonged when cognition is exercised, and when our thought and beliefs are examined, as in literature.

All cognitive effects, which are the maximized payoff for the increased effort it takes to process stylistic features of the text, are effects which change the cognitive state of the reader. More will be said on cognitive effects and cognitive views of style in Chapter 4. For the moment, we can note that a translator reading a source text as literary will read it from the point of view of style as (i) an expression of choices attributable to the speaker (author, character, narrator) and (ii) a set of points at which the reader can engage with the text, for maximum cognitive effect.

But before that, now that we have considered some views of how a translator understands the source text and its style, I want to look, in Chapter 3, at what those assumptions about the style might mean and how they might relate to what the translator does in creating a target text.

3. The Translator's Choices

3.1 Style and choice

The reader's view of style as "motivated choice" (Verdonk 2002:9) has, as we saw in the previous chapter, a parallel for the translator: s/he assumes that stylistic features in the source text reflect the inferred author's choices. What this assumption then means in practice for the actual translation may differ between translators and according to situation, translation aims, and approach. For functionally-orientated views such as Reiß (1981), the function of the source text is what decides the sort of translation required for the target text, and this function, or intention, is "verbalized by the author in his text" (1981:122).

This view takes for granted that such an intention can be discovered, though, as we have seen, it is an assumption that is fraught with difficulty. Even if one were able (as one sometimes is) to ask the original author what s/he meant by a particular word or structure, the answer might not accord with what I called in Chapter 2 the translator's meaning. For this reason, authors' statements and suggestions could be seen as simply another source of information, like dictionaries, background reading, or the opinions of other readers. At a recent workshop (on 12.6.05) the German poet Anne Duden, discussing the translation of her poem 'Winter. Reise' spoke about the word *entbunden* (literally 'un-bound') in the line "mit irrig entbundenen Ohren" ('with madly unbound ears'), translated by Andrew Shields as "with ears erroneously released" (Shields 2004:122; Duden 1999). Duden maintained the word had primarily meant not 'unbound' or 'released' but 'delivered', in the sense of delivered of a child, when she wrote the poem, as indeed it probably would to most speakers of German. Yet many workshop participants appeared to see what clearly for the poet was a second-order meaning, 'unbound', 'set free', 'released', as the primary one. Each translator will have to decide for her/himself how much such knowledge of a poet's original intention can help in arriving at a meaning. One view, which follows on from what was said in Chapter 2, is that the translator's reconstruction of what is inferred as the poet's intention is actually more helpful, because it is the role of the translator as reader of the original text to make such inferences. Expressed in Relevance-Theory terms, this means that the translator's inference that unbound means 'released', derived from evidence in the style of the text, leads him to assume that the implications in the style giving rise to this inference are in fact implicatures or intended implications. Whether they were ever *actually* intended is irrelevant. The point about a stylistic reading of the source text is that it aims to reach a full and detailed picture of the inferred

author's choices, not that it can or wishes to reach facts about an actual author's choices.

Contrary to what Verdonk appears to suggest, not all choice can be seen as consciously motivated; it is one of the purposes of both Critical Discourse Analysis and stylistic analysis to uncover unconscious choice, whose motivation may not have been at all apparent to the writer. This point is also made by Baker (2000:246), who distinguishes literary stylistics, as the study of conscious choice, from forensic stylistics, the study of unconscious choice. Yet it is implicit in the critical linguistic approach of someone like Fowler (1996) that many social and historical influences are so deeply embedded in the way we think and feel that it is not always possible to separate conscious from unconscious choice (see also Milic 1971). Does, for example, the choice of the word "verschollen" (disappeared) in a poem by Rose Ausländer suggest the agency of an evil government? The translation by Osers as "long-lost" does not carry this implicature (1977:47), but today's reader would almost certainly read such an implicature into the German word, and thus be more likely to translate it with 'disappeared'. Are we to say this connotation is consciously or unconsciously motivated in the original poem, or is put there by the reader?

If, as MacKenzie (2002:30) explains, pragmatic approaches to the reading of literature always take for granted the importance of human agency in its production, then this also applies to pragmatic views about reading, including the translator's reading of the source text. A pragmatic view also takes for granted that a translator is not just a reader, but also a communicator, and that the aim of a translation therefore goes beyond the mental expansion and cognitive pleasure of the translator because s/he will try, in the target text, to make choices potentially able to give rise to effects on target-text readers which reflect the potential effects of the source text on its readers. The writer of the translation is thus initially responsible (to the extent that any of us can be responsible for unconscious linguistic motivation) for the style of the translated text to which the reader responds and from which s/he will create meaning; it is the translator in her or his role as writer who "triggers discovery in the reader" (MacKenzie 2002:24). As Sperber & Wilson (1995:8) put it, the text does not restrict the meanings it is possible for the reader to construct, but it does "impose some structure on experience", guiding or even manipulating her or him in ways which are often not obvious.

Choice, whether seen as more or less restricted, has always been a central issue for stylistics. A typical definition is given by Thornborrow & Wareing (1998) at the start of their introductory book on literary style: stylistics, as the study of style, tries to account for "the particular choices made by individuals and social groups in their use of language" (p.3). This definition,

taken from the *Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought* (1977), provides a common denominator for a whole variety of ways of approaching style, and elaborates upon the notion of "distinctive" in the Wales definition given in Chapter 1 (2001:71). Distinctiveness arises because of choice exercised by a writer. Enkvist *et al* (1973:16-17) maintains that style is the variation within a language based on optionality, and so differs in this respect from regional or social dialects, and also from the rules and principles of grammar about which we have no choice (see also Vinay & Darbelnet 1995:16). Because choice can be exercised in the realm of the second-order meanings we met in Chapter 2, rather than in those meanings determined by lexis or syntax, style will affect such second-order meanings. For a translator, style is possibly the least contentious area of translational freedom. Consider, for example, the following sentence from Helene Holzman's diary (Kaiser & Holzman 2000:25):

Da	stand	die	Glasschale	mit	den	Erdbeeren,
there	*stood*	*the*	*glass-bowl*	*with*	*the*	*strawberries,*
die	wir	zu	Vaters	Empfang		bereitet
which	*we*	*for*	*father's*	*return*		*prepared*
hatten.	Sie	waren	längst	verfault,		keiner
had	*they*	*were*	*long-since*	*gone-mouldy*		*no-one*
räumte	sie	fort.				
cleared	*them*	*away*				

Looking at the final phrase "keiner räumte sie fort", there appears to be clear evidence from (primary) meaning to guide a choice in translation between, for example, "no-one hid them away" and "no-one cleared them away". The first introduces meaning that is not merely a stylistic variation from the sense of the original, and would generally not be considered a translation of the phrase. The second, however, is close in meaning to the original. But it is related by stylistic as opposed to lexical-semantic variation to several other possibilities:

a) no-one cleared them away
b) no-one moved them
c) no-one sided them
d) no-one thought to throw them away
e) no-one took them away

All of these alternative versions in some intuitive sense mean roughly the same. Stylistically, (a), (b) and (e) are similar; (c) is different in that it introduces a dialect word; (d) uses alliteration. On the face of it, then, these might seem stylistic variations about which the translator, even by conservative

standards, has plenty of freedom. However, it is not so simple. (c) is an authentic example; I used it in a sample translation of Helene Holzman's diary for at least two reasons. Firstly, I wanted both to suggest something of the colloquial nature of the original text, a diary (even though at this particular point the original was not colloquial: *forträumen* is fairly formal). But, secondly, I also wanted to echo a possible German alternative to the original: *beseitigen* – 'to clear away'; literally 'to put aside', 'to side'). There was also a third, more personal reason, too: in the photographs included in the book, Helene Holzman, the writer of the diary, reminded me very much of my grandmother, and she used to say "to side". But the editors of the sample did not like it, and changed it to (e).

What this example shows is that the style we choose as translators is subject to all manner of constraints and influences, some of which the translator may only be dimly aware of. In the rest of this section I will consider the sources of such constraints and influences before moving on, in 3.2, to look at some of the ways translators' stylistic choices and the constraints on them have been theorized and, in 3.3, at some of the ways the analysis of style in the target text has tried to recreate the sort of choices made by the translator.

Style, then, is seen in most stylistic approaches to texts as a question of (sometimes unconscious) choice. But it is not just choice of words or structures or sounds. According to Fowler, the concept of style goes far beyond this: it includes language in and outside literature, and "non-linguistic communication and other behaviour" and is therefore "unusable as a technical term" (1996:185). As will have become clear, this is not the view taken in this book. "Style" has indeed many areas of application, but style in language refers to those aspects of language assumed by the hearer, reader or translator, and indeed by the speaker, original writer, or writer of translations, to be the result of choice.

Fowler was right, though, in suggesting that style is not just a question of different ways of saying the same thing: stylistic choices "reflect a speaker's (subjective) choice of a given conceptualization" (Tabakowska 1993:7), and thus are always in this sense a reflection of different content rather than just different expression (Leech & Short 1981:15ff.; see also Pilkington 1996:159). The concept of choice has a moral inflection: philosopher Berel Lang speaks of "moral style", explaining how good and evil are good and evil by virtue of a "choice among alternatives, a systematic series of choices" (Rosenbaum 1998:216). This broader, moral sense of style as reflection of mind and character is also found in linguistic views which see style, through its reflections of choice, as an indication of personality. Because stylistic choice is optional, the style "tells us something about the person who uses the expression" (Teleman 1975:91; see also Pennebaker & King 1999). This

view has been a common theme in the type of stylistics Fowler (1996:11) describes as based on a "functional-textual" model of grammar; his reason for preferring such a model and rejecting generative grammar as a suitable basis is that the latter is concerned with the universal "structural possibilities afforded by the human mind" and cannot therefore ask *why* a structure is used. But universalism is important for translation. And in fact there is no reason to subscribe to Fowler's view that to contemplate universality is to sideline the question "why"? If style is one area – the main area – of language where choice is universally exercised, then one can still question or infer intention behind a particular choice, as indeed most of pragmatics, by stressing "the importance of the user" (Mey 2001:10) to some extent does. For a choice is made from those structures the mind universally makes available; the basis of all linguistics is exactly this interaction between universal and individual, as indeed it is the main concern of translation and its theories.

Fowler, as we saw in Chapter 1, pursued the notion of the individual social-cognitive nature of style in his term "mind style", the "world-view of an author, or a narrator, or a character" (1996:214; see also 1977a:103), as evidenced in textual structures, especially those which embody the speaker's experience of the socially-embedded phenomena of the real world. In Boase-Beier (2003a) I distinguished between the world-view of the speaker or narrator or inferred author and its linguistic expression. Only the latter was referred to as "mind style", and that is the way I shall use the term throughout this book. I will come back to the issue of mind style in the next chapter, which focuses on this and other aspects of cognitive approaches to style and translation.

I am making the assumption that, by attempting to reconstruct the style of a text, the translator is attempting to reconstruct states of mind and thought processes, always with the awareness that individual states of mind are affected by social and cultural influences. Such an assumption plays an important role in stylistics and Critical Discourse Analysis, and is also behind the notion of faithfulness to style in translation, as suggested by Dryden's description of it as "genius" (Lefevere 1992:104) or Denham's as "spirit" (Robinson 2002:156), both referred to in Chapter 1.

The style of the source-text author, perceived as a reflection of her/his choices and mental state, will thus provide a set of constraints upon the stylistic choices made by the translator as an attempt to recreate this mental state. In the example from Kaiser & Holzman (2000) above, (c) might partly be seen as an expression of personality; in its use of a dialect word it suggests a certain informality.

A further set of constraints upon the translator's stylistic choices will arise from the function which a translation is seen to fulfil. Reiß & Vermeer (1984), as opposed to Reiß (1981), focus on constraints imposed by the target

text: intratextual coherence in meaning and style of the target text is more important than the intertextual coherence between source text and target text. The importance of the target text's function is the essence of skopos theory. Both literary and non-literary target texts, in this view, are expected to read as texts "which at least linguistically are not visibly translations" (Reiß & Vermeer 1984:135; my translation). This is so because the "most important factor in all translations is the aim" (Reiß & Vermeer 1984:134; my translation), and most translations do not aim to capture the style of the original. Nord refers to such translations, which are governed by the aim to produce "in the target language an *instrument* for a new communicative interaction between the source-culture sender and a target-culture audience", as "instrumental" translations (1997:47). They include instructions and recipes and also literary translations where the reader is "not supposed to be aware they are reading a translation at all" (Nord 1997:52), and where therefore the target text situation is the main generator of constraints on the translator's choices.

But Nord also suggests that many literary translations are "documentary" (1997:47) or "exoticizing" (1997:48). That is, they aim to document how the original text worked. Such translations would not necessarily echo the style of the original: Nord mentions several types of documentary literary translation, including "philological translation" (ibid.), which includes explanations in additional notes. Glosses such as are given for examples in this book are also documentary translations, as their aim is to illuminate the source text, but they would not usually be considered to be literary translations. Documentary translations are therefore not necessarily literary translations, but literary translations are very often documentary: Nord suggests that this has in fact become the norm (1997:103).

Unfortunately, however, Nord's terminology is not quite satisfactory, in part because it does not seem possible to designate complete translations as "documentary" or "instrumental" in the way she suggests. A particular choice of words by a translator may indeed aim for a documentary effect, for example by reproducing aspects of source-text style in a way which goes beyond merely reflecting the general use of stylistic principles. In my example from Kaiser & Holzman (2000) above, there was a conscious attempt to echo the sound of the German word 'beseitigen', even though this word was not actually used, and thus, in the informal English, to suggest the language of the original diary at least as much as a Northern dialect of the target language; in this sense that particular choice of words could be called documentary. But it is more difficult to apply such descriptions to a complete work. In this translation by Richard Dove (1996:48) of a line by Ernst Meister (1979:18):

coffins clapping shut

there is a strong echo of the original German

es	klappen	Särge	zu
there	*clap*	*coffins*	*shut*

and for this reason the translation of this line could be called documentary, or more documentary than the more usual "coffins banging/falling shut". But the title of Dove's version of another poem in the same collection 'Maundy Thursday' for 'Gründonnerstag' (1996:15) would seem to be an instrumental translation: the English expression has been used to be consistent with an English cultural framework. A documentary title, like 'Green Thursday', would both reflect the cohesion of the source text built up in phrases such as "grüner Saft des Lebens" ("green sap of life"; Meister 1979:11) and "Frühlingsacker" ("spring fields"; ibid.) and would recreate this cohesion in the target text. The only way to explain this apparent contradiction is to say that literary translation is to some extent documentary, but it is instrumental, too, in so far as the aim, as in Dove's translation of Meister, is to create a target text which works as communication between the source-text poet and the target-text reader. More than this, we could say that literary translation achieves its instrumental function (to be read as a literary translation) by being documentary (because this is what a literary translation does).

This view is very different from that of Nida & Taber (1974), who appear to feel that "formal correspondence" is incompatible with "dynamic equivalence". The latter, which is based on ensuring that the readers of the target text respond "in substantially the same manner" as the source-text readers, is more important. This means that "stylistic subtleties" are only reproduced to the extent that they do not undermine dynamic equivalence (1974:14, 24, 13). Such a separation of style from effect appears to mark out the Bible as different from a literary text, in the view of Nida & Taber, and also as being different from a historical text, in which formal equivalence might be used for documentary purposes.

Because of Nord's discussion of documentary translation, it would not be true to say that all functionally-orientated theories of translation focus solely on the target text. However, such theories do share a common concern with the "social factors that direct the translator's activity" (Venuti 2000:216), a concern also of functionally-orientated views of style such as Fowler (1996). And yet functional translation theories such as Reiß & Vermeer (1984) or Holz-Mänttäri (1984) tend, oddly, to neglect the role of style, other than as an indication of text-type and therefore function (see e.g. Reiß 1976).

Nord (1997:120) shows that Reiß & Vermeer's skopos theory has been criticized for excluding literary translation because literary texts have "no specific purpose" (Munday 2001:81). And yet, in Nord's view, literary

translations do have a purpose or function. This is particularly true of children's books and theatre plays, where the purpose of the target text is more important than the style of the source text, a situation which is likely to lead to domesticating translations (1997:83). In fact domesticating translations are made particularly when works are adapted for an audience very different from the original, such as Grimms' originally adult fairy tales translated for English children. As Kyritsi in an as yet unpublished dissertation has shown, translations of such stories, by consciously making the material conform to what is regarded as suitable for children at a particular time, can vary quite radically from the source text. In other translations such as the 1611 King James Version of the Bible (1939), which not everyone would regard as a literary translation, the purpose may also be an important determining factor. Such translations, in which both source text and target text are generally perceived as fulfilling a purpose, will be "covert", in the sense described by House (1981). They are not merely domesticating, but they tend to be read as originals.

What can be seen from discussions of the aim of translation, and the issue of documentary versus instrumental, and the relationship of both to literary versus non-literary translation, is that no clear distinctions can be drawn with respect to the attempt to recreate style. What can be said on balance is that:

i) no literary translation is purely documentary or purely instrumental;
ii) some literary translations are more instrumental and some more documentary;
iii) the style of the source text will be the greater determining feature for documentary translation and the style of the target text for instrumental;
iv) literary texts will achieve their instrumentality by being documentary; they work *as* literary translations (are instrumental) partly by virtue of their relationship to the original (by being documentary).

The fourth point can be seen as support for the view that literary translation should be considered a unique type of writing within the whole range of literary writing, a view discussed in Section 1.5. The fact that literary translation can only be instrumental if documentary also points to the main reason for its distinction from other types of translation: in other types the instrumentality is largely independent of their documentary relationship to the source text. Part of the reason for the combination of instrumental and documentary function in literary translation is that, if the notion of "literariness" is not as culturally-bound as Nord (1997:82) suggests, but is instead a universal form of aesthetic experience (as opposed to literature itself; Pilkington 2000:11-13), then documenting the literary nature and function of the source

text would ensure that the target text is itself literary. This would mean it would be read as a literary text and allow for the sort of reader's interaction discussed in Chapter 2. In other words, if the intertextual coherence of the source text, which is the basis of its stylistic effect, is respected, the target text will, to the extent that it documents such effects, also work instrumentally.

3.2 Clues, games and decisions

It might be helpful at this point just to summarize some of the distinctions between different types of translation which we have met in the previous section and to try to see how they relate to one another, and to style, even at the risk of over-simplifying the ideas behind them. Firstly, there is the distinction made by Nida & Taber (1974), who spoke of formal correspondence to a source text and dynamic equivalence to its function, thus in both cases focussing on the relation of target text to source text. House (1981) distinguishes overt translation from covert. Reiß & Vermeer (1984) contrast intertextual coherence between source text and target text, on the one hand, with the necessary intratextual coherence of the target text, on the other. Nord (1997) speaks of documentary translation, which shows us the source text more clearly, and instrumental, which functions as communication between source-text author and target-text reader. None of these distinctions is exactly the same as any of the others because they focus to varying degrees on function and form and on the source text or the target text. And all of these distinctions are best seen as scalar rather than polar opposites: a translation may be more covert than another or have greater formal equivalence, but few translations will be wholly one thing or the other. To add to, or possibly to confuse, this picture, I have suggested in the previous section that there is a distinction between literary and non-literary translation in that literary translation achieves its function – to work as a translated literary text – by virtue of being documentary. These distinctions are important for considering the translation of style because they all touch, to a greater or lesser degree, on three aspects of the style of a text: its formal linguistic characteristics, its contribution to what the text means, and the interplay between universal stylistic possibilities (such as metaphor or ambiguity) and those rooted in a particular language (ambiguity as to whether a word is an adverb or adjective in German) or culture (metaphors about cricket in English or dogs in Spanish or bread and cheese in Turkish).

Gutt addresses all three of these aspects in a distinction he makes which is similar to Nord's (1997) distinction between documentary and instrumental translation: that between "direct translation" and "indirect translation". Direct translation, like direct quotation, tries to preserve not just what the original said, but how it said it; indirect translation, as interlingual interpretive

use, merely *interpretively*, and not actually, resembles the original (Gutt 2000:136); his indirect translation is not to be confused with Toury's (1995: 58), which refers to a translation from another translation.

However, Gutt's point here is more subtle than this. He maintains that stylistic properties of texts "often consist in linguistic features that are far from universal" and that it is not their formal qualities, therefore, that are preserved, but what they stand for: "the fact that they provide clues that guide the audience to the interpretation intended by the communicator" (2000:134). These "communicative clues", mentioned in 2.2, are preserved in direct translation, which is appropriate for literary translation, where "faithfulness in matters not only of content but also of style is demanded" (ibid.). Direct translation will thus be more difficult for the reader to process than indirect, but it will provide more cognitive or emotional effects, and will therefore be more rewarding.

A translator who aims for direct translation will thus be obeying the "maxmax" principle mentioned in Chapter 2: s/he will not avoid making things difficult for the reader. But they will not usually be made so difficult that the reader is in danger of giving up. The phrase "mind clouds" from the R.S. Thomas poem discussed in 2.2 will need to be translated in a way which preserves the various syntactic and semantic ambiguities of the original, or the religious considerations will be lost, but concessions will have to be made to the target-language syntax. It is not possible in German, for example, for a noun for 'mind' also to be a verb, nor a verb for 'clouds' also to be a noun. Any attempt to document such syntactic sophistication would be likely to defeat the reader, if not the translator.

Nord's distinction is based on function, Gutt's on the degree and manner of resemblance, but both Nord (1997) and Gutt (2000), like House (1981), are suggesting that some translations aim to give their readers a clearer picture of what was happening in the original than do others. None of these writers suggest that it is actual linguistic resemblance, or formal equivalence, as in the first example from Dove (1996) given above, which is meant. In fact, by suggesting that it is not the "intrinsic value" of stylistic features which is preserved, Gutt is suggesting that what direct translation needs to recreate is the relationship between features of style as "communicative clues" and the meanings to which these clues point (2000:134). This is why even direct translation remains an example of interpretive use: it preserves what the stylistic features mean in the overall context of the text, rather than merely their formal shape. In this sense one can argue, as I did at the end of the previous section, that a documentary translation will be instrumental whenever it preserves relationships between meanings and the potential for effects, rather than forms.

Stylistic features of a text can act as clues to what the writer of the source text meant in a number of ways, for example by indicating register (as we saw in Reiß 1976), attitude or mind style (as in Fowler 1996:214) or requiring extra processing effort because of syntactic difficulty (as in Pilkington 2000). In all these senses they are taken by the translator as implicatures (meanings implied by the text because assumed to be put there by the (inferred) author) rather than implications (whatever a reader might take the text to mean beyond what is explicit). Notice that this notion of what the source-text writer "meant" cannot be equated with a narrow understanding of meaning. If, for example, a translator reads an original dramatic dialogue in which a female speaker says:

D'Arbeit hob i fei saiwa schon gmacht kobd!
the work have I truly myself already done have
(I had already done the work myself)

then s/he will interpret the various stylistic features as clues to meaning. Use of Bavarian dialect will suggest locality, probably also rural locality, but not any particular social class; use of the adverb *fei* (a dialect form and usage of *fein*), will suggest the speaker's confidence or even pride in her achievement and perhaps the fact that she does not think the hearer will have expected her to have done the work in question. A translation will be more likely to try and incorporate clues which work in a similar way, as in

I'd already done the work myself, I'll have you know!
I'd already done the work myself, if you don't mind!

than to echo register, or "pragmatic connectives" (Gutt 2000:43) such as *fei*, or the original syntax, in their own right. A translation which attempted this, for example

This work I'd really already done myself

would risk missing the function of the original stylistic features as "communicative clues" because such features are not universal and their relationship to what they mean cannot be regarded as straightforward. The stylistic constraints on this sort of translation would therefore include those that apply to texts of the appropriate genre in the target language, or the clues would have a very different value. One might imagine that the translation just given, which keeps close to the German syntax rather than suggesting merely the emphasizing of "myself", adds a further clue, in English, to the importance of "this work", by putting it in initial position. But this was not the case in

German, where the initial position for adverbs is standard. In a language such as English which accepts dialect poetry, the use of dialect in a poet like Hardy as in 'The Bride-Night Fire' (1977:260-261) may be seen as an indication of, among other things, a close link between poetry and nature. But if dialect were used in a translation into, for example, Turkish, the connotation would be that this was not "serious" poetry (according to Erkazanci, p.m.). Such knowledge of what the target language allows or expects forms part of a whole system of what Toury calls "translational norms" (1995:58ff.) Poetry translation might be expected to allow more latitude with respect to such norms, partly because translated poetry is more likely to be experimental than the novel without thereby seeming purely documentary.

On the other hand, novel translations which bear the sort of resemblance to the foreign source text noted especially in the example from Dove (1996) given above, are likely to be seen simply as poor translations. This applies to passages like the following, taken from an English translation of a French crime novel: "no sooner than entering does she kiss me on both cheeks"; "we're going there by foot" (Koral 2000:182, 139). Readers are unlikely to interpret such expressions as communicative clues.

Whereas Gutt's theory involves interpreting style as clues to meaning, so that translating style is thus attempting to translate the relationship of clue to meaning, the theory proposed by Levý in 1967 (here Levý 2000) sees the role of style rather differently. Levý, influenced by Prague Structuralism, focuses on the constraints imposed in a translation by stylistic decisions the translator has already made. Levý argues that translation involves a series of decisions, or "moves, as in a game" (2000:148). These moves, using a theory of translation as rational action such as is also used by Wilss (1996), reflect choices among a number of alternatives given by the possibilities of rendering in the target language the meanings contained in the source text. Factors such as the way readers will judge formal closeness to the original style will also influence a translator's decisions. Once a decision has been made, however, the factors involved and the decision itself will become part of the translator's knowledge. Thus "every succeeding move is influenced by the knowledge of previous decisions" (Levý 2000:149), as happens in chess but not, for example, in card-games.

This is a process familiar to all translators who set up a data-base for their translation. The assumption is that it is important to know how, say, we have translated the word *Unsicherheit* in an English version of a German novel, and not to translate it in a different way each time, for example once as uncertainty, and later as lack of confidence. But this notion could be extended to preserving a particular stylistic pattern (in Jakobson's (1960) sense). So, for example, the choice of "dishes" in the first of these lines may determine the choice of "dye" in the second:

Dishes ….
… dye and door and deed

(Boase-Beier 2003c:93)

The original German by Ernst Meister had "Terrinen" (dishes) and "Ton" (colour), "Tor" (gate or door), "Tat" (deed). The assumption behind a choice such as "dye" for "Ton" is either that alliteration is in itself an important feature of poetry and should be preserved in the translation or that it is a "communicative clue" in the sense Gutt (2000:134) describes. It might, for example, be a clue to a view that takes the alliterative link between the various words in the poem as representing association by name rather than by function and, in a wider sense, a philosophy which arises from language, rather than from the objects the language refers to.

Levý goes further than this sort of consideration, though, to suggest that the translator's choices obey a minimax principle. In practice, a translator "resolves for that one of the possible solutions which promises a maximum of effect with a minimum of effort". In other words, translators aim to convey meaning and some aspects of style, but they do not aim for the sort of translation they might be able to come up with "after hours of experimenting and rewriting" (2000:156). And, he suggests, if preserving style would be seen by a majority of readers to produce an awkward target text then most translators will aim to please the majority of the audience. Thus audience effect, the "degree of utility" ascribed to different stylistic devices and other aspects of translation could all be fed in on one side of the minimax equation (2000:158).

It is important to note here that Levý's is a very different sort of minimax principle from that suggested by writers such as MacKenzie (2002) and Pilkington (2000) for the understanding of literary texts, discussed in the previous chapter. Where that view is concerned with the reader of source text or target text and the relationship between reading effort and the cognitive effects the reader thereby obtains, Levý is concerned with the relationship between the effort of the translator and the achieved effect estimated for the reader of the target text. Although in some cases translators may be forced to apply just the sort of calculation Levý suggests to their practice, especially if meeting a deadline, this is surely not the case for many translators, especially of poetry, who often rewrite and revise their translations over many years. Hamburger, for example, said in 1985 that he had spent 25 years translating Hölderlin (Honig 1985:172) and Clive Scott gives us multiple translations of Baudelaire. Max Knight (1963), too, whom Levý himself quotes, suggested five different translations of a Morgenstern poem. But Levý's main point – and it is a very important one – seems to be to focus on the way decisions once taken add to the knowledge we apply to making

further decisions. It is likely that such decisions, especially to the extent that they express personal preferences of the translator, do not relate merely to the translation in hand, but can be seen to apply to the body of a particular translator's work; these choices thus form part of what Schiavi (1996) and Hermans (1996) have identified as the voice of the translator.

For Levý to suggest measuring translation effort against the effects on the reader presupposes that such effects can be calculated. This presupposition is behind the view that the translator aims to achieve similarity of stylistic effect between target text and source text (Newmark 1995:48-49; Dahlgren 2000). From the point of view of Reader-Response Theory, this approach does not make much sense, because the burden is on the reader to construct a reading, albeit under the guidance of the text (Iser 1979), and so there is no way of guaranteeing stylistic effect (as indeed Newmark points out) and not necessarily any desire on the part of the writer (including the translator) to do so. Nor does it really follow from Relevance Theory, where the author "triggers discovery" (Sperber & Wilson 1995:236) but can only be responsible for a certain guidance offered to the reader, especially in a literary text where implicatures, by their very nature, will leave open endless possibilities of engagement. But it is a view often mentioned in translation theory; as we saw above, Nida & Taber explain "dynamic equivalence" (1974:24) as replicating in the target text the effects the source text had on the reader, though they are primarily concerned with message.

If stylistic effects are seen as "characteristic mental representations and mental processes" (Pilkington 2000:49), then an attempt to recreate effects would be an attempt to encourage the reader to go through particular cognitive processes. These would, by virtue of being literary, not be fixed and would differ according to the reader's cognitive context, that is, her or his beliefs, knowledge and attitudes, but it might be possible to expect similar effects in source text and target text if the readers go through similar processes, for example the processing of multiple meanings in response to an ambiguity in the text, as in the case of the "mind clouds" example from R.S. Thomas given earlier. Most of the examples discussed in Chapter 5 assume that what makes a rendering of a text in another language a translation is the similarity of cognitive effect it makes possible, as judged by the translator.

As a final point about the factors which affect a translator's stylistic choices, I want also to argue, as I said in Chapter 1, that knowledge of stylistic and translation theory can be such a factor. In a recent article (Boase-Beier 2006) I maintain that knowing about theories involves creative engagement with them, and that they thus broaden the translator's mind, increase awareness, and so can free the translator from too timid a dependence on the source text. Knowledge of style is a tool which aids in both interpreting the style of the source text and assessing the way style works in the target text. And

knowledge of translation theory opens up possibilities (such as issues about the target-text relation to the source text or the target-text relation to other target texts) which might not otherwise have been considered. Theory as a tool for practice will be the subject of Chapter 5.

3.3 Recreated choices in translation

As we have seen, approaches to style in translation look at the style of the source text as the translator reads it (as discussed in Chapter 2) and also at the sorts of constraints which might affect the translator's stylistic choices in constructing the target text. Some of these were considered in the previous section. But it is also possible to examine the style of the target text itself, and ask whether and how it can help us reconstruct why the translator has made certain choices (Malmkjær 2004:14). This point was touched on in 2.3, and I want to take it up again here. Hermans maintains that there is always a "translator's voice" in every translation; we should not be taken in by the translational ideology which puts across "the illusion of the one voice" (1996:27; see also Schiavi 1996:4) in the translated text. Some examinations of target-text style focus to quite a large extent on the target text in its own right, looking for elements of the translator's style, which Baker describes as "a kind of thumb-print that is expressed in a range of linguistic – as well as non-linguistic – features" (2000:244; see also Leech & Short 1981:167). But to some degree all studies of the style of translated texts will relate this visible presence of the translator to the style of the original text. This may be done explicitly, by looking at obvious interventions by the translator, or less explicitly, by considering choices such as "consistent use of specific strategies", including things like "use of prefaces or afterwords, footnotes, glossing in the body of the text, etc" (Baker 2000:245). Such studies of translated texts, which aim to recreate the choices made by the translator, come under what Malmkjær refers to as "translational stylistics" (2004:15).

Views which focus most clearly on the style of the target text in its own right are often found within theories of translation reception such as have been formulated especially in the framework of polysystem theory (e.g. Even-Zohar 1990;Toury 1980; 1995). Toury (1995:192ff.), for example, discusses the norms governing Avraham Shlonsky's Hebrew translation of Hamlet. Toury says that, in the various revisions Shlonsky made, the source text played only "a marginal role" (1995:196). The sorts of constraint the translator observed include prosodic (he wrote in iambic hexameter), pragmatic (he complied with "contemporary convention" in his use of "poetic" words), and theatrical (he wrote a "script suitable for declamation"). The "aspiration for adequacy", that is, in Toury's terms, the reconstruction of source-text features, was much less important in determining the translator's decisions

than considerations to do with acceptability of the target text (1995:149; 203-4).

Views which focus more clearly on the target text's relation to the source text include Vinay & Darbelnet's 1958 book (here 1995) of comparative stylistics of French and English. This tends to concentrate on individual words and expressions, such as the fact that "sauter" in French has an "intellectual" equivalent in the word "jump" but also a stylistically subjective equivalent "leap". Vinay & Darbelnet speak of "oblique" translation (not to be confused with Gutt's indirect), which, as opposed to literal, cannot recreate stylistic effects without "upsetting" the syntax or lexis of the target language (1995:31). Vinay & Darbelnet stress the importance of adaptation in such cases. A study like this assumes that it is generally clear what translation is aiming for, namely the preservation of stylistic nuances of the original but always under the assumption that it is clear what is the equivalent of a particular structure in a given context. It can thus consider style and stylistic effects as though they were purely linguistic phenomena in a narrow sense, rather than clues to meaning, and did not in any important way reflect either the ideological choices of the original author or the choices made by the translator.

It is quite possible to envisage studies of translated texts based on stylistics or Critical Discourse Analysis which concentrate on what their style can tell us about the translator's world view, or attitude towards the information conveyed. Baker (2000:246) rightly points out that such studies of translated texts are rare, but she is not correct in asserting that subtle stylistic or linguistic habits which are "largely beyond the conscious control of the writer" (2000:246) have not in general been a feature of literary stylistics *per se*, for this is exactly the area of concern of those stylistic studies influenced by Critical Discourse Analysis. In principle there is no reason why such analyses should not be performed on translated texts.

Overall, stylistic analyses of translated texts have in general not been numerous as yet. Exceptions are Boase-Beier (2003a) and the articles by Malmkjær (2004), Millán-Varela (2004) and Thomson (2004), all collected in a Special Issue of the journal *Language and Literatur e*. Malmkjær (2004:15) points out that the stylistic study of a translated text must take into account the "willing suspension of freedom to invent" on the part of the translator. But it could be argued that exactly in the area of style the translator does have a great deal of freedom to invent. Lowell, in his 1958 anthology *Imitations*, says that he has striven for "one voice running through many personalities" (1990:xi), a clear indication of stylistic invention. This wish was certainly in part dictated by the need to produce a coherent anthology, but it could equally be argued that translating an anthology is a way of procuring stylistic freedom.

Even in the case of apparently free translations, though, the style of the translation is defined by its relation to the source text, as studies by Malmkjær (2004) and Winters (2004) show. Winters discusses two different translations of Fitzgerald's *The Beautiful andDamned* and identifies "the distinctive use of modal particles as a textual manifestation of the individual style of each translator" (2004:71). This study both compares target texts and compares each with the source text, discovering that one translator keeps closer to the source text than the other, and that the difference in style between the two translators was especially noticeable in the narrative, as opposed to the translation of direct speech. This suggests that the translators tended to use direct translation for direct speech, and indirect for narrative, leaving their "thumb-print" (Baker 2000:244) more clearly on the latter. Malmkjær (2004) compares a translation of Hans Christian Andersen by Dulcken with its source text, and shows that stylistic clues in the target text point to a split between the heavenly and the earthly which was not present in the original. She speculates as to possible reasons for this, to do with Dulcken's own views, or what he considered to be the religious beliefs of the receiving culture (Malmkjær 2004:22). In Boase-Beier (2003a) two translations of the same poem are considered and stylistic differences seen as evidence for different interpretations on the part of the two translators of the cognitive state embodied in the text. The point is made in that article that a translated text is often felt by translators to be co-authored; the explanation given in the article is of a knowledge basis and world view influenced by that of the original. Though Malmkjær (2004) does not say this exactly, by arguing for a "translational stylistics" she is arguing for an analysis which takes some degree of amalgamation of source-text and target-text stylistic characteristics into account.

The notion of stylistic interaction also informs the article by Millán-Varela (2004) in the Special Issue just mentioned. This study of the style of a translation of Joyce into Galician aims to establish "how the presence of the translator's voice interacts with all the other voices already present in the source text" (2004:38). She points to various examples of "strangeness" in the translated text caused by keeping to the source text very closely and also traces of a previous translation. She found an overall "tendency to generalize", missing out details and linguistic features such as adverbials (2004:46; 52). Marco (2004), in the same Special Issue, besides looking at how differences in style between target text and its source text can change the reader's view of a particular character – in this case the governess in Catalan translations of Henry James' *The Turn of the Screw* (James 1984) – also considers, like Malmkjær, the style of the translator and how its presence is felt in the target text. He shows that a particular group of translators might have a particular approach to translating and that this, too, can be traced in the style of several target texts when compared. His interest is in an aspect of the study

of style mentioned in its definition by Thornborrow & Wareing (1998) given at the start of this chapter: the style of a particular social group (see also Snell-Hornby 1995:24ff.).

Besides looking for the visible presence of the translator in a target text, either more or less explicitly in interaction with the presence of the original author, stylistic studies of translated texts may provide evidence for the notion mentioned in 1.5 that translation can be seen as a separate literary type with a special language which has its own stylistic characteristics, a text-type distinguishable both from non-translated texts and other types of translation (cf. Venuti 2000:5).

That literary translation has its own stylistic characteristics is also suggested by Malmkjær's use of the term "translational stylistics", a particular type of stylistics which looks at the target text in its relation to its source text. If the target text is co-authored, the translator's voice will be additional to the voices in the source text, and Millán-Varela explicitly relates this additional voice to the Bakhtinian notion of "heteroglossia" (2004:38). There is in this sense more heteroglossia in a translated text than an original, although the normalizing tendency Millán-Varela notices may remove other aspects of heteroglossia, a point also observed by Thomson (2004). It is interesting that Millán-Varela's study suggests an enhancement of at least this literary quality of the original in the translation. In Chapter 5, I suggest that translated literature, and especially translated poetry, by requiring more work on the part of the reader to create a context, can also intensify poetic elements in the source text. In this sense, stylistic study of translated texts might be expected to find that such texts possess literariness to a high degree.

Baker (2000) suggests that studies of the style of individual translators can be made easier by the use of corpora, such as the *Translational English Corpus*. But she suggests that it is not necessarily easy to determine the influencing factors, such as the influence of the source language or the "cultural and ideological positioning of the translator" (2000:258). This is a very important point, and it applies to some degree to all stylistics: it is one thing to abstract from the text to the choices it embodies and thus to a translator's (or any writer's) state of mind. But it is taking stylistic study one stage further to assess the influences on that state of mind, and at this stage the study becomes far more speculative. One of the difficulties of Critical Discourse Analysis and also of all translation studies which aim to suggest such influences on the translation (e.g. Boase-Beier 2003a) is their very speculative nature. Perhaps it is partly the precariousness of such undertakings which renders the appeal of the universal and its assumed cognitive (and, ultimately, corporeal) basis in studies such as Tabakowska (1993) so strong.

A further important issue connected with the relationship of the style of the target text to that of its source text is the question of domestication and

foreignization. Venuti (2000) specifically links the stylistic nature of the target text to political questions, in the sense that for him "fluency masks a domestication of the foreign text that is appropriative and potentially imperialistic, putting the foreign to domestic uses which, in British and American cultures, extend the global hegemony of English" (2000:341). He quotes Hilaire Belloc as saying that there should be no foreignizing or we shall lose our tradition of great writing (2000:14).

Venuti (2000:4) is careful to point out that foreignizing, which he traces from Schleiermacher and the German Romantic tradition, is not merely mimetic of the source text. It does not exhaust itself in "direct" strategies such as Vinay & Darbelnet discuss, like "calque", a strategy "whereby a language borrows an expression form of another" or "oblique" strategies such as using the equivalent form of an onomatopoeic animal noise (1995:31-38). Instead, foreignizing "goes beyond literalism to advocate ... experimentalism: innovative translating that samples the dialects, registers and styles already available in the translating language" (Venuti 2000:341). The result is a style which is heterogeneous and "defamiliarizing" (ibid.). In the sense discussed in Chapter 2 such translations obey the "maxmax" principle: they demand a great deal of engagement by the reader. Examples of foreignizing in this sense have much in common, as Venuti's use of the word "defamiliarizing" suggests, with the sort of foregrounding practices discussed by the Russian Formalists and Prague Structuralists as well as many later stylisticians such as van Peer (1986) and Stockwell (2002a) as being characteristic of literary style in particular. Examples of stylistic foregrounding in this sense range from the mild (my "side" example in 3.1) to the striking (Scott's (2000) translations of Baudelaire). Venuti is often misinterpreted in that the perhaps unfortunate term "foreignizing" is taken to suggest a translation that is stylistically close to the foreign text rather than a translation written in defamiliarizing language (see, e.g., Eco 2001:22ff.; Shamma 2005).

Gutt makes a similar point when he states that even in a direct translation it is close "interpretive resemblance" that is aimed at, and not "the reproduction of words, linguistic constructions or textual features" (2000:233); thus Gutt's direct translation is different from Vinay & Darbelnet's. But where Gutt's view is still essentially mimetic, albeit based on a mimeticism in which translation echoes the relationship between style and what it implies, implicates or is a clue to, Venuti's foreignizing has a virtually non-mimetic view of style: a translated text is foreignizing when it proclaims itself a translation by its unfamiliar use of language. The converse, a domesticating translation, aims not to tax the reader by unfamiliarity. In the sense of Relevance Theory, it requires minimal processing and the effects it can achieve will be only those of a text that might as well never have been foreign.

It is important to note, though, that it is as difficult to judge stylistic

features in isolation as foreignizing or domesticating as it is to judge them documentary or instrumental. Because foreignizing is not measurable as an imitation of the foreignness of the original in any recognizable sense, but is a measure of foreignness *per se*, a word like "side" in the example in 3.1 could be seen as foreignizing because unusual (to most speakers) or as domesticating (substituting a word used by a young Jewish woman in Lithuania by a word which might have been used by a non-Jewish woman from Cheshire because the latter fits a domestic system activated by the similarity of the two women in photographs). And as Venuti (1995:303) says, even a foreignizing translation domesticates insofar as what appears foreign to a target-language audience does so against the background of that particular language and culture.

The terms "foreignizing" and "domesticating" are thus best used to describe a particular translation strategy, or the potential effects on readers. However, this is not to say that foreignizing is never mimetic. Both the "side" example and the example of "coffins clapping shut" from Dove in 3.1 shows that there *is* often a strong tendency, perhaps sometimes unconscious, on the part of the translator, to make stylistic choices which echo the original, or even, in the Holzman case, a potential original.

Foreignizing can also be seen, and is seen by Venuti, as a strategy which keeps alive an awareness of difference. Venuti sees in this a contrast to what he likes to call "linguistics-oriented approaches" (2004:148) which in his view favour universalism, though see the discussion of Venuti's criticisms in 1.3 and 1.4. Venuti's view of foreignizing takes up not only the Russian Formalist defamiliarizing and Lecercle's remainder (mentioned in 1.4), but also, more directly, de Man's term "rhetoric", as that which undermines meaning (1983:11), and Spivak's similar term "rhetoricity", the rhetorical nature (in de Man's sense) of a particular language, which works "in the silence between and around words" (2004:370-371).

This subversion of the grammar of a language by its "rhetoricity" has, as MacKenzie (2002) points out, something in common with the views of writers such as Pilkington, considered in Chapter 2, who work with cognitive pragmatic approaches, that is, the view that language carries meaning beyond what is explicitly stated. For Spivak, it is rhetoricity which subverts grammar much as for a relevance theorist it is implicature which goes beyond and can subvert (as in irony) utterance meaning. This subversion can often be in the attitude of the speaker (see Boase-Beier 2004b), and is one thing a translator takes into account by "attending to the author's stylistic experiments" (Spivak 2004:372) and by not neutralizing irony or other evidence of attitude. Such evidence can vary from the reference to auctions in the title of the scientific article mentioned in 2.2 to the presence of ambiguous structures and textual gaps in poems dealing with the Holocaust

(Boase-Beier 2004c). But it remains the translator's decision, often influenced by her or his ethical views, whether and how to put the results of thus attending to "stylistic experiments" into the target text.

The factors discussed in this chapter will potentially influence the translator's choices. Corpus studies such as those mentioned by Winters (2004) or Baker (2000) will allow us to go some way towards reconstructing and comparing choices. But in order to explain the link between the translator's reading of source-text style and its realization in the target text, we need to have a clearer view of how style is processed cognitively. It is to this that we turn in the next chapter.

4. Cognitive Stylistics and Translation

4.1 The cognitive turn in stylistics and translation studies

In a talk in the autumn of 2003, I stated confidently that "There is a cognitive turn in translation studies" (Boase-Beier 2006). My evidence for this was of three types: think-aloud studies such as Krings (1986), Jonasson (1998) and the articles collected in Tirkkonen-Condit & Jääskeläinen (2000), studies which focus on the cognitive processes of the translator as reader, such as Wilss (1996) and Boase-Beier (2004c), and translation studies of a more general cognitive persuasion, such as Gutt (2000), Tabakowska (1993), Setton (1999). Although Gutt feels there is currently a "predominance of socio-political issues in translation studies" (2005:25), interest in the cognitive – which in fact incorporates the socio-political into its notion of context – is therefore noticeable; it can be seen as part of an overall development in the humanities. This is a development encompassing cognitive linguistics (Lee 2001), cognitive literary studies (Turner 1991; Zwaan 1993; Holland 1998; Richardson & Steen 2002), cognitive stylistics or poetics (Stockwell 2002a; Semino & Culpeper 2002) and cognitive approaches to sociology (Cohen 2001), philosophy (Searle 2004; Dennett 1991), archaeology (Mithen 2003) and popular science (Britton 1997; Collett 2003). It is a trend also to be found in the natural sciences where it includes work in neuroscience (Kosslyn & Koenig 1992) and biology (Phillips 2005), and takes in such complex issues as consciousness (Carter 2002) and the nature of the mind (Damasio 1994). The cognitive trend could be seen at work in the rise of the psychological crime novel (e.g. Vine 1988; see Knight 2003), and it has even been observed in the way modern technology is "increasingly aimed inward" (Joel Garreau, quoted in *The Week* 30 July 2004), away from the modification of the environment towards the customization of the way we think. Though these views and approaches are obviously very different, they can be regarded as part of a general shift of focus from the observation of behaviour to speculation about the cause of that behaviour in the mind (Graham 1992: xiiff.). Crane & Richardson, writing in 1999, described this shift as "the major interdisciplinary initiative" (1999:123) of recent years, but suggested it had not yet had much impact on the study of literature.

As some of the above examples show, this is not the case. Some literary studies have been concerned to apply "the revolutionary discoveries of cognitive science and recent research into the brain" (Holland 1998:vi) to literary criticism. Others suggest that the direction of influence may be reversed: Lakoff (1987:vii) and Fabb (1997:3) both say we can study how language is

adapted to fulfil the aims of literature in order to study the mind. But for Stockwell the primary focus of cognitive poetics (which I would regard as virtually synonymous with cognitive stylistics) is neither the application of insights from cognitive linguistics to literature nor from literature to the mind, but the bigger questions about the nature of literature itself (2002a:6).

If one extends these questions to include translation studies, the value of cognitive approaches might be expected to lie in their potential to help us understand issues about literary comprehension, universality, and the difference between literary and non-literary texts. Most recent approaches within cognitive stylistics and cognitive literary studies have been concerned to show that "everyday language and literary language are not separate domains" (Lakoff 1987:vii), that literary meaning far from being "parasitic on core semantics" (Fauconnier 1994:1), reflects central features of the way we think, and that therefore there is no justification for studying a posited "literary mind" (Turner 1991:121) separate from other aspects of mind. Emmot, however, sounds a note of caution: she suggests that an approach grounded in cognitive linguistics might be "limited by its origins since it is created to solve highly specific philosophical and linguistic problems" (2002:155) and works on appropriate sample sentences, thus not giving the full picture of how literary texts work.

This question of the difference between literary and non-literary texts has always been central for translation studies and the main focus of the difference is style, as can be seen from discussions in Gutt (2000) about translation and relevance, in Nord (1997) about the skopos of literary texts or in Newmark (1995) about practical questions of translating. So cognitive approaches are attractive not least because they promise help in providing insights into the nature and effects of the difference.

The examples given above show that both translation studies and stylistics have been recently developing cognitive approaches, but in fact there has always been a strong tendency to view style cognitively – as a reflection of mind and as closely tied up with the nature of literature – both within and outside translation studies. This is because style is obviously, even in the most formalist approaches, a reflection of choice in a way other aspects of language are not, as discussed in Chapter 3. Tabakowska (1993:1) traces this view back to Aristotle; Turner, too, traces the history of cognitive stylistics back to rhetoric which sought to discover "how figures of diction connect with figures of thought" (2000:9). Syntax or lexis have to be acquired or learned, recalled and used pragmatically, all processes which require a mind, but nothing suggests the influence of mind more strongly than those aspects of language use where there is choice. But it is also because understanding the effects of style on the mind involves a consideration of cognitive processes. In the "affective stylistics" of Fish (1972) and in the Reader-

Response Theory of Iser (1971, 1974), Ingarden (1973) and others, reading was seen as a process which "transforms minds" (Fish 1980:66). And though Iser might appear to be taking an anti-cognitive stance when he argues that the aesthetic is perceived by the senses rather than "cognition"(2004:11), he is clearly understanding the word "cognition" in a very narrow sense, as we saw Winograd using it in 1983, to exclude the evidence of the senses, and the appeal to emotions. It is important for readers to be aware that most cognitive stylistics, especially in the area of metaphor (see, for example, Lakoff & Turner 1989), is concerned to show that the very basis of cognition is the body and the senses.

Cognitive stylistic approaches, then, are able to explore "theories that relate linguistic choices to cognitive structures and processes" (Semino & Culpeper 2002:ix), and in so doing are also able to explain cognitive insights which in the work of early stylisticians such as Jakobson (e.g. 1960) or Reader-Response theorists such as Iser, or critical linguists such as Fowler (1996:6), remained rather vague speculation. With their basis in "our biological circumstances" (Stockwell 2002a:4) they also offer important possibilities for the study of universals (see Tsur 1992, 2002) and of our "common pool of basic human experience" (Tabakowska 1993:128) across languages and cultures. Sometimes, cognitive linguistics and stylistics could be seen as antagonistic to relativity (Croft & Cruse 2004:72-73), because they stress what is biologically determined and therefore universal. In this, they may be open to some of Venuti's criticisms (e.g. 1998:1) that linguistic approaches sideline difference. But in fact the cognitive stylistic view of context as a cognitive entity encompassing knowledge about text-types, institutions, social roles and settings (cf. Semino 1997:8) relies upon the interplay of the individual, the cultural and the universal. We know that environment shapes the brain (Phillips 2005), and this is likely to be true of all experience. For Tabakowska (1993:3) it is exactly this meeting of biological sameness and cultural difference that is especially important for a cognitive approach to translation.

And above all, what Verdonk (1999:295) calls the "passivity of the reader" in linguistic, stylistic and critical approaches to literature before Fish, and which made such earlier approaches rather uninteresting for translation, has, with the development of cognitive stylistics, been irrevocably shown to be a myth. The translator can now be shown to be an active participant in the reading of the source text.

In Chapter 1 we saw how, before stylistics, the role of style in translation was merely mentioned in passing. We saw that even the advent of stylistics, because style was first seen as something fixed in the text, did not allow much scope for the creativity which characterizes so much of translating. The greater emphasis on context in stylistics after the 1970s (see Verdonk

1999:296), taking in society and the reader, has gradually allowed for an increasing focus on the mind of the reader. This cognitive view of context has affected approaches to the translation of style in two ways. Firstly, the translator-as-reader view has been able to move from the meaning *implied by* the text (still the basis of views such as Diaz-Diocaretz 1985) to the meaning *inferred from* the text by the translator (as in Boase-Beier 2004b). And, secondly, the translator-as-writer view has been able to become much more sensitive to questions of reader interaction and expectations, to the interplay between the creativity and freedom of the translator and how this must always be affected by what the reader of the target text might do, feel and decide, as shown in studies by Wilss (1996) or Gutt (2000). This has happened alongside an increasingly critical stance towards the notion of equivalence, seen in writers such as Koller (1979), and still discussed in recent works such as Jin, Di (2003). It should be remembered, though, that notions of equivalence had already shifted away from the formal in the 1960s, with Nida & Taber's (1974) emphasis on the dynamic, and thus on what the reader of the target text might be expected to think. Recent cognitive stylistics, in particular, explores the notion of style-as-mind in ways which are potentially highly interesting for translation studies. I would say the main issues in cognitive stylistics which are of relevance to translation are at least the following six:

i) Meaning is more than the words on the page. All discussions of content/form dichotomy, of translating sense-for-sense or word-for-word, have implicitly acknowledged this. One way in which meaning is more than words is in what the words imply. Communication relies on implicatures (implications we judge intentional) in the words uttered, assumptions and inferences in the reader's mind. How, then, do we translate implicatures and allow for such inferences and assumptions?
ii) Reading is a cognitive process. It is also a major part of the translator's task. So how do translators read? How do they arrive at an interpretation? (And *do* they arrive at an interpretation?)
iii) With all the freedom and involvement of the reader, we are still always trying, not just in literature, but in every type of communication, to find a reading which is more than merely personal. If what we experience as a result of reading is a changed mental state, in some respects similar to that represented in the text or guided by or enhanced by elements in the text, how do we ensure when translating that the reader of our translation also experiences a change in mental state, and that those changes, too, have at least something in common with those we have ourselves experienced?
iv) What does cognitive stylistics have to say about the difference be-

tween literary and non-literary texts? Is literature dependent on formal difference or does it provide a different reading experience from non-literature? If so, what features ensure that it gives a different reading experience? If literature demands more effort, and gives greater returns, how should literary translation make sure that this is also true of the target text?

v) And if there are universal features of literature (and of other text-types), what is their relation to the culture-specific and the context-specific?

vi) If reading a text for translation, like any act of communication, means inferring an author, assuming a meaning, finding something we can act upon, can we accept that we are merely acting as though we knew what the author meant? Can we balance a sense of our ultimate ignorance with the need to act?

It is not my intention to discuss these issues in order but I shall refer to them as they arise in the course of this chapter in an attempt to demonstrate how a cognitive view of style in its various aspects might help explain what translators find in the text and what they do with what they find.

4.2 Translating the mind in the text

The notion of mind as that which mediates between the world and the text has always been important both for stylistics and translation studies, and has been one of the aspects considered to a greater or lesser extent whenever style has been taken into account in translation. This is particularly the case for literary translation. If literary texts are indeed "a product of the mind" (Graham 1992:xiv), then we would expect to find traces of the mind of the originator in the product, that is, in the style of the source text. Schleiermacher, in the early part of the nineteenth century, saw language as both a system of common knowledge and a reflection of a speaker's mind (Schleiermacher 1938; Mueller-Vollmer 1985:11; MacKenzie 2002:6). But there is much in the mind of a writer which remains implicit and the translator needs to pay attention to such implicit meanings. Schleiermacher's view is that translation involves either a movement of the reader towards the writer, or of the writer towards the reader (Schulte & Biguenet 1992:42). It is significant that the meeting is of the author, and not the text, with the reader; the concern is with the author's "peculiar way of thinking and feeling" (Schulte & Biguenet 1992:39), a view also held by Spitzer, who said that style "reveals the soul of the author" (1948:15).

But there is no consensus about how the mind inhabits the text, just as there is no consensus about how the mind inhabits the body (Mithen

2003:31ff.; Sheldrake 2003:1-16). Where the notion of "mind style" has been used in approaching translation, it is often Fowler who is cited as a source. Thus mind style is usually seen as "any distinctive linguistic presentation of an individual mental self" (1977a:103). But Fowler was not entirely consistent in his use of the term, at one point calling it "an impression of a world-view" (1977a:73). This formulation suggests a mind style is not something located in the linguistic structures of the text but something more tenuous: an "impression", presumably in the mind of the reader. Semino & Swindlehurst distinguish mind style from "point of view"; the latter is the "perspective from which the fictional world is presented" but mind style appears to be an attribute of mind: "the way in which the fictional world is perceived" (1996:145). In a recent article (Boase-Beier 2003a) I distinguish mind style as a textual feature from the corresponding cognitive state which can be attributed to it, and that is the way I shall use the term in this and the next chapter.

It is important to remember at this point that, at least since Wimsatt & Beardsley (in Wimsatt 1954) and other New Critics rejected the emphasis on authorial intention, there has been a realization that we cannot identify the mind in (or behind) the text unequivocally with that of the author (see also Fowler 1977:36). As point (vi) above suggests, the translator might reconstruct an authorial voice, but still be aware that it *is* a reconstruction and that it is not identical with the real author's voice. Because Tennyson wrote in the voice of a suicidal murderer in 'Maud' (1894), it does not mean this was Tennyson's own situation, or even inclination, in spite of the view of some of his contemporary critics (Thwaite 1996:322). The concept of "authorial voice" is useful for the translator because it allows for the perception and creation of a coherent style, without having to claim unequivocally that this is the voice of the original author; the notion of inferred author (or character, or narrator) suggests that the burden of discovery lies with the reader or translator. But Reader-Response Theory in particular has been careful to point to the reciprocal nature of inferring through reading and thereby attributing implication to the writer: Wolff (1971) notes that an author might have a particular readership in mind, and so mind style in the text might be seen as what Iser (1979:34) calls "a textual structure anticipating the presence of such an recipient", the "implied reader" (Fowler 1977b:33), as seen from the reader's own perspective. Stockwell (2002b), who does not actually use the term "mind style", speaks of the cognitive stance which the reader takes up, guided by the changing deictic position reflected in the text.

In a recent article (2004b), I suggest that one way a reader is thus guided is by the presence of actual gaps in the text that have to be filled. The example I use is this sentence from a poem by von Törne:

> Ich lese in der Zeitung, dass die Mörder /von Mord und Totschlag nichts gewusst --.
>
> (von Törne 1981:56)

The sentence means something like 'I read (present tense) in the paper, that the murderers … known nothing of murder and manslaughter'. The dashes indicate a missing auxiliary verb in the German. What the translator needs to be aware of is that the German reader has a cognitive schema for structures such as "Ich lese, dass sie nichts gewusst (*aux*)" which clearly suggests there should be an auxiliary at the end of the sentence. This auxiliary could be understood as either indicative *haben* ("have") or subjunctive *hätten* ("are said to have/might have"). The immediate linguistic context implies both options, and this causes the reader to imagine both options, with their attendant consequences. For the translator, the presence of the gap in the original is likely to focus the attention on an attempt to keep open these two very different possible ways of thinking; translating that which goes beyond the words on the page involves finding a way to reproduce the gap in English, so that the same options (as far as possible) are open to the English reader. This example will be taken up again in more detail in Chapter 5.

This view of the textual structures acting upon the reader's mind shares with Reader-Response Theory the insight that "the reader will be able to view things that would never have come into focus as long as [her or] his own habitual dispositions were determining [her or] his orientation" (Iser 1979:35). Mind style, in this approach, by revealing a new cognitive state, allows the reader to see the world in new ways; in Relevance-Theory terms it produces "poetic effects" (Pilkington 2000). The cognitive stylistic view has similarities with the view of discourse analysts such as Cook, who maintain that in order to explain "the extraordinary value and pleasure" people find in reading of "worlds and people who do not exist, of emotions and experiences which do not affect us … [of] banal facts which we know already in works which create patterns and play with expectations for no apparent reason at all", we must assume that "literary discourse has an effect on minds, refreshing or changing our mental representations of the world" (Cook 1994:4). For translation this suggests an approach in which the style of the text both conveys and creates a cognitive state. If the translation fails to capture such a cognitive state the target text will have less effect on its readers' minds. So a first step towards preserving the mind-altering effect of literature in translation will be to recognize it. The sort of cognitive content that might be conveyed by the text could usefully be thought of as being organized into schemata, or "pre-existing knowledge structures" (Verdonk 1999:296), which individual readers have built up through a mixture of possibly innate knowledge such as how the body reacts in certain situations, as

well as cultural knowledge and all manner of conventionalized patterns, beliefs and ideologies. The German speaker's knowledge that "nichts gewusst", in the example above, must be followed by *haben* or *hätten* is stored in such a (grammatical) schema and s/he also has schemata for more generalized aspects of knowledge such as how to read a poem.

Translated literature in particular could thus be seen to change the mind in three ways:

i) by acquainting us with thoughts or feelings we had not experienced, or reflected on, or known to exist;
ii) by showing us that other people experience them;
iii) by allowing us to experience those thoughts or feelings for ourselves.

In the von Törne example above, we learn the salutary lesson that, however much ambiguities might be seen as arising from the structure of the German language (which allows gaps such as in the example above), we, too, can experience a similarly ambiguous state of mind.

But there is something else that a literary translation must take into account: part of the way literary texts produce such enhancing effects on the reader's cognitive state is by focussing on the search for such effects. This explains why literary texts make that search difficult by stylistic means. Sperber & Wilson (1995:263ff.) express what might be considered a prototypical view when they say that in communication the search for cognitive effects stops when the reader (or hearer) assumes that the speaker's intention has been reached. But discussion in Chapter 2 underlined what translators, as readers of literature, have always – at least intuitively – known: that we cannot reach such an intention. Because the act of reading focuses on the search, rather than its (unattainable) end, our literary reading is geared towards maximal relevance (Sperber & Wilson 1995:261). If a literary author's aim is to make the reader search, the translation must keep whatever prolongs that search, not just because the enhancement of cognitive state will be greater, but because the search will be better. Translation which gives away too much too easily could be seen to have failed in this particular task. The tendency to make things easy for the reader, noted by Berman (2000), can be seen especially when the original text has several possible interpretations. For example "Birne der Betrachtung" (literally 'pear of observation') in a poem by Goll (Bullock & Schulte 1981:10-11) has, in Schulte's translation, become an "observing pear", although the other possibility, that the pear is a focus of observation, would give a completely different reading. In this poem, entitled 'Crucifixion', autumn is represented as the object of crucifixion, so the pear could be an icon for us to look at or it could be a metaphor for observation itself. As each interpretation occurs to the reader, the poem is

read differently, different contexts being built up first around the pear as an object to be looked at and secondly as an object symbolizing looking. The translation does not give us the opportunity to create these different contexts. If "Birne der Betrachtung" contains two implicatures – that the pear represents observation and that it represents the observed – then the translation keeps neither, but uses a phrase which explicitly states the former. To translate both implicatures it is essential for a translator to notice them both, and then use an English phrase, such as 'pear of observation' which also has both.

Studies of the style of translated texts (e.g. Dahlgren 2005) generally see the style as the result of choice, and thus, ultimately, if not explicitly, of a cognitive state driving the choice. But, as Malmkjær (2004:13) shows, such studies cannot ignore that a translation contains both the author's and the translator's choices. One way of approaching these different choices is to compare corpora of texts from source and translation (Baker 2000). Another way, examined in 5.1 (see also Boase-Beier 2003a), is to see the translator as taking on a particular translating persona, based on an interaction of her/his own view, or cognitive state, with that of an inferred author. Thus two translations of the poem 'Two Donkeys' by Christian Morgenstern are seen as embodying two different views, held by two different translators, of the voice of the inferred author.

The notion of mind in the text can, then, be approached from the point of view of the mind constructed as inhering in the source text and affecting the reader in a particular way (as in the von Törne poem), or as being the cognitive state suggested by the interaction of inferred author mind style and translator mind style (as in the Morgenstern versions; see 5.1). But it is possible, and indeed sometimes necessary, to shift from the inferred author's, the reader's, or the translator's mind style to that of a whole group, people or culture (see Millán-Varela 2004). This will happen particularly when texts have multiple or unknown authors. A typical instance of this is the Bible. For Nida & Taber (1974), the style in the Bible was a tool for conveying God's message, and it could be adapted to suit its audience. The voice of God, one assumes, is not a stylistically marked voice. Indeed, it could not be, if we take the very varied provenance of the Bible into account. It serves the message and the sense of author comes from the content of the message rather than the way it is expressed. But Mary Phil Korsak takes a different approach to the voice of this authorless or multi-authored text: her translation *At the Start* (Korsak 1992) is, in the words of A.D. Moody in the Foreword, in "an English modified and refined by the characteristic qualities of the Hebrew original" and it is able to express the point of contact "between the mind of a modern reader and the primal Hebrew mentality" (Korsak 1992: xii-xiii).

The mind in the text can be seen as representing a cognitive state in all

its aspects: it is influenced by ideology, it takes a particular attitude, or it embodies a particular feeling. The first, the effect of ideology on mind style, is examined in critical approaches such as that of Fowler who saw meaning as "inseparable from ideology" and dependent on "social structures" (Fowler *et al* 1997:2).Translation scholars, though not usually taking up Fowler's approach explicitly, have also focussed on the ideological aspects of style (e.g. Prasad 1999). One possible difference between literary and non-literary texts is the greater presence of an informing mind in the former. In the von Törne poem with the missing auxiliary, though a gap cannot tell us what to think, it tells us that we must think, in itself an ideological position. It should not be forgotten, though, that non-literary texts are never fully objective, as analyses carried out by proponents of Critical Discourse Analysis (such as Fairclough 1992), and mentioned in 1.4, have shown. Nevertheless, if the cognitive state informing a text is seen to be more central to literature than to other texts, then a literary translation would need to pay particular attention to this aspect of the text.

The second aspect of mind in the text, that it carries an attitude conveyed by the style, is particularly important in the translation of irony, where the attitude towards the subject matter, if lost, would alter the translation completely. The German poet von Törne frequently achieves such irony by speaking with the voices of those he despises, people he regards as speaking and acting without thought of the consequences; his poems are full of thoughtless idioms and common German expressions, whose danger is exposed when they are questioned. There is thus the (thoughtless) attitude of the speaker and also the ironical attitude of the narrative voice in the lines "Ja, dann wird deutsch gesprochen … / Wir sind doch wieder wer (von Törne 1981:189), literally 'we'll speak German then … we're someone again', suggesting the impatient need of Germans everywhere, in the aftermath of the Second World War, to "carry on as if nothing had happened" with "a lack of moral sensitivity bordering on inhumanity" (Sebald 2003, tr. Bell:41-42). It is important here that the irony of "to speak German" is kept. Neither "to speak plainly", which conveys one meaning, nor "to speak our own language", which conveys another, can fully preserve the irony, which lies in the contrast between the idiomatic meaning of "to speak German" ("mit jemandem deutsch reden"), which is to be direct and forthright, and the poet's meaning, as construed by the translator, which is to hide the truth. Yet the mental processes experienced by the reader of the German text are only possible for the reader of the English translation if the irony is preserved; something like "plain German" might be a possibility.

Related to the concept of textual mind as textual attitude is a view of the textualized mind as feeling. This affective dimension has always played a role in our understanding of literary texts as Kant stated (see Kant 1987) and

as writers such as Fish (1980), Miner (1990) and Downes (2000) point out, but it has gained new emphasis in the study of "poetic effects" (Pilkington 2000). Consider this line of poetry by Crossley-Holland (1986:60):

> Beyond the hectares of mangel and beet / Open silver-grey arms, stunning, the sea

Here the words "open …. arms" suggest a homecoming, "stunning", following on from "silver-grey" suggests an impact stronger than the expected "shining", and the whole line with its short phrases and repeated sounds suggests a repetitive, gradual vision. Not, then, a description of the sea but a description of its effect on a returning viewer. A translation will need to keep that mixture of comfort ("open … arms"), awe ("stunning") and gradual vision, but decisions as to whether the word *open* is an adjective or a verb or both will probably be less important. In the poem 'Wordly Power' by Pushkin, the word "guliaiuschchikh" (Bethea 1999:150) could be translated by 'wandering' or 'strolling', but the word "sauntering" in "sauntering scions of the civilised class" in a translation by Adès (2001:147) is clearly meant to suggest lack of concern for the crucifix in the poem, and is, according to the translator's personal communication, chosen as an "emotive word".

If the features we have looked at so far in this section – gaps in the text, weak implicatures, the characteristic of fitting many different contexts, conveying ideologies, attitudes and feelings – are all typical of literary texts, then translations will need to make sure that none of these characteristics gets lost in the translation. All of them have the effect of demanding a greater involvement on the part of the reader than one would usually expect in a non-literary text. Unlike von Törne's poem, an actual left-wing newspaper report of the Nazi murderers would probably have supplied the subjunctive auxiliary, thus indicating a refusal on the newspaper's part to believe their ignorance. An extreme right-wing paper might have used an indicative to endorse it. And so on. One prerequisite for the survival of such possibilities in the translation is the recognition of subtle stylistic features such as ambiguity, contrasts, change of perspective, by the translator.

As we saw in the previous section, cognitive approaches to style and translation rely on the interplay of stylistic universals with stylistic characteristics peculiar to an individual language, culture or view. Fowler (1977a) plays down the universal aspects because his purpose is to emphasize the importance of social context; however, he acknowledges that the two interact. And it has been recognized by countless critics (e.g. Vendler 1995) that literature appears to work by combining the universal with the particular; see also Goldsworthy (1998:43). Another way to see this is that different readers construct different mental pictures of the text (different text worlds,

in Semino's view; 1997:192) because of their different backgrounds.

For translation, a cognitive view might suggest that what is universal will be more easily translated than what is culturally or linguistically diverse. Thus Gutt (2005) suggests that a translation of the New Testament story of the man ill with paralysis, which includes his friends lowering him through the roof, will not make sense in a target culture which has steep thatched roofs. One possibility is to generalize so much as to reduce the cultural conflict to what is mutually comprehensible, even leaving out the mention of the roof if necessary.

Studies like that by Gutt (2000), which use Relevance Theory as a basis, differ from earlier views of the translation of mind in the text in that Relevance Theory does not speak of re-experiencing the author's thoughts, as for example Schleiermacher did, but of "enlarging mutual cognitive environments" (MacKenzie 2002:4; Sperber & Wilson 1995:38ff.). This suggests that the readers Gutt mentions in the *roof* example just given cannot ever share the exact same connotations of roofs, whatever those were, with the original authors and readers, whoever they were. A common denominator, as Gutt (2005) suggests, is one way of creating the greatest overlap or greatest mutuality in cognitive environments of source-text author, source-text reader and target-text reader. Providing content in footnotes and illustrations is another, very different, way, but their aim is the same. Such strategies relate to the view of translation as a third language: a space where cognitive environments, because shared, are changed. Translation in this sense is attempting to bring about a meeting of minds. What this account ignores, though, is that the search for contexts which allow the source text to make sense could be part of the aim of the text. This will certainly be true if it is a literary text, where shared environments will not be provided but will be constructed by the reader.

But not only general knowledge of the world can be universal; so can what Kiparsky (1987) calls "categories of literariness" or what I described at the end of Chapter 1 as aspects of style, such as metaphor or ambiguity. If these are not arbitrary but are psychological givens, it is necessary to consider, in looking at their translation, both the universal basis and what is specific to a language, culture, author, or text. The next four sections examine four such aspects of the style of texts and the sort of problems they pose for translation.

4.3 Ambiguity and textual gaps

Ambiguity as a cognitive process appears just such a candidate for universality. It is often seen as "one of the special or defining features" (Wales 2001:16; Frye 1957:72), a "principle" (Boase-Beier 1987:130) of literary

language. As a stylistic characteristic it involves the presence of structures in a text which have multiple meaning; its universal status in linguistics is generally seen to result from the arbitrariness of the relation between signs and meanings (Wales 2001:15). For deconstructionist critics such as Derrida (1988), ambiguity arises automatically out of the context-dependency of meaning; this view of the inherent ambiguity of language was used as an argument against the linguistic certainties of structuralism. Cognitive linguistics also undermines the certainties of structuralism but in a different way: by focussing on the mind (which often entertains ambiguous thoughts) as opposed to the text. In cognitive stylistics, ambiguity is also of especial interest because it can be seen as expressing a cognitive state in which several different and possibly contradictory thoughts are entertained at the same time (Popova 2002:49). To take an example from Boase-Beier (1987:130), the compound "apple-grass" in a poem by Douglas Dunn (1981:17) could, at first reading, have either of the following interpretations:

a) grass which is (to the horses that eat it) like an apple (to the watching man eating one)
b) grass which contains apples

Of course there are other metaphorical readings (e.g. apple-green grass) but these two will serve as illustration.

The first, metaphorical, reading is suggested by the earlier lines of the poem and immediate context of the compound which describe a man on a ladder eating an apple while horses "munch on the apple-grass". The second meaning is suggested by an even earlier line "Fallen fruits / Spill sweetening juices on the orchard grass". As the context provides evidence for both readings, both can be assumed to apply. "Apple" and "grass" are thus both in a metaphorical and a local relation to one another; one relation and therefore one meaning for the compound does not rule the other out. It is not even the case that these two readings are potentially mutually exclusive, and just made to both apply in the poem, as the explanation given by Furniss & Bath (1996:214) and Hutchinson (1983:61) for poetic ambiguity would suggest. There is no reason not to regard as ambiguity any relationship of several meanings with one form, whether or not these meanings might be potentially mutually exclusive.

The question of what the translator might do with passages such as these has long exercised translation scholars and theorists. If the ambiguity lies in a compressed structure like a compound, as in this example, it is not usually difficult for the translator to preserve a similar ambiguity: *Apfelgras* in German would have a similar ambiguity, as would *mela-erba* in Italian or *elemalı çayır* in Turkish. And indeed compounds, because inherently ambiguous,

are a device much used in poetry (see Boase-Beier 1987). But there are other types of ambiguity which are more difficult to translate. The poem 'März' by Sarah Kirsch (1995:23) begins:

Weiße	Zähne	die			
white	*teeth*	*the*			
Schneeglöckchenzwiebeln			beim	Graben	
snow-drop-bulbs			*when*	*digging*	
			by-the	*ditch*	

As the gloss suggests, the phrase "beim Graben" is ambiguous, but this is not structural ambiguity of the type found in compounds; instead, it depends upon etymological links in the German language. The first meaning that comes to mind is 'when digging', because why, otherwise, would one see the bulbs of snowdrops unless one had uncovered them? But the translators Anthony Vivis and Wendy Mulford opt for the other meaning when they translate "The little white teeth the / Snowdrops by the ditch" (1995:24). The word *Graben* is not only a ditch, but it is also the nominalized form of the verb *graben*, to dig, and in addition has associations with graves, a word with which it is also etymologically related. The final line of the poem, which speaks of reading the word "Gras" (grass) backwards, suggests the link with a grave, because *Gras* read backwards is *Sarg*, coffin. In English, though *ditch* and *dig* are probably etymologically related, it is not so easy to find an expression which suggests both and certainly not one which also suggests a grave. Ambiguity of this sort is always closely tied up with the language which contains it: to a speaker of German, part of the cognitive context associated with a ditch is the potential link with a grave, not just in this poem. This sort of connection, because language-specific, is a particular problem for translation.

Early writers on translation such as Tytler in 1790 (Robinson 2002: 208ff.), regarding ambiguity as a stylistic fault, a view which derives from Plato (cf. Abrams 1953), saw it as the translator's job to resolve it. This sense of ambiguity as failure is also implicit in a book by Olson, which describes how problems of interpretation arise from the inadequacies of written language, including its compression and linearity (1994:19), which mean it will always give rise to ambiguities. The question for the translator is then this: should s/he keep the ambiguity in the target text, or, regarding it as an anomaly that arises in written language, make no attempt to preserve it? The latter appears to be what Vivis and Mulford (Kirsch 1995) have done in their translation of the Kirsch poem. But a view which sees style not only as a result of linguistic choice but of a state of mind would see the phrase "beim Graben" as representative not merely of an anomaly of German but of a

cognitive state which combines the act of digging, a ditch and a grave, suggesting images to do with trenches, wars, camps, bones, graveyards, death, archaeology, gardening, growth, and so on. Having arrived at what can reasonably be seen as the narrator's (or inferred author's) meaning in such a case clearly does not involve disambiguation, but rather the recognition of all these meanings and the ways they combine. It also implies an attempt to find a translation which allows access to this complex state of mind.

The view of ambiguity as essential to poetry, found in early writers like Empson (1930) and Frye (1957), was important in literary studies in the increasing focus on the reader in the 1970s, ambiguity in a text marking a point of interaction for the reader because it gave "room for alternative reactions" (Empson 1930:1), and led to an attempt, not always successful, to find coherence, according to Iser (1979:119). An approach based on cognitive stylistics would see ambiguity as both engaging the reader because it is difficult to process (in Relevance-Theory terms) and as allowing insight into what an ambiguous state of mind might mean. Such a state of mind, rather than arising out of the "peaceful coexistence of alternative meanings" which Leech (1969:205) finds characteristic of ambiguity, can be profoundly uncomfortable, frightening, or unbearable.

German, because of its relatively small vocabulary (185,000 words as opposed to 500,000 in English, at a conservative estimate; see McCrum *et al* 1992:10) and productive morphology, is particularly good at providing ambiguous words which signal complex states of mind. In Celan's poem 'Psalm' occurs the phrase "niemand bespricht unseren Staub" (no-one be-speaks our dust) and the word *besprechen* can mean to speak about, to call up (a spirit) or to banish (a plague). As a translation Felstiner suggests "no one incants our dust", but he is aware of its inadequacy, for the German phrase suggests both that Creation is annulled, and that no-one speaks of the Jewish people (1995:168). But it also suggests that no-one is able to banish the memory of what has happened. I suggest "calls up" (Boase-Beier 2004c:101), but this, too, seems inadequate not only to the meanings that the German word can carry irrespective of its context, but to the particular interpretation which its context in the poem suggests.

Not all ambiguity rests upon such words with multiple meanings; especially in poetry it can result from syntactic structure. A typical structural ambiguity in German is the inversion of subject and verb in a main clause following a clause introduced by *wenn* ('if/when'). Such inversion can also signal a question. A poem by Ausländer, 'Verwundert' ('Astonished'; Osers 1977:27-7) exploits this ambiguity so that the reader does not know whether a statement is being made or a question asked. Is the poem describing a group of people sitting around a table, or is it asking *Do we/will we sit round a table*? The ambiguity is compounded by the fact that the same verb form is

used in German for future and present tenses. Is the astonishment because a safe, comfortable life has come or is it in fact questioning whether such a life will ever come? Osers opts for the former in his translation.

Though these examples depend upon different linguistic features of the source language – the morphological ambiguity of *Graben*, the polysemy of *besprechen*, the structural ambiguity of inversion – what a cognitive approach suggests in all cases is a focus on an ambiguous state of mind. Furniss & Bath (1996:10) prefer to call such a state of mind "ambivalent", a usage I shall not follow here. Different linguistic types of ambiguity may have different connotations, but all are equally capable of implicating ambiguous cognitive states. The connection with graves in the Kirsch poem is an implicature of the word "Graben", as the ambiguous situation of the Jews (not called up, banished, discussed) in the Celan poem is an implicature of *besprechen*; and the uncertainty in the Ausländer poem is an implicature of the inversion.

Ambiguity may be removed intentionally in literary translation, because it is seen as a fault, or its implicatures may be missed. But in non-literary texts such as newspaper and magazine articles, many instances of ambiguity are disambiguated in context. Their effect depends upon the linear process of reading, so they first attract attention and create a situation where multiple meanings are held in mind, to be then resolved into only one. An example is the headline "Non fiori ma firme contro il palazzo" (*Panorama* 15.4.2004), which would be literally in English 'Not flowers but signatures against the palace' (i.e. the government). There are two sources of disambiguation in the accompanying text: a photograph of Publio Fiori and the phrase "the vice-president ... Publio Fiori", both of which tell us this is the name of a person, a fact which many Italian readers would already know. It is still possible, however, upon reading the headline, to be uncertain which of the two meanings applies, especially as it is written in small capitals so we cannot see whether it is a name. After reading the article, the uncertainty is removed. From this point of view all that would be lost in an English translation would be the foregrounding of the apparent contrast between flowers and signatures, and also the alliteration. Because headlines have no particular function other than their foregrounding effects, most translators would not find this a problem.

The ambiguity of headlines is a common phenomenon; in English it is often achieved through the use of compounds, which, as we saw in the "apple-grass" example from Dunn's poem, are by nature ambiguous. Here are two English headlines which use compounds (*Norwich Advertiser*, October 22nd, 2004):

1) Pants Protestor Trousers Seat
2) Knife Woman Attacks Breadman

There are several possible interpretations in each case; I only give three for each headline here:

1) a) Ineffective protestor nevertheless gets a place at a concert.
   b) A protestor about underwear from abroad not being allowed into the country gains a seat in local government.
   c) A protestor who only wears pants gains a seat in local government.
2) a) A woman armed with a knife attacks a man serving behind a bakery counter in a supermarket.
   b) A woman who has threatened to knife her neighbour attacks a man on the street, who defends himself with a French loaf.
   c) A woman wielding a knife attacks a man delivering bread.

On first coming across these headlines the reader will, as described by Pilkington (2000:63), supply "contextual assumptions", that allow an interpretation. In fact, if a newspaper (or other text) is being especially manipulative, it may guide the reader towards particular contextual assumptions by putting them into her or his mind. "Pants" in example (1) above suggests a negative attitude to the protestor, whereas "underpants" would not (and would also not provide the alliteration of "pants"). "Breadman" is already lexicalized as a man who delivers bread, suggesting that a man providing a service was attacked by a woman who is labelled with a compound reminiscent of *gun man* or *axe murderer*. Such connotations will persist even after disambiguation in context has taken place.

This persistence of connotation after disambiguation is a situation much exploited in advertisements. A Spanish television advertisement for a slimming product uses the word "gorda", which literally means 'fat woman' but is also a common term of affection and admiration. The woman in the advertisement takes this compliment by her partner literally and uses the product in question, so that the next time he uses the expression it no longer applies literally, but only in its idiomatic sense. Though the context makes it clear that the woman's partner now means the word in this second sense, nevertheless, the possibility of its literal meaning, once foregrounded in the advertisement, could be expected to remain in the consciousness of female viewers, prompting them to buy the product. This means that the translation of an advert like this must take into account at least the following factors:

i) the two meanings suggested by the original wording
ii) the meaning which becomes dominant in each disambiguating context
iii) the context itself: it is the slimming product which plays the decisive role in changing the first to the second meaning
iv) the sense of oscillation between two possible states (expressed by "gorda") which the product is seen to stabilize.

In literary texts, as all the previous examples suggest, such disambiguation does not occur: the ambiguity remains as an indication of an ambiguous cognitive state. But such ambiguity does not only arise out of words or structures which suggest two or more meanings. Some of the most striking instances arise from actual linguistic gaps in the text. We saw one such instance in the missing auxiliary in 4.2. Another is in the following line, which comes at the end of the poem 'Nicht gesagt' ('Not Said'), by Marie-Luise Kaschnitz:

Aber	wer	bin	ich	dass
but	*who*	*am*	*I*	*that*

(Conrady 1977:894)

It is echoed by the final line of a Sarah Kirsch poem 'Trennung' ('Separation'):

Wo	bin	ich	denn,	dass
where	*am*	*I*	*then*	*that*

(Kirsch 1991:npn)

That what? Like the missing auxiliary, these structures are simply incomplete. But whereas missing auxiliary structures are not uncommon in poetry, the two examples just given do not fit a recognized pattern. They give no guidance to the reader.

Spolsky argues that gaps in the way we understand the world are part of our cognitive make-up, and that creativity is to some extent the result of the mind trying to "vault the gaps in brain structure", in order to "make sense of the world" (1993:2, 3). These gaps are in our mind rather than in the text, and are part of the way the mind is programmed to work, a direct result of its modular structure. She links such mental gaps with Iser's (1979) textual gaps. In this sense, texts which include ambiguity may be seen as ways of reflecting the creative processes of the mind. And the process of filling linguistic gaps in the text might thus enable the reader to go through an important, essentially creative cognitive process: the filling of cognitive gaps, a creative exploration of identity or place in the world. Such textual gaps are not difficult to translate: the glosses in the examples above might serve as translations into English. They are also unlikely to be missed by a translator as they are so obvious. Gaps like that in the von Törne poem are less obvious and require greater vigilance on the part of the translator.

There is another reason why ambiguity is so essential to literature: it demands a potential search for resolution and so triggers a response from what Grandin calls "the seeking system" (2005:96) in the brain. She explains how the activation of this system, which causes great excitement and

interest in humans and other animals, is responsible for such behaviours as hunting. Remember, too, that Dawkins (1998:285) and Hernandi (2002) saw the mind-changing qualities of literature as bringing evolutionary advantage. It is interesting to speculate that it is especially the "search that feels so good" (Grandin 2005:96; cf. also Benjamin 1992) in literature and in life, because this is what enables us to survive and adapt.

Ambiguity in a text may be subtle, as in the example of the missing auxiliary in the von Törne poem, or it may be very striking, as in the Kaschnitz poem, which so obviously stops mid-sentence. In the latter case it draws attention to itself and is an instance of what is usually considered as 'foregrounding'. This is the topic of the next section. Like foregrounding, ambiguity is one of many textual features which seem to indicate the nature of a text. Lexical ambiguity is typical of headlines, whereas open-ended structural ambiguity of the type just given is much more likely to occur in poems, where it demands the involvement of the reader to a greater extent.

4.4 Foregrounding, salience and visibility

We saw in Chapter 1 that foregrounding was first discussed by the Russian Formalists and the Prague Structuralists, (e.g. in Garvin 1964 and Lemon & Reis 1965), as *ostraneniye* (often translated from Russian as defamiliarization) and, in Czech, *aktualisace.* It was in fact Garvin's translation of Havránek (1964:6) which first introduced the term foregrounding into English. It has, at least since then, played a major part in stylistic theory (e.g. in Leech 1969, van Peer 1986). For translation, the notion of a text or passage or structure which draws attention to itself, which, in Fowler's words, involves the "use of some strategy to force us to look" (1996:57) is interestingly at variance with a common theme in translation: that of smoothness, neutrality, readability (Venuti 1995:1ff.). There are two possible ways in which foregrounding might be perceived in the translated text: one is to see it as lack of smoothness, as a sign of the awkwardness of what is sometimes, negatively, termed 'translationese' (Landers 2001:209). The other is Venuti's (1995) view that if a text does not draw attention to its language it will more easily be seen as part of the canon of the target culture, rather as a foreigner might wear the typical dress of a new country and assimilate as much as possible in order not to appear different. Visibility is a term much used by Venuti and is often assumed simply to refer to a text's visibility as *a translation*, in the sense that the source text is visible in or behind the translated text. However, Venuti is careful to make it clear that he is not simply talking of visibility in this sense. Translation, he says, is writing which "releases the remainder" (1998:11). "Remainder", a term he takes from Lecercle (1990), refers to the "minor variables" within language, which are the focus for "power relationships"

(Venuti 1998:10). But he argues, just as Fowler, Empson (e.g. 1930) and others have done, that all (literary) writing does this. Indeed, Aristotle (in Cope & Sandys' translation, 1970:14) also said "a foreign air must be given to the language; for people are admirers of … what is far off, remote, and all that is *wonderful* is agreeable". This means that domesticated, smooth writing is incompatible with what might be seen as the nature of literature, namely to prolong the processes of reading and understanding. A third issue raised by the question of foregrounding and its relation to translation is that if, to echo Jakobson, we regard foregrounding as evidence of an emphasis on form (or "set towards" it in Jakobson's terms, see 1960:356), then its presence provides what Gutt's Relevance-Theory view calls a "communicative clue" (2000:134); that is, it alerts us to the speaker's wish to draw attention to a particular word, phrase or passage. In Gutt's view, such clues are present in order to guide the reader to the author's intention. But in the terms I have been using here, they may serve to draw attention to structures for which it is up to the reader to find contexts; that may indeed be the author's intention.

Before Relevance Theory, the notion of "communicative clue" was not used, but the idea was there. Riffaterre, for example, spoke of "stylistic devices" by which the reader was "guided … to the essentials" (1960:207, 1959:162).

For writers like Mukařovský (1964) and Jakobson (1978b), the foregrounded language of poetry distinguished it from non-poetic language. However, as van Peer (1986:9) indicates, it is difficult to maintain such a distinction in view of the fact that non-poetic language (for example in advertisements) clearly also uses language that draws attention to itself. For Furniss & Bath (1996:13) it is a particular type of foregrounding – the use of lines – that helps alert readers to the fact that a poem *is* a poem and therefore demands a particular sort of reading. For the translator, foregrounding is therefore not just something to be aware of in stylistic terms, but also for what it says about text type, a fundamental question for the type of translation to be carried out, according to functionally-orientated views such as those described in Nord (1997) and discussed in Chapter 3. Thus a headline in a newspaper not only serves to draw attention to itself by violating grammar, in that it might miss out articles and pronouns, but also tells the reader to embark upon a search for disambiguation, as outlined in the previous section.

In cognitive stylistics, the linguistic foregrounding which Jakobson, Mukařovský and others spoke of can be seen with reference to what is frequently termed salience (Leech & Short 1981:212ff.) or prominence (Stockwell 2002a:15). Tabakowska (1993:46-47), discussing the translation of foregrounding, also links it, as do Stockwell (ibid.), Leech (1996), and van Peer (1986) to the "psychological principle" (1993:48) of figure and ground, a principle implicit in the Prague Structuralists' concern to link

literary with other forms of art. This psychological approach allows us to see foregrounding not simply as something based on stylistic deviation, but also on different ways of describing an object or event. Tabakowska, for example, shows how, in an essay by Polish playwright Sławomir Mrożek, the phrase "wyniosło mnie" (literally: (it) raised me) foregrounds the event of his elevation from poor graduate to successful editor, while making the playwright himself merely the recipient of the event. The unattributed English translation for the Mrożek Festival, however, which has "I was promoted", foregrounds the 'I'. Thus the relative importance of elements in the described event have shifted, as what was ground becomes figure (Tabakowska 1993:49).

One of the cognitive effects of foregrounding is to make readers rethink their views of the world. Cook (1994:182-211) shows how it can serve to change the cognitive schemata of the reader, as discussed in 4.2. If figure-ground relationships are unexpected, they will change our perception of events. One way in which literary texts, and especially poems, do this is in the creation of patterns. Van Peer (1986:10-11) points to the link between pattern and foregrounding in both Jakobson and Leech (1970:123-24). Both Leech (1969:57ff.) and van Peer (1993) show that several instances of uncommon use are more striking than one single instance, so the repetition of the unusual adds to its salience. They also show how, by creating parallelism, the regularity or pattern itself is foregrounded.

Such patterns often make use of etymology and other systematic connections between words. Consider the following lines from the opening of Francis Thompson's 'The Kingdom of God', well-known as a hymn (Jacobs 2002:375):

> O world invisible we view thee
> O world intangible we touch thee
> O world unknowable we know thee
> Inapprehensible we clutch thee!

Here the contrast in the first three lines between the in/un-adjectives and the verbs which follow is heightened by the (etymologically determined) alliteration (in**v**isible – **v**iew; in**t**angible – **t**ouch) and repetition (un**know**able – **know**) so that the use of rhyming "clutch" as positive action to counter the negative "inapprehensible" is prepared for. Translating into a language which does not have related adjectives and verbs, such as French, gives us:

> O monde invisible nous te regardons
> O monde intangible nous te touchons
> O monde insachable nous te connaissons
> Inappréhensible nous te saisissons.

This translation (written specially for this book by Timothy Adès) keeps some of the repetition (in**t**angible … **t**ouchons) but has considerably less than the original. German, on the other hand, is much more transparent than English, so a translation would have to use: unsichtbar – sehen / untastbar – tasten / unkennbar – kennen / unfassbar – fassen where, apart from the first adjective-verb pair, the words are too similar to allow the subtle parallelism of the English to be reproduced.

What is foregrounded in the hymn is the notion of something ineffable brought into human reach, and the repetition of subtle but noticeable adjective-verb parallelisms underlines both the closeness and the ineffability, a contrast realized in the famous final lines of the hymn: "And Lo, Christ walking on the water / Not of Gennesareth, but Thames!"

It is thus possible to see repetition as a particularly strong case of foregrounding. Though Sperber & Wilson (1995:222; see also Gutt 2000:149) say processing of patterns requires little cognitive effort, it is more likely that they merely shift the focus of effort. In the above example, the very fact that the structure of the first line of the hymn is repeated means we do not have to try very hard to understand the following parallel structures; instead, attention is focussed on the differences, that is, upon the different aspects in which one can do the impossible. Similarly rhyme, while linking words such as *touch* and *clutch,* would also focus attention on the way the different initial consonant clusters indicate different meanings.

Such patterns in the text, though relying on the linguistic structure of a particular language, are made possible by a universal principle of repetition, according to McCully (1998:23), rooted in biology and, in Goldsworthy's view (1998:43) not only mnemonic but also typically creating an illusion of truth.

In all the instances given, repetition both provides what Verdonk calls "connective phonological tissue" (1999:299), and reflects a cognitive process. In the case of the hymn above, this could be seen as a process of discovery of the power of the spiritual to enlighten the everyday. In the poem 'To His Love', by Ivor Gurney, it might be seen to reflect a process of remembering. In this poem there are a number of repeated patterns: the rhyme scheme, the metre, the layout of lines on the page, the references to colours, the use of pronouns, and so on. The poem, originally published in 1919, is as follows:

To His Love

1 He's gone, and all our plans
2 Are useless indeed.
3 We'll walk no more on Cotswold
4 Where the sheep feed

Quietly and take no heed.

His body that was so quick
Is not as you
Knew it, on Severn river
Under the blue
Driving our small boat through.

You would not know him now …
But still he died
Nobly, so cover him over
With violets of pride
Purple from Severn side.

Cover him, cover him soon!
And with thick-set
Masses of memoried flowers –
Hide that red wet
Thing I must somehow forget.

(Gurney 1987:76)

An important point at which the various patterns of repetition run together can be seen as what Freeman (2005:40) and Ross (n.d.) call "the eye of the poem", or van Peer a "nexus of foregrounding" (1986:14). Riffaterre had much earlier noted the presence of such a point in a poem; for him it was the locus of a "stylistic cluster" (1959:172). It could be argued that lines 19/20 constitute the "eye of the poem" for at least the following reasons:

i) They contrast "red" with "the blue" in line 9 suggesting the peace of the pastoral scene and the "purple" of line 15 which suggests pride.
ii) They take up the uncertainty of pronominal reference ("his love", "he", "we", "you" with the impersonalizing "thing".
iii) They maintain the *abcbb* rhyme scheme of all the previous stanzas.
iv) They provide in the final word not only a contrast to the "memoried flowers" of line 18, but pick up a theme of knowing and remembering ("heed", "knew", know").
v) They shock the reader in a description of a war-damaged body following suddenly on images of nature and flowers.

For a translator, this notion of the eye of the poem has important consequences. If the translation employs compensation (Harvey 1995) at this particular point in the poem, for example replacing the assonance of "red wet thing I must somehow forget" with assonance at some other point, then,

it could be argued, the poem has no eye, no vantage point from which to view the whole poem. One could argue that an important consequence of the notion that there is an eye of the poem for translation is that these lines must contain as large a convergence of patterning as possible. So a translation of lines 17-20 might read:

> Und mit dichten
> Massen von Blumen, die seiner gedenken
> Verstecke das rote Nass
> Dieses Dings, das ich nun vergessen muss.

Here the penultimate line could link "verstecke" (hide) with the earlier repeated "decke" (cover), "rote" (red), much as in the English original, would pick up the "blue" and "purple" earlier in the poem, "Nass" (wetness), both the references to the river and, by sound repetition, the following "vergessen" (forget) and "muss" (must). In the final line, "Ding" (thing) is emphasized by the alliteration ("dieses Dings") and the reverse rhyme with "dichten" two lines before. "Vergessen muss" (must forget) links semantically to the theme of memory, including the word "gedenken" (remember) three lines before.

Repetition is not just a device for foregrounding. In the Freudian sense, it can result from an inability to come to terms with traumatic experience (see Freud 1961). And in this sense, too, it can be seen in this poem to be a reflection of a cognitive state. A translator thus has to consider both the cognitive state embodied by stylistic repetition and the cognitive effects on the reader of patterns which draw attention to particular points in the text.

As the example from the hymn translated above show, not all languages have equal possibilities for repetition, or indeed for other types of foregrounding: the Polish example is especially hard to replicate in English. But the notion of universality, in spite of protests by Venuti (2000:124) that it can work towards the suppressing of otherness, is important, because it suggests that a concept such as foregrounding as a reflection of attention to salience is a universal characteristic of animate beings, and that literature exploits this. And although it is often difficult to explain in what sense something in a text is striking, studies like those by van Peer (e.g. 1986:22, 176) show a high degree of agreement among readers of literary texts as to what elements are foregrounded.

For a translator, such findings suggest that there are at least some textual features which the translator can feel confident will be noticeable to all readers, and so go some way towards justifying the inferences the translator makes and alleviating some of the inevitable sense of ignorance mentioned at the end of 4.1.

4.5 Metaphor, mind and translation

Metaphor has generally been seen as a difficult area for translation (e.g. see Snell-Hornby 1995:55ff.) Either for this reason, or because, conversely, it is viewed as unproblematical (see Kloepfer 1967), it is completely ignored by recent works on translation, such as Bell (1991), Hatim (2001) or Hatim & Munday (2004), indicating a situation which has changed little since van den Broeck complained in 1981 that the translation of metaphor received only "random attention". Tabakowska (1993:66) points out that structuralist linguistics viewed metaphor as "marginal", but this does not explain why it has received so little attention in those works on translation which are not based on linguistics. Thus it is odd that it does not merit an entry at all in Baker's *Encyclopedia of Literary Translation* (1998). Linguistically-based approaches to the translation of metaphor, such as van den Broeck (1981), tend to classify it according to types and the possible ways of translating them. Newmark describes the translation of metaphor as the "most important particular problem" (1995:104), and makes a number of suggestions for translating the different types such as "dead", "cliché", "standard", "adapted", "recent" and "original" metaphors (1995:105-113).

In spite of Newmark's observation about the importance of metaphor, we find it not only ignored by theory but also, sometimes, by translators. For example, Jill Dawson's novel *A Trick of the Light* (1996) uses the metaphor of light for the way we can see a relationship sometimes in one way and sometimes in another. There are images of sunlight, lamplight, storm light, ultraviolet light. These last two are simply missed out in the translation (Goga-Klinkenberg 2002:139). The fact that the title of the book is translated as (in back translation) 'The House on Mount Coyote', suggests that the idiom *trick of the light* could not be adequately translated and so the central image has simply been made invisible by being removed from important places in the development of the narrative.

Metaphor itself, as opposed to its role in translation, has been very widely researched; many studies before the development of cognitive linguistics and stylistics had attempted classification of metaphorical figures such as metonymy, metaphor proper, or simile, e.g. Richards (1936), Leech (1969) or Mooij (1976). Most of these theories, which view metaphor as a linguistic figure or a deviation from standard everyday language, see themselves as developing from Aristotle's view in the *Poetics* and *Rhetoric* (1996; 1970) that metaphors are comparisons used primarily for ornament. Approaches to translating metaphor, such as Newmark (1995), have generally taken this linguistic view as their starting point. Richards (1936) had made a useful distinction between the tenor (or topic) of a metaphor and its vehicle, that

which is used as an analogue for the entity to be described. It is this distinction which forms the basis of van den Broeck's (1981) classification of translation possibilities. Like Richards, most stylisticians until recently tended to view metaphor as based on a violation of selection restrictions on subject and verb, so that it was seen as "inherently unconventional" (de Beaugrande 1978:73; see also Wales 2001:251). However, studies by Levin (1977; 1988) already suggest a cognitive approach. Though differing from the approaches of Lakoff & Johnson (1980; 1999) or Lakoff & Turner (1989), which rely on metaphor's bodily origins, Levin is especially illuminating on the way we might envisage the world in the text so that there is actually no violation. In this sense, an example like Levin's "The stone died" (1977:33ff.) involves the reader imagining a world where this is possible. This view is compatible with phenomenological views of literature as creating a world with its own rules (e.g. Ingarden 1973), and it is also a forerunner of later cognitively-based views which deal in more detail with the creation of possible or imaginable worlds (e.g. Werth 1999; Semino 1997). For a translator, if the violation of semantic constraints which the metaphor suggests (in Levin's terms) works in the world of the source text, there is no reason why it should not work in the world of the target text.

Although Levin's view shows the beginnings of cognitive concerns, it is not in a position to address two important aspects which have been added to stylistics and translation studies respectively in recent years. The first is the question of what actually happens in the mind, the second is the issue of cultural difference, and they are related to the extent that what happens in the mind is determined by both universal features of the brain and cultural influences. Furthermore, cognitive linguistics and cognitive stylistics are both very clear about semantics. Turner explains it thus: the post-structuralist view that the signifier has no real anchor to the world comes from structuralist phonology, but to extend such instability from sound segments to words and thus from phonemes to meanings is to deal "uncritically" with language and thought, because some meanings are fixed, being rooted in biology (2000:10ff.). This is a view that had been suggested as the basis for semantics by many scholars, notably in the 1930s by Malinowski, who said that "the meaning of all words is derived from bodily experience" (1935:58). It is the position of many writers on cognitive stylistics, though criticized by others, e.g. by Downes (1993), Bex (2000:73) and Gibbs (1994:79). Although writers such as Richards (1936) and Levin (1977) traced the origins of their approaches back to Aristotle's poetics, Turner (2000:3-4) prefers to see this cognitive view as "the natural successor to classical rhetoric" because of the latter's emphasis on the way the mind worked to create figures of thought.

This view that meaning is determined by biology is closely associated with the view that metaphor forms the basis and starting point for much of semantics; metaphorical processes are regarded by most writers on cognitive stylistics as "the centre of language and thought in general" (Stockwell 2002a:105; cf. also Fauconnier 1994), as "the most significant feature of the human mind" (Mithen 2003:24). Crisp (2001:5) explains that metaphor is seen as the basis for "human concept creation"; metaphorical concepts are seen as mappings from source to target domains where the source is typically a more "conceptually accessible" (Hiraga 2005:4) domain of everyday bodily action and the target more abstract (Crisp 2003:100). Thus Richards' terms tenor and vehicle have been replaced by target and source. It is important to remember that target is tenor and source is vehicle; Stockwell (2002a:106) has tenor and vehicle the wrong way round, and Wales also (2001:388) equates tenor with source rather than target, though the correlation is later correct (2001:403).

Steen (1994:6f.) distinguishes between such "figures of thought" (Turner 2000:3) or conceptual metaphor, and "linguistic" metaphor. Classifications of the type carried out by Richards (1936) or Leech (1969) are classifications of linguistic metaphor, or linguistic expressions of what may be the same conceptual metaphor. However, while Lakoff & Johnson (1980; 1999) place little importance on the linguistically different types, Steen, who is concerned with the actual processing of literary texts, argues that there may nevertheless be differences (1994:25).

Some metaphors, however, appear to compare two basic domains, rather than conceptualizing an abstract domain in more concrete terms; these are what Crisp (2003:103) calls "image metaphors"; his example is Ezra Pound's description of faces in a crowd as petals on a wet, black bough (Pound 2003:287). Much literary metaphor would seem to be of this type: Hughes' "moors / are a stage / for the performance of heaven" (1995:160) or a tomcat "like a bundle of old rope and iron" (1995:27) both compare something concrete to something else concrete. Literary metaphor, especially if of the image metaphor type, thus differs quite substantially from non-literary. Though most recent studies (e.g. Gibbs 1994; Stockwell 2002a; Lakoff & Turner 1989) suggest this difference is not a cognitive one, this was not the view taken in Boase-Beier (1987) or that suggested by Steen, who argues that the way we read literature means that literary metaphors are processed differently; they are processed in keeping with the "maximal subjective involvement [of] the reader" (1994:241). Thus, for example, a comparison of a cat with a bundle of rope and iron will lead each reader to imagine a different bundle of rope and iron, in keeping with, and adding to, her or his mental schemata. It seems important, therefore, that a translator respect this particular feature of poetic metaphor, rather than assuming that it works like non-poetic metaphor, in

expressing the abstract in terms of the concrete.

Stockwell (2002a:107-8) suggests that there is greater scope for reader interaction when a process of inferencing is involved in order to supply one part of the metaphor. Again, this happens commonly in Hughes: when we are told in 'The Thought-Fox' (1995:3) that "something" is alive we have to work out what it is that is being compared to a fox. Stockwell (ibid.) classifies metaphors according to ease of identification, usefully distinguishing types from the "most visible to the most invisible", starting with simile, analogy and extended metaphor down to fiction and allegory which may be difficult to see and process as metaphors. Such a classification again suggests that different types of metaphor have different cognitive values, something which a translator might well need to take into account. It is possible, as part of the debate on whether linguistically different types of metaphor are in fact not cognitively the same thing, to ask whether, perhaps, different stylistic figures are not cognitively the same thing. There have been suggestions that they are by Freeman (1991), Fowler (1996) and Hiraga (2005), among others. This issue will be taken up again in the next section, but, intuitively, Steen's caution that we might process different stylistic figures differently appears an important one for the translator to bear in mind.

In general, cognitive views should be able to tell us something about the following three areas which might be seen to play a role in translating metaphor:

i) universality versus particularity in metaphor
ii) whether different linguistic types of metaphor should or can be or are translated in different ways
iii) whether metaphor is a purely linguistic or even an "ornamental" figure or whether it constitutes thought on a much deeper level, and how such a distinction might affect translation.

As far as the first of these is concerned, while most writers are keen to emphasize universality, such universal underlying schemata can be subject to "highly original specification" by individual writers (Crisp 2003:103). In addition, image metaphors are by nature individual, as they have no cognitive basis in bodily experience. These distinctions suggest that, in translation, we need to be aware of conceptual elements which are universal and make sure they are retained, while also trying to keep whatever is specific to the culture or writer in question. Metaphors such as these from von Törne's poems:

Im	Graben	kniete	ein /	Knecht,	die	Zunge	im /	Lehmigen	Wasser (1981:163)
in-the	*ditch*	*knelt*	*a*	*knave*	*the*	*tongue*	*in-the*	*muddy*	*water*

Mit uns zu teilen der Ebenen Mühn / Stieg er, ein großer Redner vor dem
with uns to share of-the plains pains climbed he a great speaker before the
Volke / Zu uns herab von den allgäuer Kühn (1981:181)
people to us down from the Allgäu cows
Wir sind übern Berg / Nun geht es abwärts (1981:188)
we are over-the mountain now goes it downwards

will be translatable by similar metaphors because the "similarities in language across humanity" (Stockwell 2002a:5) are most clearly to be seen in conceptual metaphors which relate to notions such as up and down or higher and lower. In the above examples, the underlying conceptual metaphor is that higher represents more power, so to translate in a way (even were one available) which ignored the universal conceptual metaphor would be to misrepresent the basic conceptual nature of the power structure.

However, though studies of the cognitive basis of metaphor such as Johnson (1987:104ff.) or Gibbs (1994:438) do speak of how cognition is influenced by culture, it is a sort of universal human culture, in keeping with the aim of showing metaphorical thinking as ultimately biologically determined. Thus far cognitive metaphor studies do not have much to say about those metaphors which are embedded in a specific culture, and it is these which give most trouble to a translator: metaphors in English which use cups of tea or games of cricket as their source may not have an obvious equivalent in other cultures and languages. Does one for example substitute coffee in German on the grounds that tea, though available, does not enjoy the important cultural status it does in English? And, by the same token, does one substitute for cricket football or some other sport? And what happens in cases of extended metaphor such as Armitage's 'Greenhouse' (1989:13) if such poems are translated into a target language whose culture has no greenhouses? When more research has been done into the understanding of metaphor, some of these questions will perhaps take on a new dimension; Tabakowska (1993) is one of the few works which at least looks at some of the issues.

As regards the second question – whether, for example, metonymy should be translated with metonymy – the answer will depend on the perceived "aesthetic effects" (Crisp *et al* 2002:35) of such figures in the text in question. If, as Stockwell (2002a:105) suggests, different types of metaphor have different levels of processing difficulty, then a translation of metaphorical compounds such as "map-logical" (Holloway 1956:60), or "leopard-leaves" (Causley 1968:38; both taken from Boase-Beier 1987:87) will have to be careful not to replace them with similes. Thus a German translation such as *logisch wie eine Karte*; *Blätter wie Leoparden* (literally 'logical as a map', 'leaves like leopards') would be too easy to process and would involve the reader far less

then the original. But such translations would fail for another reason: compound metaphors of this type are only likely to express a conceptual metaphor if they combine an abstract and a concrete term: "map-logical" most probably means 'logical as a map'. This is not true of compounds like "leopard-leaves", where the fact that both terms are concrete suggests an image metaphor. This, in turn, suggests that, cognitively speaking, the leaves are not seen to be *like* leopards, but only to possess some quality of leopards, which is left unspecified. The work of the reader involves not only identifying and processing the metaphorical compound, but also finding contexts for the comparison. These might have to do with shape, colour, movement, and so on, and will vary from reader to reader.

As regards (iii) above, as we have seen, metaphor is generally regarded in cognitive approaches as constitutive of the way we think, rather than simply as a semantically deviant linguistic figure. This is particularly clear in non-literary uses such as scientific and general texts which use expressions such as *to wage war on disease*, *to defend the body against invaders* or *to suffer an attack of illness* , which are based on the conceptual metaphor DISEASE IS WAR. Such metaphors are, by their nature as conceptual metaphors, generally universal.

Because non-literary texts do not require the translator to worry about aspects of style such as repetition, metre and the like, there is unlikely to be any reason to change metaphors in translation and so the risk of losing an important conceptual metaphor is negligible. But literary uses of metaphor, too, can be seen to be based on a way of thinking. If we translate with a different metaphor, do we then change the way the speaker thinks and therefore change the cognitive domains which the reader will relate to one another? The answer must be an unequivocal "yes". This is especially obvious in a case like that of the poet William Blake, who developed his own highly complex metaphorical system whereby (according to Damon 1973) for example field, flower, dawn and dew represent innocence, and cave, cloud, frost and star oppression. If a translation, concentrating on, say, capturing rhyme or metre, were to miss some of these metaphorical uses, the whole cognitive system would be distorted. Of course, all translators of Blake are likely to be aware of his imagery and it is not difficult to find descriptions of his metaphorical system. But other poets also use metaphors peculiar to their own way of thinking. The German poet Sarah Kirsch, for example, uses everyday actions – peeling an onion, digging in the garden, grinding coffee beans – as metaphors for a sort of shadow-life in which horrors lurk and things cannot be undone. One could argue that the source of these metaphors in everyday (and especially traditionally feminine) occupations both makes us see the ordinariness of the sinister shadow-life ("the banality of evil" as

Arendt 1994 put it) and transforms the source itself into actions with a deeper meaning: coffee beans do not just make a drink when ground but also symbolize something that is destroyed and cannot be put back together again ('Schwarze Bohnen', Kirsch 1991). If one were to translate making coffee into English with making tea, or instant coffee, the destructive element would be lost. It would thus not only be the link to German culture (in which coffee-grinding is an everyday occurrence in all households) which is lost, but the link to all those other destructive everyday actions such as an onion being peeled or a garden being dug. And it would lose, too, the link to other features of everyday life which in Kirsch mirror states of mind (flood waters reflecting trees echo relationships, white snowdrop bulbs in black earth the teeth of a buried skull, and so on).

Other metaphors arise in the course of the text itself, and depend on the background of the reader and the sort of context that is brought to bear on the reading and translation. Margaret Freeman, discussing Sylvia Plath's 'The Applicant', says "the reader assumes the speaker and the applicant are both male" (2005:33). Yet I did not make this assumption on reading the poem: I assumed a corporate and therefore gender-neutral voice for the speaker and I read the addressee, the applicant, as a couple about to get married. Freeman's reading, presumably, would need a word to translate "rubber crotch" which suited its perceived male addressee, whereas if I were to translate the poem, I would need a gender-neutral word. The only gender-neutral word in German, for example, is *Schritt*; a nominalized form from *schreiten*, to step, it cannot be reified sufficiently to be made of rubber: *Gummischritt* is thus not a possible translation of "rubber crotch". I might therefore have to use *Gummischeide* (rubber vagina) which would presumably not work for Freeman.

The three issues I gave above as useful questions one might pose when applying cognitive metaphor theory to translation are not entirely separate. The question as to its cognitive nature is tied to questions of universality, as we have just seen. But notions such as specificity and universality, and even linguistic and cognitive, are not static in their applicability, which may well vary over time. Thus Millán (1997) illustrates how the dead metaphor of the thread of a conversation, common in both English and Spanish, was very much alive at the time Cervantes was writing, and this led to all manner of permutations involving sewing, unstitching and unravelling. It is important for translators to see such questions as affected by their historical context.

4.6 Iconicity, mimesis and diagesis

The term "iconicity" derives from Peirce's description of a sign which represents its object "mainly by its similarity" (1960:157) to what it represents,

and is used of structures which echo in sound or shape what they stand for. In this it runs counter to the assumed underlying principle of the arbitrariness of language (Saussure 1959:67), though, as Anderson (1998) and Simone (1994) point out, it has been an issue in the study of language since Plato.

The most obvious cases of iconicity in language are what are sometimes called "sound symbolism", where there is a "direct linkage between sound and meaning" (Hinton *et al* 1994:1). This includes onomatopoeic words like *howl*, *bang! splash*, where the sound word is clearly not arbitrary but is a conventionalized representation of an actual sound. That it is conventionalized is shown by the fact that these words are different in other languages: *heulen, Knall!, platschen* in German or *ulumak, güm!, sıçratmak* in Turkish. The resemblance is always partial, but we understand the iconic relationship because of our ability to generalize from part to whole (Anderson 1998:24, 28). In this sense, even iconicity is to some degree arbitrary.

Onomatopoeia and other types of sound symbolism may be the most striking types of linguistic iconicity, and are often used in literary texts, but there are many other types. According to Anderson, iconicity as an explanation for the origins of language was sometimes dismissed by Darwinian theorists as the "ding-dong" theory (1998:41). Yet poets such as Pope, who said in 1711 "the sound must seem an echo to the sense" (1963:155), and many literary critics (such as Bodkin 1934:235), have mentioned its role in literature.

However, it was only with the development of stylistics in the 70s that its real importance in literary and other texts was recognized. Freeman (1976), an analysis of Blake's poem 'Ah! Sun-flower', which shows how the structure of embedded relative clauses closely mirrors both the circular nature of the sunflower's movement and its philosophical counterpart, is a very clear example; iconicity and its importance for literature are also discussed by Epstein (1975), Ross (1982), Nash (1986) and Leech (1987:86). According to García & Marco (1998:68), it is important for translation because it "posits a very close link between grammar and meaning"; they find – a finding comparable to those of Parks 1998 – that translators tend to simplify complex syntax, even where it could be said to have a strong iconic function. Similar findings by Erkazanci (unpublished) with respect to heteroglossia suggest that the iconic nature of style is not taken fully into account by translators. Many later studies (e.g. Short 1996) mention it in passing, but do not explore it in detail. The most thorough recent explorations are Nänny & Fischer (1999), Fischer & Nänny (2001) and Müller & Fischer (2003). All three volumes of papers deal with different aspects of the phenomenon. In their 'Introduction' to the first volume, Nänny & Fischer say we appear to have an "innate iconic streak" (1999:xv) which makes us think words fit their meanings. This is in fact an echo of a statement by Jakobson in 1939

(see Erlich 1955:181) to the effect that poetry's job is to break up the link which most people feel inevitably exists between word and referent, a feeling Sinclair (1975:77) also discusses, and that Nash (1986:131) maintains is largely an illusion. It is an illusion to which sociolinguistic studies also point; it persists especially in the assumption that linguistic behaviour mirrors social status, and the resulting use of linguistic features to represent social contrasts (sometimes called iconization; see Eckert & Rickford 2001).

What Nash means, though, is not that the relationship between sound and sense is itself non-existent, but that, rather than being fixed, it exhibits "plurality of design" (1986:136). In this sense, it is compatible with the basic concept of all cognitive linguistic studies: that much of language is not arbitrary but shaped by the human mind or "motivated by cognition" (Gavins & Steen 2003:8). In cognitive approaches, iconicity as a figure of style or a characteristic of language can be seen as simply the expression of an existing link between perception and language. Because "cognitivists expect the relationship between forms and meanings to exhibit a higher degree of iconicity than do traditional models" (Lee 2001:78), cognitive linguistics might be seen to argue against both the arbitrariness of structuralism taken as given by most generative grammarians, and the view common in generative grammar that there is a separate language module in the mind (see e.g. Radford *et al* 1999). However, it is worth pointing out that lack of arbitrariness, while it might certainly suggest a link between language and other aspects of cognition, is in fact very much in keeping with the concern of most generative grammar to understand the biological basis of language and does not *per se* say anything about the likelihood or otherwise of a separate language module (which, if it exists, will interact with others). Indeed Graham takes the modularity view of the mind further still, arguing that the language of literature is different because it is not driven by the language module but by "a different component of the mind" (1992: 218), that is, rhetoric or poetics, a view also inherent in Boase-Beier (1987), but one to which I no longer subscribe.

But the recent three volumes on iconicity are something of an exception; it is a phenomenon that has generally been taken for granted rather than studied in detail. This also applies to cognitive stylistic approaches (such as Stockwell 2002a) and it would probably be true to say that a detailed analysis of iconicity in a cognitive stylistics framework has yet to be done, though, as mentioned in the previous section, there are some suggestions, in particular by Freeman (1991:18), Fischer & Nänny (1999:xxiii) and Hiraga (2005:14), and also to some extent Graham (1992:241-42), that either iconicity can be subsumed in a cognitive sense under metaphor (Freeman's view, and also that of Lakoff & Turner 1989:156) or that both are instances of a more general cognitive process (Hiraga's and Graham's view) because both involve a link

on the basis of perceived similarity. As Graham (1992:243) points out, this was also suggested by Wimsatt (1954b). Certainly a possible conclusion to be drawn from a view of stylistic features as mental rather than linguistic constructs is that actual linguistic distinctions are unimportant. But we should be wary of drawing such conclusions. Are we to say, for example, that the metaphorical use of concepts like *sun* or *moon* by a poet like William Blake, which amount to a complex symbolic system, are no different in essence from his use of iconic syntax in a poem like 'Ah! Sun-flower'? Does this mean that we can ignore iconic syntax and translate it with metaphor? We probably do not yet know enough about how stylistic devices are perceived by readers to conclude that we can.

One important feature of cognitive stylistics in understanding how iconicity can be translated is that, because the former always involves relating "linguistic choices to cognitive phenomena" (Semino & Culpeper 2002:x) it has no difficulty explaining the cultural difference in iconic linguistic elements. If there were a direct relation of the sort proposed by some studies of iconicity (e.g. Ohala 1984) between sign and referent, then they would be expected to be universal in a way they obviously are not. But the mind, in a cognitive stylistic approach, stands between word and referent and a mind is primed not only by its biology but also by its culture. Thus the principle might be universal but, as Johnson (1987) indicates, its linguistic manifestations would not be expected to be universal; hence iconicity works by virtue of an interaction of universal and specific. This means both that the difference between words such as *heulen* in German and *to howl* in English does not throw into question their iconic nature and, conversely, that the parallels in iconic patterns such as *glare*, *gleam*, *glisten* in English and *glühen*, *glimmen*, *glotzen* in German are explained: their etymological roots were presumably to some extent non-arbitrary (see Sadowski 2001).

There is also a sense in which iconicity can be seen as a type of mimesis; Aristotle, in *Poetics* (1996), sees this as the essential nature of literature in contrast to diagesis, which is simply the author telling us something. Graham suggests that literary texts both show (use mimesis) and tell (use diagesis) though "what a literary text says and what it shows need not be the same", a fact which can lead to a text which is both "divided and iconic" (1992:199ff.) So, for example, repetition in the Gurney poem quoted above might be seen to mirror remembering, while the poem itself talks about loss and forgetting. If literature is essentially mimetic, then stylistic iconicity is one means by which its mimetic nature can be realized. An important question to emerge from such a view is whether there is a distinction between literary and non-literary use of iconicity. Statements like that by Ross (1982:687) that "poems are not merely 'about' something – rather, they 'do' that thing" suggest there is. But many studies suggest that it has an important

role in advertising (Fischer 1999), brand names (Piller 1999), historiography (Tabakowska 1999) and in standard linguistic productivity (Ungerer 1999). Fischer & Nänny (1999:xvii) argue that it can take the place of arbitrariness wherever the latter is not recognized. Typical examples can be found in children's use of words such as onomatopoeic animal names (*Bow-wow* for dog) where they do not know the lexicalized one.

However, the observation that iconicity exists outside of literature is not in itself evidence that literary iconicity is the same as non-literary. At the very least, it seems that the sort of unity of form and meaning mentioned by so many writers from Aristotle to Pope to Ross as specific to literature cannot be merely imagined. According to Fónagy, one reason for its "more prominent role" in literature and especially poetry is that it is an additional resource needed to convey "mental contents of high complexity" (1999:11, 15, 29). Some types of poetry, such as the futurist poetry of writers like Blok and Mayakovsky which Jakobson examined (1987:300ff.), with its iconic use of lay-out and typography, use more iconicity than others. And Fischer & Nänny (1999:xvi) feel that not only different text types but, even more significantly for translation, different languages, may vary in the degree of iconicity they use. They mention that Pound saw Chinese as having a closer link with "the operations of nature" (Pound 1964:8) than a less iconic, more arbitrary language.

What these differences suggest is that, for example, the translation of futurist poetry into prose would be fraught with difficulties and require compensation, and intersemiotic translation of the "book of the film" type may well result in a novel which seems very flat if it does not compensate for the high level of iconicity possible in a film. Translation from Chinese might also need to find additional means to express the iconicity inherent in its original.

A further important issue for cognitive stylistic approaches to translation is the relation of iconicity to the concept of "the remainder", mentioned in section 4.4. Fischer & Nänny (1999:xxi) link "remainder" as used by Lecercle (1990) (and, as we saw in 4.4, by Venuti 1998), with what Fónagy calls "paralinguistic coding" (1995:285-6) or "distorter" (1971, 1999:3). But for Fónagy, the "distorter" is a specifically iconic level of language which modifies the rules of grammar. Venuti (1998:10-11), in discussing the remainder, does not specifically mention the iconic as a marginal form of language use in opposition to the rule-governed, arbitrary, standard forms. Yet translation which exploits iconicity would seem to provide an obvious area for exploring the possibilities of foreignizing.

A particular practical difficulty which iconicity causes for the translator (though Crisp *et al* (2002) argue this also applies to metaphor) is: how easy is it to recognize? This is a good example of a case where theory (as I

suggested in Chapter 1) is a useful instrument in the toolkit of the translator. Once a translator knows there is such a thing as iconicity, s/he can look out for it. Notice that this is not the same as saying that, without a theory of iconicity, we cannot adequately read a poem which uses it. Of course we can; our engagement as reader with a line such as Hughes' "hearing curlews/ Hearing the horizons endure" (1995:8) will surely allow the effect of the assonance and alliteration to be processed and felt, irrespective of whether we know that such a phenomenon as iconicity exists. Indeed, a little thought can show the empirical obviousness of this. My first recollection of the excitement of poetry was a teacher reading out Hughes' poem 'Esther's Tomcat' (1995:27) to our primary school class. It was the phrase "he yawns wide red" which especially stayed in my mind and seemed to evoke the sight and general "feel" of a cat yawning. Later I could say it was at least partly the repetition of [d] which caused this effect as well as enhanced its mnemonicity. But at the time it still had a profound effect. Most readers of poetry will remember similar experiences.

No translator is ever likely to have difficulty in seeing the repeated sounds in such a line and assessing how their effects can be preserved in translation. But not all iconicity is so obvious, and some of its effects may go unnoticed at first reading. In a sentence such as "they … rustled through interspersed tracts of leaves, skirted trunks with spreading roots …" (Hardy 1974:83; cf. Boase-Beier 1996:203), the assonance will readily be taken as mirroring the sounds of walking through leaves. But to see the repetition of sounds in this passage from *The Woodlanders* as iconic of the mirroring of the sky in the earth (a common Hardy theme) and of the theme of reflection in the novel, as I describe later in the same article, is to go a step further. Most approaches to iconicity make some distinction between these two instances; I have called the former "primary" and the latter "secondary" (Boase-Beier 1987), based on Lyons (1977:99ff.). Other writers (e.g. Meier 1999) have used a similar distinction or have spoken of "imagic" and "diagrammatic" (Fischer & Nänny 1999:xxi-xxii). These terms are used to refer to slightly different things, but the differences are sometimes subtle and will not be discussed here; more details can be found by following the references given above. What is important to the translator is that what I prefer to call "secondary iconicity" is harder to see and is likely to be missed. This is an example from the translation of Lesley Grant-Adamson's novel *Lipstick and Lies* (1998:3):

> Bias, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder.

This sentence is especially interesting for a number of reasons. It extends the common saying "Beauty is in the eye of the beholder" to take in bias. But it also creates alliteration, a figure which might be seen on one hand as an

ornament, something which merely adds beauty. Yet when something sounds good, on the other hand, we believe it (McCully 1998). Thus the new expression, both by being based on a familiar idiom, and by tapping in to its trick of alliteration, carries the ring of truth. But more than this, it indicates a mind style that often expresses itself in ideas which might seem obvious truths, but are actually based on appearance (as in the alliterated title of the novel). The German translation (Pänke 2001) not only fails to keep the alliteration in the title, calling the German book *Kein Engel so rein* (literally 'no angel so pure') but, in the case of the extended idiom, translates "Wie Schönheit liegt Voreingenom-menheit im Auge des jeweiligen Betrachters" (2001:10). This does not have the ring of an idiom, but, more importantly, fails to suggest through alliteration a mind which judges on the basis of beauty, thereby undermining the wisdom of the idiom itself. In these cases, the awareness that such a figure exists might have helped in a practical sense.

An even less obvious type of iconicity is what is sometimes called phonaesthesia. Anderson describes it as sound associated with emotion (1998:224). There is much evidence from psycholinguistic study (e.g. Ullmann 1964) that such associations are shared by the vast majority of speakers of a particular language. Words such as *squawk*, *awkward* and *gawk* are felt to be unpleasant, high front vowels are associated with triviality and weakness and words with low back vowels with sorrow (Anderson 1998:225, 227, 229). As suggested earlier in this section, such words often form whole series, with particular connotations. Anderson's example (1998:230) is "fowl", "howl", "owl", "scowl" in 'Rape of Lucrece' by Thomas Heywood. Series of words like this can be used to create a particular effect in a text, and the translator will need to be aware of the effect in order to achieve something similar. An example from Blake's 'London' is looked at in Chapter 5.

The question for translation is how something so abstract, but which clearly adds to the meaning of the text, can be suitably reflected in the translation. It is not explained by recourse to morphology because the segments *-owl* in the example just given are not morphemes, that is, they are not elements of words which have meaning or grammatical function such as *pter-* (wing) in *pterodactyl* or *helicopter* or *in-* as in *inequality* and *inefficient*. They cannot therefore be expressed at the morphological level in the target language in the same way that, for example, *in-* in inequality may be expressed by *un-* (*Ungleichheit*) in German. Translating them requires a high level of abstraction, to a notion of repetition of sound not directly related to meaning or function but nevertheless having connotations.

All instances of iconicity in the source text which can be identified by a translator suggest that the language is non-arbitrary. Though such non-arbitrariness does not necessarily imply a greater degree of choice on the part of the speaker or writer (for the iconicity could be conventionally

pre-determined) it is always going to suggest to a reader that it carries implicatures which go beyond the obvious. It is very hard to see, for example, Thomas Heywood's use of "fowl", "owl", "howl" and "scowl" in alternate lines of his poem as signifying nothing. As Anderson says, they suggest "images associated with death" (1998:230). A translator would want to find a series of words with similar associations (such as *heulen* (to howl), *Eule* (owl), *Greuel* (horror) in German).

4.7 Cognitive stylistics and the pretence of translation

What the previous discussion in this book and this chapter has shown is that as translators we can study the style of a text and on this basis make a good case for what a text means, but we cannot guarantee, even if we wanted to, that we know what the author meant.

Understanding any act of communication involves a certain degree of pretence about having achieved such certainty. When we respond to a colleague's statement that it is too hot by opening a window, or a friend's remark that it is late by going home, we are making an assumption that we know what is meant. The colleague could be suggesting that he has a high temperature and needs to see a doctor, or merely making an observation. The friend could be suggesting we decide an important issue quickly, or remarking that the evenings are getting longer. We arrive at the meaning for which we have most evidence and act upon it, while being aware, if we think about it, that there are other possible interpretations. We are used to the fact that in some situations statements are more difficult to interpret than in others; absence of body language in an email can make us especially careful to question the writer as to her or his intentions.

Translation is no different from any of these other communicative situations in that we have to arrive at an interpretation for which there appears to be a reasonable amount of evidence. The answer to the sixth question at the end of 4.1 – about balancing ignorance with a need to act – is thus quite simple: if we have enough evidence for interpreting a text, we can act upon it, even while being aware that any such interpretation is not final, absolute or exclusive. But in literary translation there are two complicating factors. The first is that literary texts by their very nature allow multiple interpretations, a point made by critics as diverse as Empson (1930), Iser (1979) and Downes (1993), and mentioned many times in this book. The second is that translation cannot end with reading. While the critic might be content to note the indeterminacy of literary meaning (to a greater or lesser degree, depending upon her or his point of view) a translator has to go on to produce a target

text which will be seen by its readers to be a reasonable rendering of a reasonable number of aspects of the source text.

What the discussion in this book and especially in this chapter suggests is that much of what gives a literary text its special literary character lies in its style. It is the style which allows the text to be open-ended and ambiguous (as poststructuralist and postmodernist views suggest it is), to invite the involvement of the reader (as in Reader-Response Theory), to contain implicatures which the reader can base inferences upon (as in Relevance Theory), to give expression to feelings and attitudes and to do all this by virtue of its relationship with meaning. A cognitive stylistic view of translation suggests that as readers we see style as a reflection of mind, and attempt to grasp that mind in reading and to recreate it in translation.

In this sense, the answers to the first three questions I asked at the end of Section 1 of this chapter – what is beyond the text, how we as translators get to it and how we recreate it in translation – all depend upon our view of what is still relatively unknown: the mind. While it might seem risky to stake so much on what we cannot see, it should be recalled that style has always, since the earliest discussions of Aristotle, been seen as a manifestation of mental processes or properties, or mental states. There is no other way to explain that style represents choice.

Not only the questions about what we do when we translate literature but also the question of what literature is and how its translation differs from that of non-literary texts – the fourth issue at the end of Section 1 – depend upon a notion of mind. It is because, in the von Törne poem mentioned in 4.2, we are reading a poem and not a newspaper, that we are prepared to allow both for the possibility of an ambiguous state of mind and for the poem's reflecting it. In this sense the differences between literary and non-literary texts reflect the extent to which we attribute importance to reading a mind into the text, to seeing the text as expressing feelings, attitudes and states of mind and allowing the reader to feel them, too.

But at the same time as we attribute a great deal of importance to the mind in a literary text we are also aware that we cannot be certain of having discovered its characteristics. If we were reading an actual newspaper account of Nazi atrocities, we would expect to be able to get at the opinion of the journalist (or newspaper) quite easily, perhaps using the methods of Critical Discourse Analysis mentioned in 1.4. But because it is a poem we can only say we have evidence for a particular state of mind: an ambiguous state of mind, as I suggest. And we cannot say whether this is the mind of the typical journalist or indeed the typical newspaper reader, or of a particular one, or of von Törne himself.

And the fifth question – the relation between universal and specific in

literary (and other) texts – is also in part answered by realizing that the information our minds store is at once personal and specific to our own experiences and context, while also sharing some universal characteristics with every other reader's mind. The concepts of ambiguity, foregrounding, metaphor and iconicity which we have looked at in the previous sections are certainly universal. The notion of mind as embodied (Johnson 1987) also suggests such universality very strongly. But the notion of cognitive context emphasizes the importance of the individual. A translation would do well to recognize and honour both aspects. In Verdonk's words, interpretation is both subjective and "intersubjective" (1999:298).

As I stated in the Introduction to this book, knowledge of style can help us to understand how style works in its relation to all the above questions and also to interpret stylistic features of the text. But it cannot give guarantees that we have arrived at a 'correct' reading because no such guarantees are possible, and because the nature of literature suggests there is no correct reading. What stylistics aims to do is to explain how we get to the readings we intuitively arrive at. But readers can be naïve or critical, as many writers such as Fowler (1981) or Diaz-Diocaretz (1985:16) have pointed out. If a translator is a critical reader, a sense of how style works will be a useful tool. And while one might want to argue, as Pilkington does (2000:49), against description informed by theory, there can be no principled reason to take this stance to its extreme, simply because everything we do is informed by theory. Translation is no different.

What I have implicitly been arguing throughout this book is that translation which is stylistically aware can make a more reasonable case for its interpretation of the source text than any other sort of translation can. It must do this in full knowledge that the translator's interpretation is only one among many. And if it is possible to convey the attitudes, emotions and interactional possibilities of the style of the source text, at least the translation will not close off too many possibilities. In the next chapter, I attempt to illustrate what such a stylistically-aware translation might look like.

5. A Stylistic Approach in Practice

5.1 Elements of a stylistic approach to translation

This chapter will attempt to assess what stylistics offers, or can offer, to translation. As I stated in Chapter 1, I am taking a particular view of the relationship of theory to practice, one which has two aspects that should be kept separate: (i) that that relationship works best when theory describes practice, but does not dictate it and, (ii) that knowledge of theory may alert the practitioner to phenomena s/he would not otherwise have noticed, and especially to subtle aspects of the style of the source text. Stockwell (2002a:7) worries that accepting this second point carries with it the suggestion that only reading which is based on such knowledge or awareness is valid, but that is not a worry I share. Theories, approaches and views, whether one accepts them or rejects them, are just aspects of knowledge and knowledge of one's subject is likely to have an influence on practice. While this might not be true of the general reader about whom Stockwell speculates, it certainly applies to a professional translator: there is no reason to avoid gaining knowledge of theory, and it is likely to be a useful tool. Some translators might be offended by such a view, but they will not be reading this book.

I hope to reflect these two aspects of the relationship by, on the one hand, examining other people's translations and offering suggestions as to how they can be understood from a stylistic point of view and, on the other, giving examples from my own translations, which, to a greater or lesser extent, were informed by awareness of many of the issues discussed in the previous four chapters. In particular, those issues addressed by the theories discussed in Chapter 4 will shape the discussion. To recap briefly: these issues are to do with how we read and how we translate what goes beyond the actual words on the page, and how we ensure literary translations preserve the mind-altering qualities of the original. I shall also, where appropriate, refer to the interplay of universal and specific and the difference between literary and non-literary texts. And we will need to keep at the back of our minds, while considering the examples here, the notion that translators have to pretend (based on evidence) to know what the original author meant.

In discussing both reading of the source text for translation and reading of the target text as a translation, the underlying assumption is that a stylistically-aware analysis can help explain how readings are arrived at more easily than if analysis is impressionistic. This view of stylistic analysis does not of itself suggest it is an advantage for an actual translator to read the source text in this way; it merely suggests that stylistic awareness makes it easier to present and discuss examples. But by making the claim in (ii), I am

in fact unequivocally arguing for the advantage to the translator of at least a stylistic sensitivity. And I am making an even stronger claim than this: I am suggesting that literary translation is, in a very basic and important sense, the translation of style, because style conveys attitude and not just information, because style is the expression of mind, and literature is a reflection of mind. This applies much less to non-literary texts (except journalism), because they are not primarily reflections of mind, though there is certainly a sense in which the influence of mind, attitude and point of view of the originator of a non-literary text will always play a role; this is something which Critical Discourse Analysis, in particular, aims to bring to light. Stylistically-aware reading is, then, the only possible way to read a literary (source or target) text *as* a literary text. In order to set out the parameters of stylistically-aware reading for translation, bearing in mind all that has been said in the previous four chapters, I want at this point to revisit the six issues in cognitive stylistics which I said at the start of Chapter 4 would be likely to prove relevant for translation. We can now attempt a fuller view of these issues, to be examined in the present chapter:

i) The textual meaning of the source text is more than just the words on the page because it is dependent on context. This is a view shared by Marxist criticism (e.g. Eagleton 1986), and pragmatic linguistics (Sperber & Wilson 1995), by contextualized stylistics (Verdonk 2002) and by cognitive approaches to translation (Tabakowska 1993). Much of what goes beyond the immediate and obvious meaning of lexis and syntax of the source text is in its style. The attitude expressed in the text is in its style (Sperber & Wilson 1995), the basis for reader engagement is in its style (Pilkington 1996), the expression of cognitive state is in its style (mind style, as Fowler 1977a). Therefore it is highly important for a translator to be as stylistically aware as possible, and to use the style as the basis and focal point for a translation.

ii) Reading is a cognitive process; the translator as reader of the source text plays an active role in constructing a reading, which involves the construction and modification of contexts. This assumption is based on Reader-Response Theory (Iser 1979), Relevance Theory (Gutt 2000) and many other pragmatic approaches to literature (Lecercle 1990), language (Sperber & Wilson 1995), and translation (Diaz-Diocaretz 1985). This applies equally to the reader of the target text.

iii) The translator can convey some of the richness and the openness to reader involvement of the source text if it is borne in mind that the style represents (author's, narrator's, character's) choices (Thornborrow &Wareing 1998). This is not to say that these choices represent different ways of saying the same thing but different ways of saying which reflect different ways of seeing; what is said also varies according to how it is said. One of the ways such choices are reflected

in the style of the source text is in its use of what Relevance Theory calls weak implicatures (Pilkington 2000), what Reader-Response Theory has called gaps in the text (Iser 1979), and other writers have called weakly-implied meanings (Montgomery *et al* 2000). These reflections of choices in the source text, if carried over to the target text, allow for the reader of the target text to similarly engage with the text and create new meanings.

iv) The difference between literary and non-literary texts is crucial for translators. Literary texts (and some non-literary texts such as letters, journalistic articles) convey a cognitive state. For the translator, there is no need to focus on trying to replicate the effects the original text might have had on its original readers (Nida & Taber 1974), because recreating something of the cognitive state will enable some of its effects to be relived by the reader. Furthermore, constructing a reading of a literary text involves an infinite search for possible contexts; literary texts contain elements which promote such searches. A literary translation must give its readers such possibilities for prolonged searches, or it will not have achieved its literary effect. Though some of what applies to the reading and translation of literary texts also applies to non-literary texts (Pratt 1977; Short 1986), there will usually be fewer weak implicatures in non-literary texts and they might be less weak, thus manipulating the reader rather than inviting the reader's engagement.

v) The meaning of the source text is neither exclusively text-immanent nor simply universal but is a mix of universal themes, cognitive possibilities, and specific description, and involves the cognitive context of the reader. Stylistic figures in the text such as metaphor, iconicity, ambiguity and the like are not merely in the text. They have cognitive correlates (Tabakowska 1993; Stockwell 2002a), and in this cognitive sense they have both a universal basis and an individual context which is to some extent culturally bound. Translators need to make decisions especially about what to do with their culturally-bound and individual aspects. These are the sorts of decisions affected by translation strategies such as foreignizing and domesticating (Venuti 1995), or producing an overt or covert translation (House 1981).

vi) A translator's work will proceed by "pretending" s/he knows what the text (or by extension its author) is saying, just as the recipient of any act of communication will; that is, the translator will take implications found in the text to be implicatures (or intended implications). At the same time a stylistically-aware translator will know that s/he has constructed this view of the author and that the author is therefore an inferred author (Boase-Beier 2004a).

Throughout the chapter, discussion based on a stylistic approach to the target text as product will be interspersed with discussion of translation as process.

I can best illustrate the latter by using my own translations, and these are almost exclusively translations of poetry. However, as discussion of examples in the previous chapters suggests, much of what I have to say in this chapter will apply almost equally to other types of literary text, and to a lesser extent to many non-literary text-types such as journalism and advertising.

5.2 Using style to translate mind

Literary translation can be seen as the translation of style because it is the style of a text which allows the text to function as literature. One way of putting this is to say that the style, as the direct reflection of the author's choices, carries the speaker's meaning, both conscious and unconscious, and so the translation of a literary text is the translation of a particular cognitive state as it has become embodied in the text. It is in this sense that a translation can, as Shelley put it in 1840 "spring again from its seed" (Brett-Smith 1972:29). However, because of the translator's role as active participant in creating a textual reading, different readers will read the same text differently, will engage with its implicatures differently and will produce different translations reflecting different aspects of the mind behind the text. In this chapter I shall use the term "reading", in a similar sense to that used by Scott (2000), to mean both the process of reading and its product, whereby the product is dynamic, variable and open, specifically encouraging a search for contexts. I will tend to use the term 'interpretation' to mean a particular understanding of a text which the interpreter feels is as good an understanding as can be reached; this is different from the way the two terms are used by Stockwell (2002a:8).

Almost all texts indicate in their style the cognitive state of the speaker or writer. This may be the actual writer of the text or a persona taken on by the writer, a representation of a character, or even a composite of several writers, as when a journalist's description of an event carries traces of both her/his view and that of the newspaper for whom s/he writes. However, style is most clearly a representation of a cognitive state when the text does not purport to be about a true state of affairs. In a recent article (Boase-Beier 2003a), I use Morgenstern's 'The Two Donkeys' as an example of a poem about a fictional world: it cannot be about two donkeys in the real world because the donkey characters in the poem get married and hold a conversation. This is the poem, followed by two different translations:

Ein	finstrer	Esel	sprach	einmal
a	*gloomy*	*donkey*	*said*	*once*
zu	seinem	ehelichen	Gemahl:	
to	*his*	*wedded*	*spouse*	

"Ich bin so dumm, du bist so dumm,
I am so stupid you are so stupid
Wir wollen sterben gehen, komm!"
we want to-die go come
Doch wie es kommt so öfter eben:
but as it comes thus more-often in-fact
Die beiden blieben fröhlich leben.
the two stayed happily to-live

(Morgenstern in Arndt 1993:15)

A gloomy ass one morning said
Unto his mate of board and bed:
"I am so dumb, you are so dumb,
Let us seek death together, come!"
As it turned out (and often will)
The two are blithely living still.

(Arndt 1993:15)

A dismal donkey, tired of life
Said to his lawful wedded wife:
"We are so stupid, you and I,
Why don't we just go off and die?"
But habit dies hard, as folks say
And they are living to this day.

(Bell 1992:n.p.)

The poem ironically suggests, by means of formal language used about the two donkeys as well as the fact that they are married, speak, consider themselves stupid, contemplate suicide but do not carry it out, that neither the institution of marriage, nor the despair of people who feel life is not worth living, should be taken too seriously. But the ironical mind style is represented very differently in the two different translations. Arndt's translation, possibly about metaphorical donkeys, reflects the ironical representation of German pedantry in language and institutions, whereas Bell's has more of the feel of a folk rhyme, and reflects the monotony of life and people's tendency to be creatures of habit. What the article in question, which considers these two translations, attempts to show is that "the reader adapts the reconstruction to his or her own view of the world" (Boase-Beier 2003a:263). Arndt's view of the world, I argue, is influenced by the fact that he is an academic, a translator of Pushkin and Goethe, interested, as his Introduction shows, in Morgenstern's concern with the conventions of language and their subversion in language play. Bell's view is influenced by her translations of children's literature and her interest in the folktale elements of the poem. Her book contains an illustration of real donkeys in human clothes, something

that, in cognitive terms, could be seen to suggest a blend, a mental representation in which elements of different worlds co-exist (Stockwell 2002a:97). Here these two worlds are the real and the fairytale world. Each translation is thus a product of a particular interpretation of the source text, in each case profoundly affected by the individual translator's cognitive context, that is, by her or his circumstances, beliefs, interests and views. My reading of these translations is also (as I assume the translator's reading of the source text is) an attempt to reconstruct a mind style as perceived through what is distinctive about the manner of expression (to use Wales' definition of style 2001:371 again).

Ideally a translation will leave the text open to as many readings as possible, rather than forcing its reader to accept one interpretation over another. However, because literary reading shares with other types of communication a search for meaning, even though literary reading differs in focussing on the search itself rather than its attainment, we are constantly, as readers and translators, behaving as though there were in fact a privileged interpretation or set of interpretations. Perhaps one thing stylistic awareness can hope to achieve is that the translator will recognize this tendency and also recognize the tendency of literature to run counter to it. Just as a critical analysis which starts from a particular interpretation is unlikely to do justice to the text it aims to analyse, so, if the reading of the source text tends towards a fixed interpretation, then there can be little hope that the resulting translation will do justice to the original text, or will itself work as literature.

To see how the notion of mind style might affect the process of translation, let us take up in more detail an example from 2.3, the poem by Ernst Meister 'Entschlafen', which begins with the foregrounded word "entschlafen":

Entschlafen

Entschlafen, ent-
away-slept away-
träumt
dreamt
nicht einmal
not even
ein Halm.
a straw

Denk es,
think it
und zur Kugel
and to-a ball

nimm dich
pull you
zusammen.
together

Die meisten
the most
Sterne
stars
sind leblos.
are lifeless

(Meister 1979:102)

The word "entschlafen" is striking because it is both lexicalized with a particular meaning and also inherently ambiguous. As a lexicalized participle it has the meaning 'died'. The rich derivational morphology of German makes it possible to coin new words fairly freely: *ent-* means to free from (as in *entlasten*, to unburden, from *Last*, burden) but also to move away (as in *entkommen*, to escape, from *kommen*, to come). *Schlafen* means to sleep; the past participle "entschlafen" could therefore either mean 'died' or be a new coinage meaning to have gone away into sleep or to have escaped out of sleep. The second word in the poem, which does not have a lexicalized meaning at all, could mean either to be lost in dream or to have escaped out of dreams. In an article which looks at how Relevance Theory might affect the translation of this poem (Boase-Beier 2004a), I argue that this initial ambiguity sets off a train of further ambiguities throughout the poem. However, what I want to focus on here is the way the final stanza of the poem, which contains a near anagram of the poet's name, gives a clue to the particular state of mind of someone thinking about death. The poem in translation reads as follows:

Out of sleep, out
of dream,
not even
a straw.

Think this
and pull
yourself into
a ball.

Most of
my stars
are lifeless.

(Boase-Beier 2003c:113)

There is a complex cognitive state embodied in this poem. Death is envisaged as freedom, as loss, and as inevitable, in stanza 1. *Ent-* suggests both freedom and loss, the image of a straw, something which one might clutch at, though it does not exist. The idiom in the second stanza "pull yourself together" is begun but then changed half-way through to suggest a protective drawing in. Death is thus both not to be feared – so one should pull oneself together – and to be feared – so one should draw oneself in. The final stanza changes from imperatives and the "you" of stanza 2 to the speaker himself, who is identified by "meisten Sterne" as the poet. Stars are bright but dead which is both positive (they are still there, they still shine, though they consist of dead material) and negative (they might seem bright but they are dead). In this translation it is the contradictory nature of thoughts about death which has driven my reading of the poem, and the clues are in particular three stylistic features:

i) the double meaning of *ent-*
ii) the mix of an idiom suggesting resignation and control with an image suggesting fear and hiding
iii) the near-anagram of Ernst Meister in stanza 3

This in turn has led me to translate *ent-* the first time with "lost" and the second time with "free", both words which in themselves can suggest either a positive escape or a removal. It has further led to combining the idiom "pull yourself together" with "into a ball", which is what a hedgehog does to hide. And it has prompted the insertion of "my" in stanza 3 to suggest both the poet's name Meister ("my stars") and to draw attention to the change from the externalizing, second-person address of the second stanza to the internalized, first-person description of the final one. It links the poet's name with the word "lifeless", suggesting a preoccupation with death. I would argue that it is the importance of this mental state, this preoccupation with the approach of death, and the combination of fear and acceptance which goes with it, that has determined the apparent deviation in the final stanza from the source text, which could simply have been translated as *most stars are lifeless*.

But it is not only in literary texts that style can be seen as indicative of mental attitude or belief. As we saw in 4.1, this especially applies to journalism. A German magazine text about a condition which supposedly affects half a percent of the German population (*Focus*, 14 May 2005) clearly shows the attitude of its author, Juliane Lutz, that this a serious illness. Words and phrases such as "geradezu besessen" (completely obsessed), "groteske Schicksale" (grotesque fates), "leiden" (suffer), "tragisch" (tragic), "schwere, mitunter sogar lebensbedrohliche Mangelerscheinungen" (serious and sometimes even fatal deficiencies), "katastrophal" (catastrophic), indicate the

serious nature of the perceived threat. The 'illness' is given a name: "Orthorexie" (orthorexia) and the people who suffer from it are "Orthorektiker" (orthorectics). The text has many references to important authorities, such as "Detlev Nutzinger, Professor für Psychosomatik und Psychotherapie an der Universität Lübeck", which lend it gravity. The attitude this text conveys is one of fear and the need to issue warning. A documentary translation into English which kept close to the German would sound pompous and would risk seeming to be a parody of other articles warning of mysterious diseases and afflictions. Yet it is important that the mind style is not lost, because the article does not have any information value; it merely expresses opinion. An instrumental translation would therefore have to tone down "catastrophic", perhaps, to *serious*, "completely obsessed" to *obsessed*, and would not need to give us a designation for people suffering from the supposed condition, nor would it need to explain the etymology of the name of the illness, as the German text does. What, in fact, translation would need to do, would be to imagine an attitude more likely in an author of a short article in a similarly popular English magazine.

What this discussion would appear to suggest is that the writing of an instrumental translation demands that we see the style as indicating the attitude of the original writer; this may in fact be a major component of the meaning of the text.

5.3 Ambiguous translation

The German word *wenn* is inherently ambiguous: it can mean either 'when' or 'if', a linguistic fact often used in poetry to create ambiguity. The poem 'Am Ende der Zeit' ('At the End of Time') by Rose Ausländer (1977:266) begins

> Wenn der Krieg beendet ist / am Ende der Zeit

an allusion to the Book of Micah's "But in the last days it shall come to pass … they shall beat their swords into ploughshares … neither shall they learn war any more". These first two lines could mean 'At the end of time, when the war is over' or 'If the war is over by the end of time'. A line further on in the poem says "Es wird schön sein / wenn es sein wird", which could mean 'It will be good when it happens' or 'It will be good if it happens'. The poem thus suggests both that a time will eventually come when there is no more war, and also that possibly there will never come a time when there is no war. There seems no way to choose between these meanings, not just because both are possible but because, as we saw in the previous section in the poem 'Entschlafen', what is behind the poem is a complex state of mind in

which both negative and positive possibilities are entertained; this is in fact the state of mind which embodies hope. The translation of 'Am Ende der Zeit' by Ewald Osers (1977:55) translates "wenn" both times with "when", thus representing a stronger hope without room for doubt. This changes the cognitive state embodied in the poem quite radically, making it far more optimistic. But English does not have a word which is ambiguous between the meanings of *when* and *if* (neither does French, nor Turkish); this is something distinctively German. Indeed, one might be tempted to argue that the cognitive representation of *wenn* in German, a state of uncertainty (if) but with the underlying assumption that what is predicted will happen (when) simply does not exist in English, just as Wierzbicka, as discussed in Chapter 1, argued that words like *Bruderschaft* in German or *grev* in Russian do not exist in English (1997:9).

However, more thought will show that this is not in fact a cognitive difference, or at least not an absolute one: in English we can say "when the war ends, if it ever does" or "if and when the war comes to an end" though neither of these would work well in the compressed form of a poem like this one. The only thing a translator could do, if s/he does not wish to translate the German hopeful uncertainty into either clear doubt or certain hope, is to change the structure somewhat and use an expression like: "The war might end / at the end of time / and we'll go for a walk" and, further on "It could happen / it could be good". In fact, Oser's translation works perfectly well as an English poem. But because it changes the uncertainty of the original, we could consider it not to be a translation if a translation's task is to preserve the interactive nature of the original. We could also argue that it does not allow the reader to experience a state of hopeful uncertainty, which is, at least in one possible interpretation, exactly what the title itself suggests.

As I explained in 4.3, ambiguity is a pervasive feature of German vocabulary. Many words have, or are associated etymologically with, both a neutral meaning and one with negative connotations:

Schlacht	–	battle (since the sixteenth century) or slaughter (in older texts)
Heide	–	heath or heathen
verwesen	–	to administrate (now almost obsolete) or to decay
Abgang	–	departure, exit, abortion or death

Some of these senses are now almost obsolete, but are capable of reactivation and so, just like those words where the different meanings are current, can be used in poetry to give a sense of the sinister underlying the everyday, as Kirsch's poetry often does, to express uncertainty, as Ausländer's does, or to develop contradictory views, as in much philosophical poetry. An example

of the latter use of ambiguity comes from another poem by Ernst Meister, which has as its final four lines:

Was ist, ist
what is is

und ist aufgehoben
and is lifted/cancelled out/kept
im wandlosen Gefäß
in-the wall-less vessel
des Raums.
of-the space

(Boase-Beier 2003c:122)

The word "aufgehoben" can mean (a) undone, erased, (b) kept, preserved, or (c) lifted up. The ambiguity here is similar to that in the previous example, but here at least two of the readings are more clearly implicated by the collocation "ist und ist aufgehoben". This suggests both *ist und ist nicht* (is and is not), i.e. "aufgehoben" understood in sense (a), and *ist und bleibt* (is and remains), i.e. "aufgehoben" in sense (b). Thus at least the first two meanings are likely to be activated for the reader. A translation might focus on creating a clear meaning, which preserved only one of these alternatives. An approach which focussed on the fact of ambiguity, on the other hand, might try to find a word in English with similar ambiguity, though it is doubtful that one exists. However, a cognitive stylistic approach, which would do neither, seems especially relevant here because Meister is generally regarded as a "philosophical" poet (cf. Dove 1996:xvi). That is, he is a poet who is concerned with what we know, with ideas of time, space and reality, with how we argue and how we understand. It is thus reasonable to assume that what the translator needs to focus on is less the ambiguity of the word itself and more the ambiguous idea this word suggests: space which preserves being by erasing it. This has led to my translation of these lines as:

What is is

and is not
held in the wall-less vessel
of space

(Boase-Beier 2003c:123)

This translation aims to draw attention to the nature of being and not being and to the ambiguity that exists between both that opposition and the opposition between being held and not being held by "the wall-less vessel of space". It draws upon the use of the word *aufgehoben* by German Romantic

writers, and especially Schlegel, to suggest reconciliation or erasing of difference between, for example, the naïve and the analytically sophisticated (Travers 2001:12; see also Schlegel 1968).

As our earlier discussion showed, many uses of ambiguity are structural rather than lexical. The example given briefly in 4.2 is taken from an article (Boase-Beier 2004b), in which I discuss the translation of the following poem by Volker von Törne (1981:56):

Beim	**Lesen**	**der**	**Zeitung**
during-the	*reading*	*of-the*	*newspaper*

Ich	lese	in der	Zeitung,	dass	die	Mörder
I	*read (pr.)*	*in the*	*paper*	*that*	*the*	*murderers*
Von	Mord	und	Totschlag	nichts	gewusst.	
of	*murder*	*and*	*manslaughter*	*nothing*	*known*	
(Meine	Schwester	nähte	damals			
my	*sister*	*sewed*	*at-that-time*			
ihren	Puppen	gelbe	Flicken	auf der	Brust.)	
her	*dolls*	*yellow*	*patches*	*on the*	*chest*	

A central, salient feature of this poem is the missing auxiliary after "gewusst" (known); this use of the perfect tense whereby the auxiliary *haben* (have) is omitted is common in German poetry but has an unusual effect here because it is dependent upon the verb "lese" (read): "ich lese, dass X nicht gewusst ---" (I read that X --- not known). A gap in these circumstances does not fit the "cognitive unit" (Verdonk 1999:297) of linguistic knowledge which tells us that an auxiliary must be present. (English would not, of course, use the perfect here; it would say 'did not know', rather than 'have not known'.) The dependency upon the verb "to read" means that the second half of the first sentence, beginning with "dass" (that), describing what has been read, is indirect speech. In German, indirect speech usually uses, for the auxiliary verb in question, either first or second subjunctive (*hätten*) or present or imperfect indicative (*haben, hatten*). Subjunctive would suggest distancing from the content: the speaker (here the reader of the newspaper) reports something but is not prepared to endorse it. Indicative would suggest the speaker is prepared to endorse or at least accept what s/he is reporting. The two possibilities would thus usually be:

a) ich lese, dass X nicht gewusst *hätten* [reader is distancing her/himself from what is read]
b) ich lese, dass X nicht gewusst *haben* [reader is endorsing what is read].

In English, this distinction can be approximately captured by:

a) I read that X allegedly did not know
b) I read that X did not know

But in fact no auxiliary at all is given; the italicized forms *hätten* and *haben* in the above examples have to be "thought" by the reader. Thus the one word which could unequivocally express the attitude of the reader of the paper ("ich" in line 1) cannot do so. So not only does the reader of the poem not know the reader of the paper's attitude, but the latter does not even speak it, leaving instead a gap at the point at which it would normally be visible. Why? The assumption I made in the article mentioned above, and am making here, is that the speaker, who is the reader of the paper, is in two minds. That is, the words of the poem reflect a cognitive state, characterized by ambiguity. Perhaps the newspaper itself is ambiguous (as, especially in headlines, newspapers are expected to be; see Sandig 1971) but more importantly, the reader of the newspaper, unable in standard German to avoid expressing her or his attitude in the act of reporting, here in this poem manages to do exactly this by omitting the auxiliary. The omission suggests that s/he does not know what to think. But s/he does not know what to think because those thoughts would be about someone else's state of mind – that of the perpetrators of "murder and manslaughter". And, by inference, those murderers and slaughterers also did not know whether they knew or not. That this was their actual state of mind is suggested by the many statements taken from perpetrators of Nazi crimes and their bystanders (see, for example, Sereny 2000).

So this short and apparently simple poem reflects five levels of uncertainty:

a) the reader (and translator) of the poem does not know which auxiliary to insert in the gap at the end of line 2, to suggest
b) the speaker believes (indicative *haben*) or does not believe (subjunctive *hätten*) in the murderers' lack of knowledge;
c) the speaker does not say (and by inference does not know) whether s/he believes the newspaper's statement of the murderers' knowledge or lack of it, and by inference does not say (or know) whether s/he believes in the lack of knowledge itself;
d) the newspaper does not say whether it endorses or rejects the murderers' purported lack of knowledge;
e) the murderers both know and do not know about the crimes they are committing, which are murder (if they know) or manslaughter (if they do not, or indeed both: line 2 says murder *and* manslaughter, suggesting they both know and do not know.

The uncertainty which the reader of the poem feels, (a), thus mirrors the

other uncertainties (b-d) before finally allowing access to the crucial one, (e): the moral ambiguity which allows people to become perpetrators of (or bystanders to) atrocity. And the reader of the poem, like the reader of the newspaper, by not knowing what to think, is made to experience the same moral ambiguity. Further evidence for the view that what is ultimately being expressed is the ambiguity of the perpetrators themselves comes from other poems by von Törne. He puts his own name in a poem dealing with recent history: "I speak of myself: Volker von Törne" (translation of the first line of 'Gedanken im Mai'; von Törne 1981:168); he accepts responsibility: "And I was guilty" (von Törne 1981:168). The author was a member of *Aktion Sühnezeichen* (The Sign of the Atonement), and worked to repair the damage caused by fascism after the Second World War. If what Dennett (1988:185) says is correct and we can only cope with "five or six orders of intentionality", that is, five or six levels of belief about the minds of others, then this poem is bordering on the highest degree of complexity we can cognitively process. This is likely to make the reader of the poem, like the reader of the newspaper, somewhat confused as to who believes what.

Five things are important for a translation based on a cognitive stylistic reading of this type:

i) the focus is on the missing auxiliary not as a poetic convention but for the way it is used in this poem to reflect a cognitive state: that of simultaneous knowing and not-knowing;
ii) the poem links the figure of ambiguity to all other instances of ambiguity in Holocaust writing and in any writing about atrocity by virtue of expressing, iconically, an attitude which is the result of a cognitively ambiguous state;
iii) as a poetic figure, the missing auxiliary serves to maximally engage the reader, in the sense of Relevance Theory and Reader-Response Theory, by forcing her or him to fill the gap it has left (and realizing in doing so that there are two contradictory options);
iv) The poem, though short and at first glance easy to understand, contains a large enough number of orders of intentionality to be mentally taxing;
v) the ambiguity is so striking that it takes precedence over the other stylistic features of the poem such as the rhyme (which suggests a link between the act of reading and the child's act of playing with dolls) and the regular metre (which suggests a children's rhyme and the lack of decision-making on the part of adults in the world von Törne describes). This striking ambiguity also influences the interpretation of these other stylistic features so that both the linking of child playing and adult reading and the suggestion of children's writing both suggest moral underdevelopment rather than innocence.

The consequence of the first of these points is that a translator into English might choose something not merely typical of poetic language (as in one sense the missing auxiliary in German is) but something which can convey the "doublethink", to use Orwell's term, of the German (see Orwell 1987). The consequence of the second is to place the poem in the context of other Holocaust writing with its unspoken words, unfinished sentences, gaps, spaces and silences (*The Language of Silence*, in the memorable title of a book on Holocaust literature by Schlant 1999) and honour the gap in the poem, rather than spelling out the two possible meanings. In Reader-Response and Relevance-Theory terms – point (iii) above – this means that Holocaust writing in particular, in common with other types of writing which aim to bear witness, makes the reader decide how to deal with gaps, how to articulate the unspoken. The consequence of (iv) is that a translation must not inadvertently reduce the orders of intentionality or it runs the risk of both misrepresenting a confused or at least stretched state of mind and of failing to similarly stretch its reader. And the consequence of (v) is that the translation must enable the links made stylistically between the child and adult worlds to suggest moral underdevelopment rather than innocence. If the translator, seeing the two meanings, spells out only one, the reflection of the "doublethink" will be lost. If s/he spells out both, it will be represented diagetically to the reader but not mimetically; the iconicity will be lost. The reader will thus be told, in the way that the perpetrators and bystanders in Sereny's book (2000) tell us, that people both knew and did not know. But the reader will not be made to feel the same. In leaving the gap, the reader is forced to see both possibilities at once. Stockwell (2002a:14) suggests that when confronted with ambiguous figures it is "very difficult not to see one as figure and the rest as ground", that is, to give precedence to one reading over the other. But here the reader is confronted not so much with a figure that can be read in two ways as with a gap, and the consequence is that both possibilities, both equally invisible, both equally implied, have equal weight. We feel what it is to both know and not know, because this is not an interview with a perpetrator but a mimetic piece of verbal art. To pick up the term introduced in Chapter 2.2, this is not just a striking instance of the "maxmax" principle whereby we maximally engage with texts to try and get the most out of them, but in fact the reader is almost forced into such engagement because the presence of a gap with two conflicting resolutions forces her/him to follow two different paths of thought, and experience a state of mind in which they co-exist. The poem, that is, has a moral purpose. So what can a translation do? One possibility is to make use of the newspaper register to achieve ambiguity, but in a slightly different way. Headlines leave gaps as we saw in Chapter 4, and the first line of the translated poem, picking up on its title, could run

Butchers ignorant of slaughter

There is no verb here; the reader can substitute on the one hand 'are' or 'were', on the other 'are alleged to be', 'say they are', 'believe themselves' and so on, each inserted verb expressing one of two possibilities: they were ignorant or they were not. The reader of the paper must fill the gap and so must the reader of the poem, but both possibilities are equal, so the reader (of the paper and of the poem) can or must entertain both at once, just as the butchers themselves kept a split mind. There is a further ambiguity of tense, for the missing auxiliary in German, besides being subjunctive or indicative, can also be past or present: perhaps they were ignorant but are not now. The same ambiguity obtains in the English because there is no verb to carry tense. As the examples in Chapter 4 showed, headlines are usually disambiguated in the text which follows them. But in the English version of 'Beim Lesen der Zeitung', there is no disambiguation, as the second line reads "so at least the papers say". No clue is given as to the actual mind of the perpetrators nor the actual opinion of the newspaper but the context of the final two lines also suggests the reader of the paper has a particular reason to doubt the suggestion of ignorance, for he reads these lines in the context of remembering his sister putting yellow patches on her dolls. She, as someone young enough to play with dolls, can be supposed to be ignorant because innocent. The murderers are either by implication also ignorant (though not innocent) being morally unable to do other than follow what everyone else does, or they are seen as contrasted with the sister and therefore committing crimes knowingly. The English version, given in full now, tries to preserve this context carefully because it is an important clue to the forces that are pulling the reader of the paper in different directions:

While Reading the Paper

Butchers ignorant of slaughter
– so at least the papers say.
(And I watched my sister with her dolls,
sewing yellow patches on in play.)

From the above examples it is clear that ambiguous structures result in two (or more) possible readings and that, in literary texts at least, these readings all obtain at the same time. Even if they appear to be mutually exclusive (to know and not to know in the von Törne example) they tend to express a complex cognitive state in which both meanings exist, something we also saw in the previous section with the Ernst Meister poem 'Entschlafen'.

However, if we look at a non-literary text, it will be clear that what is happening is subtly different, at least in cognitive terms. In the discussion of

the von Törne poem we noted that headlines contain ambiguity, yet this ambiguity tends to be resolved in context. The headlines given in 4.3 ('Pants Protestor Trousers Seat' and 'Knife Woman Attacks Breadman') are both followed by texts which contain various disambiguating elements. There is thus a potential ambiguity which is later removed, and yet, once the reader has thought about the first possible interpretation it will be difficult to entirely discard it. The rejected meaning (ineffective protestor, horror-film figure wielding knife) will tend to persist alongside the contextualized one. This is also possible in literary texts, as an example in section 5.6 of a poem by R.S. Thomas will show. However, it is worth noting that a major difference between non-literary and literary texts is that the former tend to give the reader a certain amount of cognitive effort but then provide a reward in a clear interpretation which allows effort to stop whereas the latter do not allow such closure. A characteristic of literary texts is that they allow the search for alternative contexts to be pursued; the critic D.W. Harding calls this stimulating rather than gratifying the reader's needs and wishes (Lodge 1988:227). It is important for a literary translation, in order to work as a literary text, to do the same.

5.3 Attracting attention: patterns and other deviant structures

As we saw in 4.4, there are many ways in which texts can draw attention to particular elements. In a poem about memory by Erich Fried, 'Aufforderung zum Vergessen' ('Invitation to Forget'; Hood 1990:39), the word "vergessen" (forget), occurs eight times. But there are other words in the poem which begin with *ver*: "vergiftet" (poisoned), "verbrannt" (burned), "verloren" (lost), "Vertreiber" (those who drive people out). All these words are negative, and indeed the prefix *ver-* can suggest undoing (*verlieren*, 'to lose', *vergessen*, 'to forget'), error (*sich verrechnen*, 'to miscalculate', *sich versprechen*, 'make a linguistic slip'), destruction (*verstummeln*, 'to mutilate', *verderben*, 'to decay'), among many other things. The effect of the distinctive pattern of words in this poem is to draw attention to the negative connotations of poisoning, burning, losing and driving out and to link them to forgetting. Forgetting is thus seen as something negative, a violence done in the wake of war or atrocity. The translation by Stuart Hood translates all uses of "vergessen" with "forget" but "vergiftet" is translated with "poisoned"', "verbrannt" with "burnt", "verloren" with "lost" and "Vertreiber" with "those who drove you away". The juxtaposition of the poem's title with various sorts of forgetting strongly suggests irony, but the words of the English poem do not underline this irony so strongly. The various "invitations" in the German poem are not just limited to harmless ways of forgetting but, by virtue

of the foregrounded repetition, extended to include suggestions that we burn and poison the earth and drive people away. We are thus being invited to be complicit in the very acts we are invited to forget. No such link is made in the English.

Pattern is an obvious way of foregrounding particular elements of a text. Breaking the pattern can foreground them even more, if the pattern is first established strongly enough to attract the reader's attention. This is what happens in the following translation by Elisabeth Kuhn of a poem by Robert Gernhardt:

> Fear of failure is my curse
> whenever I am writing verse,
> which has too often, I must say,
> led many of my rhymes amiss.
>
> (Kuhn 2004)

What particularly stands out here is the word "amiss"; the obvious *aabb* rhyme scheme and the collocation "to lead ~" can both be assumed to reflect cognitive schemata into which the word *astray* would fit. The strongly iconic element of the poem – "lead amiss" suggests something gone astray: both rhyme and collocation have got lost – adds to the focus on this final word. A translation will need to find a word which is iconic in both these ways and must lead up to it with appropriate regular rhythm. The actual words chosen for the rest of the poem will be less important than the fulfilling of these two criteria.

But foregrounding is not always a matter of pattern or its disruption. It can be instead a disruption of a grammatical cognitive schema, as in the following four lines of a poem by Yvan Goll:

> In deinen Augen, den erloschenen
> *in your eyes the extinguished*
> Haust eine kalte Angst.
> *houses a cold fear*
> Und deine leere Seele
> *and your empty soul*
> Mußt du mit Zeitungen verstopfen.
> *must you with newspapers stuff*
>
> (Bullock & Schulte 1981:22)

The translation by Rainer Schulte reads:

> In your dead eyes
> Dwells cold fear.

And you fill your empty soul
With newspapers.

(Bullock & Schulte 1981:23)

The first line of the German extract requires more processing than the usual preposition-possessive-adjective-noun order *in deinen erloschenen Augen*, because the adjective is postposed to give "den erloschenen" in a structure which is grammatically possible but only used for emphasis in German. The adjective is thus strongly foregrounded. It is not possible to say in English *in your eyes, the extinguished ones*. In order to put emphasis on the adjectival phrase one can say *in your eyes, extinguished* , or in *your eyes which ar e extinguished*, and so on. But the phrase is striking in another, though less obvious way: *erloschen* (extinguished) is not the usual way of saying *dead*, though it is fairly common in poetry. This has the odd effect of emphasizing the extinguishedness of the eyes while not emphasizing, or "deselecting", in the terms used by Stockwell (2002a:18) the phrase "eine kalte Angst" (a cold fear), which follows the usual order of an adjective-noun combination, and focussing equally little attention on 'deine leere Seele' (your empty soul) for the same reason. The cold fear and the empty soul thus become the background against which two things are emphasized: the extinguishedness of the eyes and the action that must be taken to fill the empty soul. Again "verstopfen" (stop up, stuff) is a more unusual word than 'füllen' (fill); it is usually associated with filling gaps around window frames or in walls, an image which is emphasized by the unusual (though not for Goll) verb "haust" (lit: houses) for *lives*.

The translation by Rainer Schulte reads well as a poem in English, but the relationships in the original, including that of reader to text, are changed quite radically. "Dead eyes", "cold fear" and "empty soul" all follow the same pattern so that attention becomes focussed on this pattern itself, which is the most striking aspect of the English translation.

This analysis of the style of Schulte's translated poem could be used as the basis for a re-translation. Such a translation might read

In your eyes now extinguished
Dwells a cold fear
And your empty soul
You must stop up with newspapers.

This has the advantage of focussing attention on "extinguished" by violating the usual cognitive representation of an adjective-noun word order. It is not necessarily a better poem than Schulte's but, I would argue, it is a better translation, because it conveys more of the pattern of foregrounding of the

original poem. If we see translated literature as a special category of writing, as suggested in 1.5, this re-translation would be instrumentally more effective as translated literature.

One of the reasons one might object to the translating of "forträumen" in the example from Kaiser & Holzman discussed in Chapter 3 with "side" is that, for people in whose dialect this word does not occur, the word will be foregrounded in a way incompatible with the original, where there was no dialectal use. However, in keeping with Venuti's (1998) view, such foregrounding might be seen as a reminder that this is a translation of a literary text, a "communicative clue" in Gutt's terms (2000:132). Yet in fact the book contains Holzman's actual diary entries; its language, rather than drawing attention to its literary status, is colloquial and unremarkable and thus draws attention away from itself and any literary status that might be accorded to the work, allowing it to fall instead on the events portrayed in the diary. It would thus also be reasonable to argue that anything which draws attention to the language and the fact that it is a translation detracts from its documentary value as a text recording actual events by turning it into a documentary translation.

As mentioned in 4.4, foregrounding is an essential feature of literature which, in cognitive terms, forces the reader to engage fully with the text. In keeping with Jakobson's view that the literary function involves focus on the language (1960), it can be seen as rendering the style of the text uneven, with some features attracting more attention than others. Translation which keeps the strangeness of certain elements – a foreignizing translation in Venuti's (1995) terms – is therefore more likely to be a foregrounding translation. As I have noted several times, Venuti is not advocating a sort of translation which mimics the foreign original, so much as one that uses non-standard language. What a cognitive approach suggests is that the element of mimicry must indeed be there if the pattern of figure and ground in the original is to be kept but that it is these relationships, rather than the foreign syntax or lexis, of which a translator needs to be more aware.

As an example for the sort of relationships within the target text that foregrounding can give rise to, I want to consider the following poem by Johannes Poethen (Conrady 1977:1017):

Blindheit
blindness

1	In	meiner	blindheit	
	in	*my*	*blindness*	
2	taste	ich	bildern	nach
	feel	*I*	*pictures*	*after*

3	die	mir	entfliehen		
	which	*from-me*	*flee*		
4	Flucht der	säulen			
	flight of-the	*pillars*			
5	fluchten	heiliger	tiere		
	flights	*of-holy*	*animals*		
6	flüchtiges	öl –			
	volatile	*oil*			
7	Auf	dem	grund		
	on	*the*	*ground/reason*		
8	auf	dem	Grunde	der	blindheit
	on	*the*	*ground/ reason*	*of-the*	*blindness*
9	fühl	ich	weiße	fläche	
	feel	*I*	*white*	*area*	
10	– letzte	leinwand	gegen	den	tod –
	final	*canvas*	*against*	*the*	*death*
11	und	male	mich	sehend.	
	and	*paint*	*me*	*seeing*	

There are many repeated patterns in this poem, some more and some less obvious. Looking at the way a stylistic analysis might affect translation, we see that these are, (at least) the following, beginning with the most striking and going down to the more subtle (though their perceived salience will of course vary from reader to reader):

- words to do with seeing: “blindheit”, “bildern”, “blindheit”, and “sehend”
- words to do with flight: “entfliehen”, “flucht”, “fluchten”, and “flüchtig”
- alliteration: “blindheit … bildern”; “flucht”, “fluchten”, “flüchtig”; “fühl .. fläche”; “male ... mich”
- assonance: “blindheit ... bildern”; “mir … entfliehen … tiere”; “weiße ... leinwand”;
- an almost repeated phrase: “auf dem grund” … “auf dem grunde”

The most foregrounded passage (the “eye of the poem”, to use the term introduced in 4.4) is, in my view, lines 4/ 5/ 6, which all start with a word beginning [fl], which has, on the surface, to do with flight. This is heightened by the strange ambiguity of “fluchten”, strange because it is both syntactically and semantically ambiguous. Its two potential meanings are suggested by other words in the context, in each case given in square brackets:

a) flights (plural noun) or fleeing (nominalized verb) ["Flucht" in line 4]
b) alignments (plural noun) or lining up/being lined up (nominalized verb) ["säulen" in line 4]

Syntactic ambiguity is increased because the usual pattern in German of capitals for nouns, often disrupted slightly in poems where first words of lines or stanzas (as in English) may be capitalized, is here completely disrupted. Neither nouns, first words in lines nor first words in stanzas are regularly capitalized, so the usual sense of what is a noun and what is a verb, vague enough in a language of small vocabulary and rich derivational morphology like German (which, for example, readily derives verbs from nouns and nominalizes verbs), is completely lost. This syntactic blurring tends to give precedence to semantics, so that one first reads "fluchten" as though it said *fliehen* or *flüchten* (the fleeing (of) ….), before realizing this is not only semantically impossible but also does not fit the syntax, which suggests either a nominative plural of flight (the flights of the holy animals), or a dative plural, dependent upon the verb in line 2: I feel for pictures … (I feel for) flights of holy animals, where "fluchten" is dative plural like "bildern" in line 2.

Stockwell (2002a:15) describes figure and ground as "the basic features of literary stylistic analysis", in other words the sense that some things in the poem stand out is what drives the way we perceive the poem's style and therefore the attitude that is being taken to what is being discussed. It also, by focusing attention on a particular part of the text, as we saw in the earlier example of Kuhn's Gernhardt translation, drives the perception of all other relationships in the poem that tend to be made to fit whatever relationship is most foregrounded. Here, if the concepts of "blindness" and "flight" are being foregrounded, and the ambiguity of "flight" and "alignment" is also foregrounded, this is the perspective from which we view the poem. It could also be argued that the patterns of "blindness" and "flight" become, within the poem, to some extent the background; indeed lines 7 and 8 suggest exactly this. There are of course other aspects of the poem, such as the ambiguity of the final phrase "und male mich sehend" (paint myself sighted / paint myself while seeing) that a translation must take into account, but I want here to concentrate on the foregrounded patterns of repetition. One might echo these in the translation by focussing on the following:

i) the way lexical patterns to do with flight are supported by assonance and alliteration: an English version might use *flee*, *flight*, *fleeting*
ii) the way repeated lexis to do with blindness is similarly supported; English *my* and *blindness* alliterate
iii) the focus these patterns of foregrounding suggest on lines 4, 5 and 6; if *fleeting* is used for *volatile*, the pattern can be to some extent preserved.

This example shows the importance of the poetic line for creating foregrounded patterns. In prose, it works differently. One way in which foregrounding takes place in novels is through the use of heteroglossia, or different voices, seen by Bakhtin (1981), for example, to be a typical characteristic of the novel, as opposed to poetry (though Geyer-Ryan (1989) argues that poetry also uses heteroglossia). In this passage from *Die Eisheilige* (Mischke 1998), a character speaks in a South-Hessian dialect, represented as:

> "Sie sind siwwe Minude zu frieh. Sind Sie ohne Mandel?" (1998:0)

The standard German spelling would be "Sie sind sieben Minuten zu früh. Sind Sie ohne Mantel?", and the peculiar spelling serves the purpose of representing the dialect in question. But my assumption when translating this has been that it is not the resemblance of the original to an actual South-Hessian dialect which matters, but the fact that the secretary is a figure of fun: her large glasses, odd name (she is called Frau Kohlrabi) and dialect all draw attention to the outward impression on the main character, and away from any character she might herself have. The translation, therefore, aims neither to represent some English dialect nor to echo the German one. That is, it does not either domesticate or foreignize, but simply aims to reproduce the foregrounding effect. Frau Kohlrabi's words "Yur suvven minnus urly. Havn chugot a curt" (Boase-Beier 2002b:73) do nothing more than draw attention to themselves, like her colourful glasses and high heels. In this case the foregrounding of the language merely serves to relegate the character to the background.

5.5 Metaphorical thought translated

The poem by Sarah Kirsch, 'Edelstein wird er genannt', has an underlying theme common to a great deal of literature: the way death waits unexpectedly to destroy things. Here is the translation by W.D. Jackson (2000:78-79):

> **He Shall Be Called Jewel**
> The kingfisher left the nest
> For the first time / fluttered among
> Twigs / while behind the
> Millstone / the cunning
> Old cat lies waiting. A waste
> Of beautiful colours / recently acquired
> Grace.

The stylistic clues to the theme in the original include a change from past

tense when speaking of the kingfisher to present used of the cat lying in wait, a contrast Jackson has carefully kept in the translation. The title, in the translation as in the original, suggests the Bible. The reader of the German is able to supply many possible contexts for the understanding of this poem. The Biblical reference, the tenses, the generic use of "der Eisvogel" (the kingfisher) and "der … Kater" (the cunning old cat) suggest universality. A German reader might see the Holocaust, a war, a cot death, the strictures of a Communist state, the demise of Communism, as possible contexts. The translation allows all these possible contexts, and whatever others are compatible with the readers' background knowledge, to be constructed for the poem.

But the title is a more difficult matter: the German word *Edelstein* (jewel) is literally a "noble stone". *Edel*, meaning noble, valuable, better than average, is commonly seen in concatenation with materials in German compounds such as *Edelgas* (inert gas), *Edelholz* (fine wood), *Edelmetall* (precious metal), *Edelstahl* (stainless steel). In this poem, the superiority of "Edelstein" in the title contrasts strongly with "Mühlstein", a millstone. The kingfisher is up in the twigs (though not far enough up) and the cat on the ground, waiting. Thus the two stones, the "Edelstein" and the "Mühlstein" could be seen as metaphorically representing the position of kingfisher and cat (*Edel* is etymologically related to *Adel*, the highest class in a society, and *Mühlstein*, as in English, appears in idioms relating to its weight). This metaphorical linking of "Edelstein" with the kingfisher and "Mühlstein" with the cat works in German because the two types of stone are linguistically contrasted, but also because "Edelstein" suggests bright colours and "Mühlstein" grey and because of the conceptual metaphors GOOD IS UP and BAD IS DOWN which cognitive metaphor specialists such as Lakoff & Johnson (1980) suggest we all carry in our minds. It is thus a pity that Jackson's translation uses "Jewel" rather than, say, *gemstone* in the title. Because the contrasts in types of stone (the higher *Edel-* and the lower *Mühl-*) are lost, so too are the contrasting positions of kingfisher and cat and all that they entail. In many ways "jewel" sounds better in English; one could argue it is the more natural word. But losing some of the metaphorical import of the contrast is a high price to pay.

Being aware of metaphor, and of recent views which stress the centrality and ubiquity of metaphor and how it structures our thinking, might thus affect the way we carry out a translation. As an example, let us consider a poem by Rose Ausländer (1984:142):

Snow

Schnee fällt
snow falls

Die Welt wird weiss
the world becomes white

In der Sonne
in the sun
glitzert das Weiss
sparkles the white
in allen Farben
in all colours

Weisse Sterne
white stars
blühn in der Luft
blossom in the air

Am Horizont
on-the horizon
hinter den Bergen
behind the mountains
sieh Schneewittchen
see snow-white
und die sieben Zwerge
and the seven dwarves

Nachts
at-night
ist das Weiss schwarz
is the white black
wie die finstere Königin
like the dark queen
hinter den Bergen
behind the mountains

There are several conceptual metaphors here and several different types of stylistic realization. The main conceptual metaphors could be seen as:

GOOD IS WHITE
BAD IS BLACK
LIFE IS A LANDSCAPE
LIFE IS A FAIRY STORY

Stylistic representations of these vary from the unspoken – the world turns white suggesting the world appears to be good, safe, in order – to the explicit but cognitively complex: white is black in the same way as the dark queen

(who appears good but is sinister). This is in contrast to the notion of poetic metaphor suggested by Stockwell (2002a:108); metaphors which "tend to have low clarity but a high degree of richness". In fact, this metaphor has high clarity in one aspect (white is black *like* ("wie") the dark queen) but low clarity in another (we are left to assume that it is the dissembling nature of the queen that is being compared with the deceptive appearance of the snow).

The metaphor is made more complex by the fact that white and black are seen to be relative, not absolute, qualities, influenced by perception: white is coloured in the sun, white is black at night.

The cognitive stylistic approach to metaphor sees metaphor as cognitive rather than linguistic. The emphasis in understanding the metaphor lies less with whether a particular instance is a simile or an instance of metaphor proper and more with the cognitive metaphors upon which the linguistic realizations are based. But how does this perception of the metaphors as cognitive rather than merely linguistic affect translation?

A first important point is that conceptual metaphors, so far as they are embodied, are likely to be universal. Metaphors such as LOVE IS WAR and GOOD IS UP, discussed by both Stockwell (2002a) and Lakoff & Johnson (1980), will be familiar to most cultures. But not all conceptual metaphors are embodied; many have to do with conventions, and these can vary culturally, as pointed out in Chapter 4.5. GOOD IS WHITE and BAD IS BLACK are not universal: good is not necessarily white in every culture; in Chinese culture it can also suggest misfortune, according to Biedermann (1992:380). Dark does not equal sinister in every culture: sweeps are lucky, especially in Germany; there is cultural difference between English and German here. But in fact the concepts of white and black are more complex than this in English and German: ghosts, for example, are white and are not necessarily considered good; black is the colour of priestly robes and can suggest soberness. And the symbols can be used ironically. *Blanca paloma* (white dove) in Spanish is often used to refer to a person who merely pretends to be good and innocent while being in reality the opposite. While such idiomatic ironical uses are perhaps less common in English or German, they are conceptually possible. It would be interesting to explore the symbolism of black clothes and their various connotations in this respect.

A second point is that metaphor, especially in literary texts, also frequently serves to create allegory. That is, just as the world of the fairy tale might suggest a parallel, real world when we read the story of Snow White, or the Morgenstern poem about two donkeys, discussed in 5.2, so the world of the poem can suggest a set of historical events. This poem, in a much less explicit way than 'Beim Lesen der Zeitung' in the previous section, can be seen as a poem about the Holocaust. What appears good (white) is only good so long as it is day. What is to come is good (snow-white and the seven

dwarves) so long as it is day. But as in the fairy tale which contains the evil queen, so here waiting to enter the scene is something evil, a destroyer of innocence.

These considerations will mean that the position of words such as *white* and *black* in the English translation needs to be carefully thought out, so that the contrast is foregrounded. In the source text, "weiss" and "-wittchen", white, appear in initial or final position in lines except in the final stanza, where "weiss" is less prominent and the more prominent position is taken by "schwarz", black. This is surely highly significant. The English translation (Boase-Beier & Vivis 1995:39) translates the second stanza as:

> In the sun
> that white glitters
> in every colour

But I would now argue that "white" should be in a more prominent position, not an easy thing to do in English with its stricter word-order.

The consideration of the cognitive import of metaphor will also mean that the position of *sun* and *night* will need to foreground the contrast, as they indeed do in the translation.

For a further example of how a cognitive view of metaphor might affect translation, let us consider Meister's poem 'Am Rande des Meers' (1979:44). The title, which literally means 'at the edge of the sea', is picked up in the second line with the idiom "zu Rande", as in *zu Rande bringen*, to manage to do something, and at the end of the poem with "Wegrand", the edge of the path. The poem considers the meaning of idioms, both literal and metaphorical. For the translation, I have opted for 'Near the Top of the Hill' (Boase-Beier 2003c:46-47), because I assume that the focus on idioms and language is of most importance in the poem, and the way that the same expression can undergo shifts of meaning in different contexts. Using this title in the English version allowed me to transform the idiom into "on top of" "the path to the top", and so on, and to preserve the contrast of journey and destination. However, it would be quite possible to argue that the cognitive basis of "at the edge" is not the same as "on top of", and that therefore the English translation has made a radical conceptual change. My translation takes the notion of metaphor itself as a cognitive and linguistic phenomenon to be central to the poem, but a view which placed more emphasis on the embodied basis of metaphor (GOOD IS UP) would possibly not accept this translation as having an appropriate cognitive basis.

Though metaphor is seen as a typically poetic figure, it is used in many other texts, as Lakoff & Johnson (1980) have shown. Because metaphors are cognitive, and structure the way we conceive the world, we would expect to

find many conceptual metaphors in popular science texts, as they both act as models for observed phenomena and, being largely universal not only across languages but across individuals, are useful tools of communication. The metaphor ILLNESS IS A HUMAN BEING is commonly used in such texts; for example, BSE is described thus: "as though a competent team of chambermaids in a respectable hotel were taking lessons from a boss who insists on making apple-pie beds" (*Independent*, 10.12.1995). In another newspaper article (*Stern* online) cancer is compared to an unidentified person. In the latter case, we are told that tumours do not just form secondary tumours anywhere, but "bereiten deren künftigen Standort sehr sorgfältig vor", literally, that they prepare their future location very carefully. This makes it easier to see the cancer as an enemy to be fought. The effect is heightened by the common use of *daughter tumours* in German for secondary tumours and expressions such as "mobilize", "travel", "assist" in this text. It is important that these metaphors are kept in translation, because they have potential consequences for the way the efficacy of a cure is described, and also, it could be argued, for the faith a patient places in a cure.

Conceptual metaphor reflects, and can influence, the way we pursue our thinking. This is especially true of metaphors in scientific texts for the mind itself. If the mind is seen as a sponge, different theories will be explored and different types of tests developed than will be the case if it is seen as a Swiss army knife. So the metaphor used cannot be replaced in translation with something in the target culture which has different characteristics. Of course, this is highly unlikely to happen in a text discussing models of the mind: here the type of model is of such obvious importance that it would not be changed by a translator. It is more likely to happen in a text not directly concerned with the metaphors themselves. So, for example, Midgley's joke (2001:4) that "the Swiss Army does not consist only of knives" could easily get translated as (in back translation) the *German Army does not consist of knives* or *the English Army does not consist of knives* if it were understood as saying that an army is more than weapons, rather than that the Swiss army knife is a poor metaphor for mind because it lacks the human (or divine) element.

5.6 Keeping the echo: translating for iconicity

Not only literary texts, but many other types of text, too, echo meaning in form. In 4.6 we saw that many writers have argued for an iconic basis for language in general.

Sometimes advertisements use very unsophisticated iconicity, such as that for Friendly Insurance, where the "e" of "friendly" is subtly altered to suggest a smiling face, or the line

small dog seeks big **love**

from the Dogs Trust (sic). There is no reason why these would cause problems for a translation. But sometimes iconicity can be much more subtle. The repetition in the poem 'Blindheit', discussed in 5.4, could be considered weakly iconic of a state which will keep repeating itself unless seeing (the final word of the poem) is the final outcome. The repetition can be seen as weakly implicating such a state, thus giving plenty of scope for the translator to interpret the implicatures differently or not as implicatures at all. But the iconicity of the repeated words to do with seeing is underlined and made more noticeable by that final word, which provides further evidence for seeing it as an implicature. If it is seen as in this sense iconic, and not only as an instrument of foregrounding, it is even more important that it should be preserved in translation.

But repetition may be more strongly iconic. As primary iconicity (Lyons 1977:99ff.), it may represent repetition in the world it describes in a more obvious sense. This poem by R.S. Thomas appears to be concerned with reflection:

Of course there was no serpent.
The tree's fruit was a mirror,
its temptation reflection.

There is no Trinity
in a glass. The self looks at the self
only and tenders its tribute.

(Thomas 1990:11)

One possible reading of the first stanza is that it is about personal responsibility. Temptation is in human beings, not in an externalized tempter. This poem is in the section of the book entitled B.C. and this context suggests an interpretation whereby we only have a reflection of ourselves before Christ and so we can only worship ourselves. (This could be seen as an allusion to St. Augustine's teaching that to be in a state of sin meant the self could focus only on the self.) In terms of iconicity, there are three interesting features of the poem, all to do with the way we read the second stanza:

i) Having read the bold complete statement in stanza 1 that "Of course there was no serpent", we first read line 1 of stanza 2 as "There is no Trinity", that is, as a denial of the existence of God, Christ and the Holy Spirit. But then we see, going on to line 2, that this is in fact not a perfect parallelism, for line 2 qualifies the statement that there is no Trinity; it is not an absolute state of affairs but what happens when

you look only at your own reflection: there is no trinity in a glass. This leads us to re-read "its temptation reflection" not (only) as 'what appears to be external temptation is actually only an externalization of what is within ourselves' but (also) as 'the temptation of the fruit was to a circular, self-focussed way of seeing the world'. In other words, if we see temptation only as a reflection of ourselves, we have only ourselves to look at: no serpent, no Trinity. The linear act of reading thus presents us first with the statement that there is nothing beyond ourselves, but then qualifies this, making us go through a particular thought process: first focus on the self, then focus on what is preventing movement beyond the self. This is an instance of what Furniss & Bath (1996:61-62), echoing Ricks (1963), call "double syntax": syntax which first suggests one meaning but then goes on to suggest another, thus iconically echoing the thought processes involved in seeing things first one way and then another.

ii) There are three instances of stylistic reflection in the poem which echo the theme of reflection:
   - the alliteration of "tenders its tribute"
   - the repetition of "the self" rather than the more usual "the self looks at itself"
   - the repeated *-tion* ending of "temptation reflection"

iii) And there is one instance, given under (i) above, of partial reflection, suggesting that there is a reality beyond the mirror when (and if) we do not only see ourselves reflected back at ourselves.

For the translation, this view of the poem as iconic has important consequences. Firstly, the first line of stanza 2 must at first reading seem parallel to the first line of stanza 1, and its further qualification only become apparent in line 2. Thus

(a)

Es	gibt	keine	Dreieinigkeit
there	*is*	*no*	*trinity*
in	einem	Spiegel	
in	*a*	*mirror*	

is to be preferred to the more usual

(b) Es gibt in einem Spiegel
keine Dreieinigkeit

or

(c) Im Spiegel gibt es
keine Dreieinigkeit

because neither (b) nor (c) allows the lines to be read first in one way and then, prompted by line 2, in another.

Secondly, words will need to be chosen that keep these or similar parallelisms, for example:

Versuchung Widerspiegelung (temptation reflection)
Anerkennung anbietend (tenders its tribute)
Das Selbst betrachtet das Selbst (the self … the self)

Thirdly, if the first stanza begins:

Natürlich gab	es	keine	Schlange
naturally was	*there*	*no*	*snake*

and the second:

Es	gibt	keine	Dreieinigkeit
there	*is*	*no*	*trinity*

there will be a failure to recreate the partial reflection necessary for a conflict between the first and the further reading of the second stanza; this suggests that, if (a) above is used to allow both readings of the first stanza, then the second stanza must follow the same pattern, thus:

Es gab natürlich keine Schlange

because this sequence allows the order of subject and verb "es gab" – "es gibt" to be parallel in both cases.

As noted in 5.3 in the discussion about ambiguity, if readings are developed in sequence during the act of interpreting a poem, the second reading does not nullify the first, but both will persist. This is particularly important in philosophical or religious poetry, because the reader often needs to be aware of both possible ways of thinking.

In a religious poem like the one above, the reader is also aware that the second reading is stronger – because more recent, because the word "glass" for mirror triggers the image, used in the Church of England funeral service, of now seeing only "through a glass, darkly", but with greater vision promised, and so on – but that the first one also remains present, and easier (in both Relevance-Theory and theological terms) to arrive at. It is therefore important in the translation that the relative ease with which the respective readings can be obtained is kept. This is not to suggest that a translator would ordinarily remain unaware of the poem's ambiguities, but it does seem reasonable to assume that the more awareness a translator has of how linguistic

structures might echo thought processes, the more likely s/he is to accord such iconic elements the necessary significance in the translation process.

As this example shows, iconicity is not simply the reflection of reality in language but the reflection of reality mediated through cognition. To illustrate this further, let us consider Blake's poem 'London' (Wilhelm 1975:54). Here is the first stanza:

> I wander thro' each charter'd street,
> Near where the charter'd Thames doth flow
> And mark in every face I meet
> Marks of weakness, marks of woe.

In its last two stanzas the poem has a pattern of repeated [bl] sounds:

> blackning blood blasts blights

Taken together with Blake's imagery (where *black* is a symbol of restriction and *blood* suggests cruelty: Kazin 1974:1-55; Percival 1970:189) and the context of the first stanza's "marks of weakness, marks of woe", as well as the existence of other words in English such as

> bleed, blot, blain, blame, blaspheme, blemish

and the similar unvoiced [pl] in "plague", and "hapless", also in the poem, these repeated sounds give rise to a sense that the [bl] sound is expressing some sort of unpleasant staining. This phenomenon, sometimes called "phonaesthesia", is referred to in Chapter 4.6; it is a type of iconicity which gives meaning to elements of words not apparently related through the morphology of the language but nevertheless powerfully if peripherally present as part of a speaker's linguistic knowledge.

We know that iconicity is a feature of all natural languages (Anderson 1998) though the degree to which different structures can be considered iconic is a source of controversy. But what this fact suggests for a translation of Blake's poem into another language is that, firstly, it may be better not to keep the [bl] sound itself, for it may have different connotations in other languages, and also, secondly, that simply finding a set of sounds used in appropriate words in the target language will not necessarily work if there is no sense that meaning can be attributed to these particular sounds. A translation must therefore take into account not just the patterns in this particular text, but all further instances within the language and culture of the target text to which the pattern will allow access. Thus a careful translation involves extracting some common core of meaning from the English words,

which I have here described rather loosely as "unpleasant staining", and finding a sound in the other language which also occurs in many words not in the poem and might have similar associations. For German one might try some combination of words from the series

> Fleck, (be)flecken, Fluch, fluchen, Fluss, fließen (stain, to stain, curse, to curse, flow/river, to flow)

or from the series

> Verdruss, verdammen, vergällen, Verderb, verkommen (cloying, to damn, to make bitter, decay, to disintegrate/dilapidated)

A translation which did this might do so because it was influenced by notions of cognitive stylistics. The German translation by W. Wilhelm (1975:95f.) is not influenced by such awareness: it does not attempt to keep any such patterns, concentrating instead on preserving regularities of metre and rhyme. The later translation (1996:101ff.) by Thomas Eichhorn uses "Blut … belegt … Plagen" (instead of *Pest*), but still seems to focus mainly on the rhyme. Where the pattern is particularly striking in Blake's final line 'And blights with plagues the marriage hearse', neither translation keeps this pattern. It is in fact very common for translators to ignore iconic effects in poetry, even if they do keep other elements of the style. Rowan Williams explains that his aim in his translations is to keep "progressions of imagery" (2002:8) rather than to offer a close rendering. His poem 'Angel', a translation of Rilke's 'Der Engel', for example, keeps the image of "durch sein Herz geht riesig aufgerichtet / das ewig Kommende' (literally: through his heart standing up hugely goes / the ever-awaited) with "something enormous pushing up through his heart", a much stronger image than Stephen Cohn's (1992:6) "each gigantic heartbeat brings more close / the huge event". But it does not attempt to keep Rilke's repeated "und gingen … und griffen … und brächen" (and would go in … and seize you .. and break you), instead opting for a more violent but diffuse "they'd burrow in … and clutch you, wrestle you … to push you, break you". It could be argued that Rilke's original, by using fewer words, focuses more strongly on the progression of "gingen – griffen – brächen", so that "brächen" (would break) is a more obvious climax and reflects a process of gradual increasing pressure at the hands of the angel.

What all these examples show is that iconicity is not a separate stylistic feature of texts; it interacts with other stylistic features such as foregrounding and ambiguity. The example from Thomas shows how repetition in 'the self looks at the self' is distinctive enough to draw attention to itself and, in so

doing, focuses on the mirroring of self. Blake's striking use of [bl] and [pl] sounds in words expressing staining draws attention to them in the way that the wanderer's own attention was drawn: he marked the "marks of weakness and of woe" as does the reader. And an ambiguous word such as "aufgehoben" in the Meister poem discussed in 5.3 is iconic of an ambiguous state of mind: an understanding that what is kept is kept by being erased. In poets who use a great deal of ambiguity, such as Meister or Kirsch, this usually is more than just a figure to draw in and engage the reader. One could argue that the corollary of accepting that stylistic figures have cognitive correlates is to say that all stylistic figures are inherently iconic: they are not just there, they represent states of mind, and because this is so they give rise to this state of mind in the reader. Sometimes the difference between a translation that takes this into account and one which does not is very subtle indeed. The following is the final stanza of a poem by Meister which has been translated by Dove (1996) and by me (2003c):

Der Abend kommt,
the evening comes
wo ich,
where I
am Menschen schleppend,
on-the human pulling
hin und
up and
her geh.
down go

The poem speaks of the "self-recital of light" in my translation, in Richard Dove's of the way light is "narrating itself". But the difference I want to consider is in the final stanza. Here are its translations side by side:

Evening comes when,	Evening comes
lugging a mortal,	and I -
I walk up	weighted with being human-
and down.	walk up
(Dove 1996:112)	and down.
	(Boase-Beier 2003c:97)

Obviously "am Menschen schleppend", literally "pulling/dragging on the person" has been interpreted, or perhaps merely expressed, rather differently in the two English translations. But the difference I wish to comment on is a very subtle one. Both translators appear to have seen Meister's final two lines as iconic: the two lines are exactly the same length and suggest in the

contrast of "hin" and "her" the backwards and forwards walking of a man in thought: *hin* and *her* are examples of contrasting direction particles of a type common in German; they include *auf und ab* (up and down), *rauf und runter* (up and down), *drunter und drüber* (at sixes and sevens; literally below and above), whose contrasting meaning is signalled by the alliteration or slant rhyme whereby there are contrasting vowels or consonants in words which share some similar sounds. Such pairs are rarer in English. Both translations have the two words "up" and "down" in the same position to underline the contrast. On the printed page, Dove's two final lines are almost the same length. In my version, I moved the 'I' to line 2 so that only four words would remain for the final two lines. Of course, I know (or can pretend to know) my own reasons; I can only reconstruct Dove's. Printed, Dove's more clearly suggests the backwards-and-forwards, restricted movement. Read aloud, I think mine does. These are two different decisions, but the understanding of the iconic relationship is, I assume, similar.

But in the end all that any reading of a source text by the translator can do is collect evidence for a particular cognitive state, if it is a literary text, and fashion the target text to contain both implicatures for that cognitive state and enough open-endedness to maximally engage the reader. Even the fact that different translators appear to have interpreted the source text in a similar way is no guarantee that either of them knows what the source text meant. It is in this sense that, at the beginning of this chapter, and in Chapter 4, I spoke of the pretence of translating.

6. Conclusion

Recent studies of the creative aspects of translation (for example, the articles in Boase-Beier & Holman 1999 or Perteghella & Loffredo 2006) suggest that the difference between original writing and translation is in some respects not clear-cut. All writing, says Barnstone (1993:20), is translation. Yet some translators clearly feel that the two types of writing are, in Willard Trask's words "entirely different" (Honig 1985:14). Michael Hamburger, trying to express this difference says it is the difference "between playing music and composing music" (Honig 1985:175).

It may be that the difference is greater for some writers than for others. Translation, perhaps, has less emphasis on subject and content, which are given, than on the way the content is expressed; this is what Hamburger calls "an involvement only as far as the formal matters of the language are concerned" (Honig 1985:175). This cannot, however, be entirely true for literary translators, because their choice of text may often be an endorsement of a view. If, following Gutt (2000), we see translation as interpretive use – saying what someone else meant – we nevertheless usually have the choice, as when, in everyday conversation, we report the view of others, not to say it at all or to adapt it to our own view. But Hamburger's point is that a translator will focus on the style of the source text, that aspect of the text which carries the attitude, the world view, the voice of the original, and so will to a great extent become part of the translator's subject matter.

Because translation concerns itself so intensely with the language of the original and the choices it expresses, style has generally, as we saw in Chapter 1 (though not often very explicitly), been regarded as important to translation, especially the translation of literary texts. But there has often been an assumption that it was perfectly clear what it was; thus Tytler can speak about preserving the "style and manner of writing" (Robinson 2002:233) of the original without elaborating upon what this means, and many books are written about literary translation with only a passing reference to style.

This may partly be because style is a notoriously "slippery notion" (Fowler 1996:185), so some writers on translation have avoided discussing it. Then, too, it can be discussed in its various aspects such as ambiguity (Popova 2002) or repetition (Ben-Ari 1998).

The comparative lack of discussion of style in works on translation is only partly the result of the 'slippery', inhomogeneous and hybrid nature of the phenomenon. It is also partly because it has been seen in literary translation as being intimately tied up with what makes the text literary and thus with the creative element in literary translation. This can lead to the view

that it is translated intuitively, and needs no explanation. While it may be true that most writing, whether translation or not, proceeds largely by intuition, this does not absolve us of the need to explain the factors that affect such intuitive behaviour.

The way style has been approached in this book is as a cognitive entity, rather than as a purely textual one. Just as, linguistically speaking, style expresses what is beyond semantics, so, cognitively speaking, it reflects a series of choices, determined in part by a cognitive state which has absorbed historical, sociological and cultural influences. This state of mind is attributed by a reader to a character, narrator, or to the author. If the reader is a translator s/he will need to be especially aware that the latter is an inferred author, and not the real one.

The reader of the target text will react to choices made by the translator, reflecting her or his cognitive state and views and voice, and also those that have been added during translation. Here again the difference between reading translations and reading original texts is one of degree. Any original text will express a multitude of different voices and attitudes and readers will need to make their own decisions as to whose they are and how they are to be read. The readers of the translation will also make their own decisions as to whose voices and attitudes are in the text.

Knowledge of stylistic approaches to translation can help us understand more about what style is, what its effects are, how it works and how it becomes transformed in the translation process. But, as discussed in Chapter 5, such knowledge does not of itself help us to understand what its effects might be on the practising translator. This is not just a question for stylistic approaches and theories, nor for translation theories in general: it is an issue affecting any discussion of the relation of theory and practice to one another. The view taken here is that for translators, as for any practitioners concerned with theory, the theory is another possible tool, a way of broadening the mind, an added perspective, a "pair of spectacles through which to see the world differently" (Midgley 2001 :26). Knowledge of theory, for example, suggests that we read for translating in a different way from how we would read if not intending to translate (1.5). But knowledge of theory might also allow us to read for translating more effectively, by paying close attention to style and recognizing what is important for its effects, by being open to its cognitive dimensions, and by enjoying an enhanced awareness of what is universal and what culture-specific. Such knowledge can inform decisions made during translation, however tentative they are. Part of the tentative nature of such decisions is captured in the notion of what I called in Chapter 4 the "pretence" that we know the answers to these things. It is this which makes the act of translating possible.

Above all, a cognitive stylistic approach has suggested not only that

literary translation is first and foremost the translation of style but also that the translated text is a type of writing different from the non-translated text. While they share some characteristics, as I noted at the start of this chapter, they also differ, though not in the way the comments by Trask or Hamburger suggest. The essential difference that has emerged is that a translated text will multiply the voices in the text, will give more scope for the reader's engagement than did the original, and will make the reader's search for cognitive contexts in which to understand the text harder, more prolonged, and more rewarding. While a non-literary translation will be primarily a set of instructions, or a critical work, or a report, or an example of whatever text-type it belongs to, a literary translation, especially if it is informed by stylistic awareness, will be a more literary text than an untranslated text.

Bibliography

Abrams, M. H. (1953) *The Mirror and the Lamp*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Adès, T. (2001) 'Alexander Pushkin, translated by Timothy Adès', *Modern Poetry in Translation* 18: 147.

Anderson, E. A. (1998) *A Grammar of Iconism*, London: Associated University Press.

Appiah, K. A. (2000) 'Thick Translation', in L. Venuti (ed), 417-429.

Arendt, H. (1994) *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*, London: Penguin.

Aristotle (1970) *The Rhetoric*, *Vols I-III*, eds. E. Cope & J. Sandys, Hildesheim: Olms.

------ (1996) *Poetics*, tr. M. Heath, London: Penguin.

Armitage, S. (1989) *Zoom!*, Newcastle: Bloodaxe.

Arndt, W. (tr) (1993) *Christian Morgenstern*: *Songs from the Gallows – Galgenlieder*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Assman, A. (1996) 'The Curse and Blessing of Babel; or Looking Back on Universalisms', in S. Budick & W. Iser (eds) *The Translatability of Cultures*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 85-100.

Ausländer, R. (1977) *Gesammelte Gedichte*, Cologne: Literarischer Verlag Braun.

------ (1984) *Ich höre das Herz des Oleanders: Gedichte 1977-1979*, Frankfurt am Main: Fischer.

Baker, M. (ed) (1998) *Routledge Encyclopedia of Literary Translation*, Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.

------ (2000) 'Towards a Methodology for Investigating the Style of a Literary Translator', *Target* 12(2): 241-266.

Bakhtin, M. (1981) *The Dialogic Imagination. Four Essays*, ed. M. Holquist, Austin: University of Texas Press.

------ (1986) *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*, Austin: Texas University Press.

Barnstone, W. (1993) *The Poetics of Translation: History, Theory, Practice*, New Haven & London: Yale University Press.

Barry, P. (2002) *Beginning Theory: An Introduction to Literary and Cultural Theory*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Barthes, R. (1976) *The Pleasure of the Text*, tr. R. Miller, London: Cape.

------ (1977) 'Introduction to The Structural Analysis of Narratives', in S. Heath (ed), 79-124.

Bassnett, S. (1991) *Translation Studies*, London: Methuen.

------ & A. Lefevere (eds) (1998) *Constructing Cultures: Essays on Translation Studies*, London & New York: Routledge.

Bayley, J. (1992) 'Introduction', to S. Cohn (tr) *Rainer Maria Rilke: Neue Gedichte – New Poems*, Manchester: Carcanet.

Beardsley, M. C. (1982) *The Aesthetic Point of View: Selected Essays*, eds. M.J. Wreen & D.M. Callen, London: Cornell University Press.
Beeby, A., D. Ensinger & M. Presas (eds) (1998) *Investigating Translation: Selected Papers from the 4th International Congress on Translation, Barcelona 1998*, Amsterdam & Philadelphia: Benjamins.
Bell, A. (tr) (1992), *Christian Morgenstern: Lullabies, Lyrics, Gallows Songs*, London: North-South Books.
Bell, R. (1991) *Translation and Translating: Theory and Practice*, London: Longman.
------ (1998) 'Psycholinguistic/Cognitive Approaches', in M. Baker (ed) *Routledge Encyclopedia of Translation Studies*, London & New York: Routledge, 185-190.
Ben-Ari, N. (1998) 'The Ambivalent Case of Repetitions in Literary Translation. Avoiding Repetitions: A "Universal" of Translation?' *Meta* 18(1): 68-78.
Benjamin, W. (1992) 'The Task of the Translator', trs. H. Zohn, in R. Schulte & J. Biguenet (eds) *Theories of Translation: An Anthology of Essays from Dryden to Derrida*, Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 71-82.
Berlin, B. & P. Kaye (1969) *Basic Colour Terms*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
Berman, A. (2000) 'Translation and the Trials of the Foreign', in L.Venuti (ed), 284-297.
Bethea, D.M. (1999) '"Secular Power": An Introduction to Pushkin's Mirskaia Vlast', *Modern Poetry in Translation* (15): 150-159.
Bex, T. (2000) 'Augustan Balance and Cognitive Contexts: An Approach to the Study of Pope', in T. Bex *et al* (eds), 67-84.
------, M. Burke & P. Stockwell (eds) (2000) *Contextualized Stylistics: In Honour of Peter Verdonk*, Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Bianquis, G. (tr) (1965) *Thomas Mann: Les Buddenbrook*, Paris: Fayard.
Biedermann, H. (1992) *The Wordsworth Dictionary of Symbolism*, tr. J. Hulbert, Ware: Wordsworth.
Birch, D. (1989) *Language, Literature and Critical Practice*, London & New York: Routledge.
Blakemore, D. (1987) *Semantic Constraints on Relevance*, Oxford: Blackwell.
------ (2002) *Linguistic Meaning and Relevance: The Semantics and Pragmatics of Discourse Markers*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bloom, H. (1975) *A Map of Misreading*, New York: Oxford University Press.
Boase-Beier, J. (1987) *Poetic Compounds: The Principles of Poetic Language in Modern English Poetry*, Tübingen: Niemeyer.
------ (1996) 'Mats of Starry Moss: A Passage from Hardy's *The Woodlanders*', *Norwich Papers* V: 203-205.
------ (2002a) 'Translating Style', in S. Csábi & J. Zerkowitz (eds) *Textual Secrets: The Message of the Medium*, Budapest: Eötvös Loránd University, 317-325.
------ (tr) (2002b) 'Sophie, The Icy Saint-Excerpt', *Dimension2* 6(1): 63-81.
------ (2003a) 'Mind Style Translated', *Style* 37(3): 253-65.

------ (2003b) 'Style and Choice: Recreating Patterns in Translation', *Studies in Cross-Cultural Communication* 1: 1-28.
------ (tr) (2003c) *Ernst Meister*: *Between Nothing and Nothing*, Todmorden: Arc Publications.
------ (2004a) 'Saying what Someone Else Meant: Style, Relevance and Translation', *International Journal of Applied Linguistics* 14(2): 276-287.
------ (2004b) 'Knowing and Not Knowing: Style, Intention and the Translation of a Holocaust Poem', *Language and Literature* 13(1): 25-35.
------ (2004c) 'Bringing Together Science and Poetry: Translating the Bystander in German Poetry After the Holocaust', *Comparative Critical Studies* 2(1): 93-104.
------ (2006) 'Loosening the Grip of the Text: Theory as an Aid to Creativity', in M. Perthegella & E. Loffredo (eds), 47-56.
------ & M. Holman (eds) (1999) *The Practices of Literary Translation: Constraints and Creativity*, Manchester: St. Jerome.
------ & A.Vivis (trs) (1995) *Rose Ausländer: Mother Tongue*, Todmorden: Arc Publications.
Bodkin, M. (1934) *Archetypal Patterns in Poetry: Psychological Studies of Imagination*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Booth, W.C. (1961) *Rhetoric of Fiction*, Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press.
Bradford, R. (1994) *Roman Jakobson: Life, Language, Art*, London & New York: Routledge.
Brett-Smith, H. (ed) (1972) *Peacock's Four Ages of Poetry; Shelley's Defence of Poetry; Browning's Essay on Shelley*, Oxford: Blackwell.
Britton, P. (1997) *The Jigsaw Man*, London: Corgi.
Brooks, C. & R.P. Warren (1960) *Understanding Poetry*, New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
Bullock, M. & R. Schulte (trs) (1981) *Yvan Goll: Selected Poems*, Munich: Limes.
Burton, D. (1982) 'Through Glass Darkly: Through Dark Glasses', in R. Carter (ed), 195-214.
Butler, L.St.J. (1993) '[Review of] The Violence of Language, by J.-J. Lecercle', *Language and Literature* 2 (1): 70-72.
Carroll, J. & M. Tanenhaus (1975) 'Prolegomena to a Functional Theory of Word-Formation', in R. Grossman (ed) *Papers from the Parasession on the Lexicon*, Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society.
Carston, R. (2002) *Thoughts and Utterances: The Pragmatics of Explicit Communication*, Oxford: Blackwell.
Carter, Rita (2002) *Consciousness*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
Carter, R. (ed) (1982) *Language and Literature*: *An Introductory Reader in Stylistics*, London & New York: Routledge.
------ (1997) *Investigating English Discourse*, London & New York: Routledge.
------ & J. McRae (1997) *The Routledge History of Literature in English: Britain and Ireland*, London & New York: Routledge.

Catford, J.C. (1965) *A Linguistic Theory of Translation*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Causley, C. (1968) *Underneath the Water*, London: Macmillan.
Chamberlain, L. (2000) 'Gender and the Metaphorics of Translation', in L. Venuti (ed), 314-329.
Chapman, R. (1973) *Linguistics and Literature*, London: Arnold.
Chatman, S. (1990) *Coming to Terms: The Rhetoric of Narrative in Fiction and Film*, London: Cornell University Press.
Chomsky, N. (1957) *Syntactic Structures*, The Hague: Mouton.
Cluysenaar, A. (1976) *Introduction to Literary Stilistics*, London: Batsford.
Cohen, S. (2001) *States of Denial: Knowing about Atrocities and Suffering*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Cohn, S. (tr) (1992) *Rainer Maria Rilke: Neue Gedichte / New Poems*, Manchester: Carcanet.
Collett, P. (2003) *The Book of Tells: How to Read People's Minds from Their Actions*, London: Doubleday.
Concise Oxford Dictionary, ed. J.B. Sykes, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Conrady, K.O. (ed) (1977) *Das große deutsche Gedichtbuch*, Kronberg: Athenäum.
Cook, G. (1994) *Discourse and Literature*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Crane, H.T. & A. Richardson (1999) 'Literary Studies and Cognitive Science', *Mosaic* 32(2): 123-140.
Crisp, P. (2001) 'Allegory: Conceptual Metaphor in History', *Language and Literature* 10(1): 5-19.
------ (2003) 'Conceptual Metaphor and Its Expressions', in J.Gavins & G. Steen (eds), 99-113.
------, J. Heywood & G. Steen (2002) 'Metaphor Identification and Analysis, Classification and Quantification', *Language and Literature* 11(1): 55-69.
Croft, W. & D. Cruse (2004) *Cognitive Linguistics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Crossley-Holland, K. (1986) *Waterslain*, London: Hutchinson.
Crystal, D. (1987) *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
------ & D. Davy (1969) *Investigating English Style*, London: Longman.
Culler, J. (1975) *Structuralist Poetics*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Dahlgren, M. (1998) 'Relevance and the Translation of Poetry', *Revista Alicantina de Estudios Ingleses* 11: 23-32.
------ (2000) 'A Relevance-Based Approach to Poetry in Translation', *Perpectives: Studies in Translatology* 8(2): 97-108.
------ (2005) '"Preciser What We Are": Emily Dickinson's Poems in Translation: A Study in Literary Pragmatics', *Journal of Pragmatics* 37: 1081-1107.
Damasio, A. (1994) *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain*, New York: Avon.
Damon, S.F. (1973) *A Blake Dictionary: The Ideas and Symbols of William Blake*, London: Thames & Hudson.

Dancygier, B. (2005) 'Blending and Narrative Viewpoint: Jonathan Rabau's Travels Through Mental Spaces', *Language and Literature* 14(2): 99-127.
Darling, J. (2004) *Apology for Absence*, Todmorden: Arc.
Davie, D. (1960) 'Syntax and Music in *Paradise Lost*', in F. Kermode (ed) *The Living Milton*, 70-84.
Dawkins, R. (1998) *Unweaving the Rainbow*, London: Penguin.
Dawson, J. (1996) *A Trick of the Light*, London: Hodder & Stoughton.
De Man, P. (1983) *Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
De Beaugrande, R. (1978) *Factors in a Theory of Poetic Translating*, Assen: van Gorcum.
De Saussure, F. (1959) *Course in General Linguistics*, eds. C. Bally & S. Sechehaye, tr. W. Baskin, New York: McGraw-Hill.
Dennett, D. (1988) 'The Intentional Stance in Theory and Practice', in R. Byrne & A. Whiten (eds) *Machiavellian Intelligence: Social Expertise and the Evolution of Intellect in Monkeys, Apes and Humans*, Oxford: Clarendon, 180-202.
------ (1991) *Consciousness Explained*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Derrida, J. (1976) *Of Grammatology*, tr. G.C. Spivak, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
------ (1988) *Limited Inc*, ed. G. Gratt, Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
D'haen, T. (ed) (1986) *Linguistics and the Study of Literature*, Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Diaz-Diocaretz, M. (1985) *Translating Poetic Discourse: Questions on Feminist Strategies in Adrienne Rich*, Amsterdam & Philadelphia: Benjamins.
Dove, R. (1996) *Ernst Meister: Not Orpheus – Selected Poems*, Manchester: Carcanet.
Dowling, W. (1999) *The Senses of the Text: Intensional Semantics and Literary Theory*, London: University of Nebraska Press.
Downes, W. (1993) 'Reading the Language Itself: Some Methodological Problems in D.C. Freeman's "According to my Bond": King Lear and Recognition', *Language and Literature* 2(2): 121-128.
------ (2000) 'The Language of Felt Experience: Emotional, Evaluative and Intuitive', *Language and Literature* 9(2): 99-121.
Duden, A. (1999) *Hingegend*, Lüneburg: zu Klampen Verlag.
Dunn, D. (1981) *St. Kilda's Parliament*, London: Faber & Faber.
Durant, A. & N. Fabb (1987) 'New Courses in the Linguistics of Writing', in N. Fabb *et al* (eds), 224-240.
Eagleton, T. (1976) *Marxism and Literary Criticism*, London: Methuen.
------ (1986) *William Shakespeare*, Oxford: Blackwell.
Eckert, P. & J. Rickford (eds) (2001) *Style and Sociolinguistic Variation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Eco, U. (1981) *The Role of the Reader*, London: Hutchinson.
------ (1994) *The Limits of Interpretation*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

------ (2001) *Experiences in Translation*, tr. A. McEwen, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Edwards, M. (2001) 'Making the Implicit Explicit for Successful Communication: Pragmatic Differences between English and Spanish Observable in the Translation of Verbs of Movement', *Revista Alicantina de Estudios Ingleses* 14: 21-35.
Eichhorn, T. (tr) (1996) *William Blake: Zwischen Feuer und Feuer*, Munich: dtv.
Elsworth, B. (tr) (2000) *Michael Strunge: A Virgin From a Chilly Decade*, Todmorden: Arc Publications.
Emmott, C (2002) ' "Split Selves" in Fiction and in Medical "Life Stories": Cognitive Linguistic Theory and Narrative Practice', in E. Semino & J. Culpeper (eds), 153-181.
Empson, W. (1930) *Seven Types of Ambiguity*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Engler, B. (1990) *Poetry and Community*, Tübingen: Stauffenburg.
Enkvist, N. (1991) 'On the Interpretability of Texts in General and of Literary Texts in Particular', in P. Sell (ed), 1-25.
------, J. Spencer & M. Gregory (1973) *Linguistics and Style*, London: Oxford University Press.
Epstein, E.L. (1975) 'The Self-Reflexive Artefact: The Function of Mimesis in an Approach to a Theory of Value for Literature', in R. Fowler (ed), 40-78.
Erkazanci, H. (unp) *Heteroglossia in Turkish Translation: Locating Literary Style in an Audience Design Perspective*, University of East Anglia PhD Thesis, 2006.
Erlich, V. (1955) *Russian Formalism: History – Doctrine*, The Hague: Mouton.
Ervin, S.M. (1964) 'Language and TAT Content in Bilinguals', *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 68: 500-507.
Even-Zohar, I. (1990) *Polysystem Studies*, Tel Aviv: Porter Institute.
Fabb, N. (1997) *Linguistics and Literature*, Oxford: Blackwell.
------, D. Altridge, A. Durant & C. MacCabe (eds) (1987) *The Linguistics of Writing: Arguments Between Language and Literature*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Fahnestock, J. (2005) 'Rhetorical Stylistics', *Language and Literature* 14(3): 215-230.
Fairclough, N. (1992) *Discourse and Social Change*, London: Polity Press.
Fairley, I. (1975) 'Syntactic Deviation and Cohesion', *Language and Style* 6: 216-229.
Fauconnier, G. (1994) *Mental Spaces*: *Aspects of Meaning Construction in Natural Language*, London: MIT Press.
Fawcett, P. (1997) *Translation and Language: Linguistic Theories Explained*, Manchester: St. Jerome.
Felstiner, J. (1995) *Paul Celan: Poet, Survivor, Jew*, New Haven & London: Yale University Press.
Fischer, A. (1999) 'Graphological Iconicity in Print Advertising: A Typology', in M. Nänny & O. Fischer (eds), 251-283.
Fischer, O. & M. Nänny (1999) 'Introduction: Iconicity as a Creative Force in

Language Use', in M. Nänny & O. Fischer (eds), xv-xxxiii.
------ & M. Nänny (eds) (2001) *The Motivated Sign [Iconicity in Language and Literature 2]*, Amsterdam & Philadelphia: Benjamins, .
Fish, S. (1972) *Self-Consuming Artifacts: The Experience of Seventeenth-Century Literature*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
------ (1980) *Is There a Text in This Class?*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Fodor, J. (1983) *The Modularity of Mind*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Fónagy, I. (1971) 'The Functions of Vocal Style', in S. Chatman (ed) *Literary Style: A Symposium*, London & New York: Oxford University Press.
------ (1995) 'Iconicity of Expressive Syntactic Formations', in M. Landsberg (ed) *Syntactic Iconicity and Linguistic Freezes: The Human Dimension*, Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 285-304.
------ (1999) 'Why Iconicity', in M. Nänny & O. Fischer (eds) *Form Miming Meaning*, Amsterdam & Philadelphia: Benjamins, 3-36.
Foucault, M. (1988) *Technologies of the Self: A Seminar With Michel Foucault*, ed. L. Martin, P. Hulton & H. Gutman, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
Fowler, R. (1975) 'Language and the Reader: Shakespeare's Sonnet 73', in R. Fowler (ed), 79-122.
------ (ed) (1975) *Style and Structure in Literature*, Oxford: Blackwell.
------ (1977a) *Linguistics and the Novel*, London: Methuen.
------ (1977b) '"The Reader" – A Linguistic View', *Cahiers romains d'études littéraires* 4: 47-60.
------ (1981) *Literature as Social Discourse: The Practice of Linguistic Criticism*, London: Batsford.
------ (1996) *Linguistic Criticism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
------, R. Hodge, G. Kress & A. Trew (1979) *Language and Control*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Frawley, W. (ed) (1984) *Translation: Literary, Linguistic and Philosophical Perspectives*, London & Toronto: Associated University Presses.
Freeborn, D. (1996) *Style: Text Analysis and Linguistic Criticism*, London: Macmillan.
Freeman, D. (ed) (1970) *Linguistics and Literary Style*, New York: Holt, Rhinehart & Winston.
------ (1976) 'Iconic Syntax in Poetry: A Note on Blake's "Ah! Sun-flower"', *University of Massachusetts Occasional Papers in Linguistics* 2: 51-57.
------ (ed) (1981) *Essays in Modern Stylistics*, London: Methuen.
------ (1991) '"Songs of Experience": New Books on Metaphor', *Poetics Today* 12: 145-164.
Freeman, M. (2005) 'The Poem as Complex Blend: Conceptual Mappings of Metaphor in Sylvia Plath's "The Applicant"', *Language and Literature* 14 (1): 25-44.
Freud, S. (1953-66) 'Constructions in Analysis', in J. Strachey (ed) *Standard*

Edition, *Vol. 23*, London: Hogarth Press, 255-269.
------ (1961) *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, tr. J. Strachey, New York: Norton.
Frye, N. (1957) *Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays*, New York: Athenäum.
Furniss, T. & M. Bath (1996) *Reading Poetry: An Introduction*, London etc.: Prentice Hall.
Gadamer, H.G. (1988) *Truth and Method*, trs. G. Barden & J. Cumming, New York: Continuum.
García, I. I. & J. Marco (1998) 'The Degree of Grammatical Complexity in Literary Texts as a Translation Problem', in Beeby *et al* (eds), 65-74.
Garvin, P. (ed) (1964) *A Prague School Reader on Esthetics, Literary Structure, and Style*, Washington: Georgetown University Press.
Gavins, J. & G. Steen (eds) (2003) *Cognitive Poetics in Practice*, London & New York: Routledge.
Gellerstam, M. (1986) 'Translationese in Swedish Novels Translated from Swedish', in L.Wollin & H. Lindquist (eds) *Translation Studies in Scandinavia*, Lund: CWK Gleerup, 88-95.
Geyer-Ryan, H. (1989) 'Heteroglossia in the Poetry of Bertolt Brecht and Tony Harrison', in W. van Peer (ed) *The Taming of the Text*, London & New York: Routledge, 193-222.
Gibbs, R. (1994) *The Poetics of Mind: Figurative Thought, Language and Understanding*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Goddard, C. & A. Wierzbicka (1994) *Semantic and Lexical Universals*, Amsterdam & Philadelphia: Benjamins.
Goga-Klinkenberg, S. (tr) (2002) *Jill Dawson: Das Haus am Mount Coyote*, Reinbek: Rowohlt.
Goldsworthy, P. (1998) 'The Biology of Literature', *PN Review* 119: 31-44.
Goodman, P. (1971) *Speaking and Language: Defence of Poetry*, New York: Vintage.
Graham, J. (1985) *Difference in Translation*, Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press.
------ (1992) *Onomatopoetics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Grandin, T. (2005) *Animals in Translation*, New York: Harcourt, Inc.
Grant-Adamson, L. (1998) *Lipstick and Lies*, London: Hodder & Stoughton.
Grice, P. (1989) *Studies in the Way of Words*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Gurney, I. (1987) *Severn & Somme and War's Embers*, ed. R.K.R. Thornton, Manchester: Carcanet.
Gutt, E.-A. (2000) *Translation and Relevance*, 2nd edition, Manchester: St. Jerome.
------ (2004) [Untitled message on Relevance Theory Email List] http://www.phon. ucl.ac.uk/home/robyn/relevance/relevance-archives/.
------ (2005) 'On the Significance of the Cognitive Core of Translation', *The Translator* 11(1): 25-49.
Halliday, M. (1971) 'Linguistic Function and Literary Style: An Inquiry into the Language of William Golding's "The Inheritors"', in S. Chatman (ed) *Literary Style: A Symposium*, London: Oxford University Press, 330-368.

------ & R. Hasan (1976) *Cohesion in English*, London & New York: Longman.
Hamburger, M. (tr) (1994) *Friedrich Hölderlin: Poems and Fragments*, London: Anvil.
Hamilton, C. (2005) 'A Cognitive Rhetoric of Poetry and Emily Dickinson', *Language and Literature* 14(3): 279-294.
Hardy, T. (1974) *The Woodlanders*, London: Macmillan.
------ (1977) *Poems of Thomas Hardy*, ed. T.R.M. Creighton, London: Macmillan.
Harvey, K (1995) 'A Descriptive Framework for Compensation', *The Translator* 1(1): 65-86.
Hatim, B. (2001) *Teaching and Researching Translation*, London: Longman.
------ & I. Mason (1990) *Discourse and the Translator*, London: Longman.
------ & J. Munday (2004) *Translation: An Advanced Resource Book*, London & New York: Routledge.
Heath, S. (ed and tr) (1977) *Image, Music, Text: Selected Essays of Roland Barthes*, London: Fontana.
Hermans, T. (ed) (1985) *The Manipulation of Literature: Studies in Literary Translation*, London: Croom Helm.
------ (1996) 'The Translator's Voice in Translated Narrative', *Target* 8(1): 23-48.
------ (1999) *Translation in Systems: Descriptive and System-Oriented Approaches Explained*, Manchester: St. Jerome.
Hernandi, P. (2002) 'Why is Literature: A Coevolutionary Perspective on Imaginative Worldmaking', *Poetics Today* 23(1): 21-43.
Hinton, L., J. Nichols & J. Ohala (eds) (1994) *Sound Symbolism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hiraga, M. (2005) *Metaphor and Iconicity: A Cognitive Approach to Analyzing Texts*, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Hirsch, E.D. (1967) *Validity in Interpretation*, New Haven: Yale University Press.
Hofmannsthal, H. von (1979) 'Die Wege und die Begegnungen: Erzählungen, erfundene Gespräche und Briefe', in B. Schöller & R. Hirsch (eds) *Gesammelte Werke*, Frankfurt: Fischer, 360-382.
Holland, N. (1998) *The Brain of Robert Frost: A Cognitive Approach to Literature*, London: Routledge.
Holloway, J. (1956) *The Minute and Longer Poems*, Hessle: The Marvell Press.
Holmes, C. (1991) *A Tolerant Country*, London: Faber & Faber.
Holmes, J. (1988) *Translated! Papers on Literary Translation and Translation Studies*, Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Holz-Mänttäri, J. (1984) *Translatorisches Handeln: Theorie und Methode*, Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia.
Honig, E. (ed) (1985) *The Poet's Other Voice: Conversations on Literary Translation*, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.
Hood, S. (tr) (1990) *Erich Fried: 100 Poems Without a Country*, London: John Calder.
House, J. (1981) *A Model for Translation Quality Assessment*, Tübingen: Narr.

Hughes, T. (1994) *Winter Pollen: Occasional Prose*, ed. W. Scammell, New York: Picador.
------ (1995) *New Selected Poems 1957-1994*, London: Faber & Faber.
Hutchinson, P. (1983) *Games Authors Play*, London: Methuen.
Hyde, G. (1993) 'The Whorf-Sapir Hypothesis and the Translation Muddle', *Translation and Literature* 2: 4-16.
Ingarden, R. (1973) *The Literary Work of Art*, tr. G. Grabowicz, Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Institute of Translation & Interpreting (2005) *Code of Professional Conduct*, Milton Keynes: ITI.
Iser, W. (1971) 'Indeterminacy and the Reader's Response in Prose Fiction', in J. Hillis Miller (ed) *Aspects of Narrative*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1-45.
------ (1974) *The Implied Reader: Patterns of Communication in Prose Fiction from Bunyan to Beckett,* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
------ (1979) *The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
------ (2004) 'The Resurgence of the Aesthetic', *Comparative Critical Studies* 1(1/2): 1-15.
------ (2006) *How to Do Theory*, Oxford: Blackwell.
Jääskeläinen, R. (1996) 'Hard Work Will Bear Beautiful Fruit: A Comparison of Two Think-Aloud Protocol Studies', *Meta* 41(1): 60-74.
Jackson, W.D. (2000) 'Sarah Kirsch, Translated and With a Commentary by WD Jackson', *Modern Poetry in Translation* 16: 62-87.
Jacobs, A. (ed) (2002) *Poetry for the Spirit*, London: Watkins.
Jakobson, R. (1960) 'Closing Statement: Linguistics and Poetics', in T. Sebeok (ed) *Style in Language*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 353-358.
------ (1971) 'Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbance', in R. Jakobson & M. Halle (eds) *Fundamentals of Language*, The Hague: Mouton, 55-82.
------ (1978a) *Selected Writings, Vol V: On Verse, Its Masters and Explorers*, Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
------ (1978b) *Six Lectures on Sound and Meaning*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
------ (1987) *Language in Literature*, ed. K. Pomorska & S. Rudy, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
------ (2000) 'On Linguistic Aspects of Translation', in L. Venuti (ed), 113-118.
James, H. (1984) *The Aspern Papers and the Turn of the Screw*, London: Penguin.
Jin, Di (2003) *Literary Translation: Quest for Artistic Integrity*, Manchester: St. Jerome.
Johnson, M. (1987) *The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Jonasson, K. (1998) 'Degree of Text Awareness in Professional vs. Non-Professional Translators', in A. Beylard-Ozzeroff, J. Králová and B. Moser-Mercer (eds)

Translators' Strategies and Creativity, Amsterdam & Philadelphia: Benjamins, 189-200.
Jones, F.R. (1989) 'On Aboriginal Sufferance: A Process Model of Poetic Translating', *Target* 1(2): 183-199.
Kaiser, R. & M. Holzman (eds) (2000) *Dies Kind soll leben: Die Aufzeichnungen der Helene Holzman 1941-1944*, Frankfurt: Schöffling & Co.
Kant, I. (1987) *Critique of Judgement*, tr. W.S. Pluhar, Indianapolis: Hackett.
Katz, J. (1990) *The Metaphysics of Meaning*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Kazin, S. (ed) (1974) *The Portable Blake*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Kenny, D. (1998) 'Equivalence', in M. Baker (ed), 77-80.
Kiparsky, P. (1987) 'On Theory and Interpretation', in N. Fabb *et al* (eds), 185-198.
Kirsch, S. (1991) *The Brontës Hats*, tr. W. Mulford & A. Vivis, Cambridge: Street Editions.
------ (1995) *T*, tr. W. Mulford & A. Vivis, Saxmundham: Reality Street Editions.
Kloepfer, R.C. (1967) *Die Theorie der literarischen Űbersetzung*, München: Fink.
Knight, G.W. (1961) *The Wheel of Fire: Interpretations of Shakespearian Tragedy*, London: Methuen.
Knight, M. (tr) (1963) *Christian Morgenstern's 'Galgenlieder': A Selection*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
Knight, S. (2003) *Crime Fiction, 1800 – 2000: Detection, Death, Diversity*, London: Palgrave.
Kohlmayer, R. (1988) 'Der Literaturübersetzer zwischen Original und Markt', *Lebende Sprachen* 33(4): 145-156.
Koller, W. (1979) *Einführung in die Űbersetzungswissenschaft*, Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer.
Koral, D.L. (tr) (2000) *Brigitte Aubert: Death From the Woods*, London: Hodder & Stoughton.
Korsak, M. (tr) (1992) *At the Start: Genesis Made New*, New York: Doubleday.
Kosslyn, S. and O. Koenig (1992) *Wet Mind*, New York: Free Press.
Krieger, M. (1956) *The New Apologists for Poetry*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Krings, H.-P. (1986) *Was in den Köpfen von Űbersetzern vorgeht. Eine empirische Untersuchung zur Struktur des Űbersetzungsprozesses an fortgeschrittenen Französischlernern*, Tübingen: Narr.
Kuhn, E. (n.d.) 'There's Nothing Lightweight about Translating Light Verse: A Linguistic Analysis of Some of the Reasons Behind the Challenge', Paper presented at the New York PALA Conference, 2004.
Kyritsi, M.-V. (unpublished) *Historical Comparative Analysis of the Translation of Grimms' 'Kinder- und Hausmärchen' into English*, University of East Anglia PhD Thesis, 2006.
Lakoff, G. (1987) 'Foreword', to M. Turner *Mind, Metaphor, Criticism*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

------ & M. Johnson (1980) *Metaphors We Live By*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
------ & M. Johnson (1999) *Philosophy in the Flesh*, New York: Basic Books.
------ & M.Turner (1989) *More Than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Landers, C. (2001) *Literary Translation: A Practical Guide*, Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.
Langacker, R. (1987) *Foundations of Cognitive Grammar, Vol I: Theoretical Prerequisites*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Lawrence, D.H. (1961) *Lady Chatterley's Lover*, London: Heinemannn.
Lecercle, J.-J. (1990) *The Violence of Language: Interpretation as Pragmatics*, London: Palgrave.
------ (2001) 'Of Markov Chains and Upholstery Buttons', in O. Fischer & M. Nänny (eds), 289-302.
Lee, D. (2001) *Cognitive Linguistics: An Introduction*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Leech, G. (1969) *A Linguistic Guide to English Poetry*, London: Longman.
------ (1970) '"This Bread I Break" – Language and Interpretation', in D. Freeman (ed), 119-128.
------ (1983) *Principles of Pragmatics*, London: Longman.
------ (1987) 'Stylistics and Functionalism', in N. Fabb *et al* (eds), 76-88.
------ & M. Short (1981) *Style in Fiction: A Linguistic Introduction to English Fictional Prose*, London: Longman.
Lefevere, A. (1975) *Translating Poetry: Seven Strategies and a Blueprint*, Assen: van Gorcum.
------ (1986) 'On the Processing of Texts, or What is Literature', in T. D'haen (ed), 218-244.
------ (ed) (1992) *Translation/History/Culture: A Sourcebook*, London & New York: Routledge.
Lemon, L. & M. Reis (1965) *Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays*, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
Lesser, R. (1989) 'Voice; Landscape; Violence: Sonnevi into English in Helsinki', in D. Weissbort (ed), 125-137.
Levin, S. (1977) *The Semantics of Metaphor*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
------ (1988) *Metaphoric Worlds: Conceptions of a Romantic Nature*, New Haven & London: Yale University Press.
Levine, S.J. (1991) *The Subversive Scribe: Translating Latin American Fiction*, Minnesota: Graywolf Press.
Levi-Strauss, C. (1966) The Savage Mind, tr. unknown, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
Levý, J. (1969) *Die literarische Űbersetzung: Theorie einer Kunstgestaltung*, Frankfurt: Athenäum.
------ (2000) 'Translation as a Decision Process', in L. Venuti (ed), 148-159.
Lodge, D. (ed) (1988) *Modern Criticism and Theory: A Reader*, London: Longman.

Lowell, R. (1990) *Imitations*, New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux.
Lyons, J. (1977) *Semantics Vol I*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
MacKenzie, I. (2002) *Paradigms of Reading*, London: Palgrave.
Malinowski, B. (1935) *Coral Gardens and Their Magic*, London: Allen & Unwin.
Malmkjaer, K. (1992) '[Review of] E.A. Gutt: Translation and Relevance Cognition and Context', *Mind & Language* 7(3): 298-309.
------ (2004) 'Translational Stylistics: Dulcken's Translations of Hans Christian Andersen', *Language and Literature* 13(1): 13-24.
------ (2005) *Linguistics and the Language of Translation*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Mann, T. (1985) *Buddenbrooks*, Frankfurt: Fischer.
Marco, J. (2004) 'Translating Style and Styles of Translating: Henry James and Edgar Allan Poe in Catalan', *Language and Literature* 13(1): 73-90.
McCrum, R., W. Cran, R. MacNeill (1992) *The Story of English*, New York: Penguin.
McCully, C. (1998) 'The Beautiful Lie: Towards Biology of Literature', *PN Review* 121: 22-24.
Meier, H. (1999) 'Imagination by Ideophones', in M. Nänny & O. Fischer (eds), 135-154.
Meister, E. (1979) *Ausgewählte Gedichte 1932-1979*, Darmstadt: Luchterhand.
Mey, J. (2001) *Pragmatics: An Introduction*, Oxford: Blackwell.
Miall, D.S. & D. Kuiken (1998) 'The Form of Reading: Empirical Studies of Literariness', *Poetics* 25: 327-341.
Midgley, M. (2001) *Science and Poetry*, London & New York: Routledge.
Milic, L. (1971) 'Rhetorical Choice and Stylistic Option: The Conscious and Unconscious Poles', in S. Chatman (ed) *Literary Style: A Symposium*, London & New York: Oxford University Press, 77-94.
Millán, J. (1997) Paper read at *The Cervantiada. A Symposium on Innovative Writing*, Brown University, 1993; http://jamillan.com/cervante.htm#N[2].
Millán-Varela, C. (2004) 'Hearing Voices: James Joyce, Narrative Voice and Minority Translation', *Language and Literature* 13(1): 37-54.
Miller, J. Hillis (1982) *Fiction and Repetition: Seven English Novels*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
------ (1991) *Theory Then and Now*, Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Mills, S. (1992) 'Knowing Your Place: A Marxist Feminist Stylistic Analysis', in M. Toolan (ed) *Language, Text and Context: Essays in Stylistics*, London & New York: Routledge, 182-205.
------ (1995) *Feminist Stylistics*, London & New York: Routledge.
Miner, E. (1990) *Comparative Poetics: An Intercultural Essay on Theories of Literature*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Mischke, S. (1998) *Die Eisheilige*, Munich: Piper.
Mithen, S. (2003) *The Prehistory of the Mind*, London: Phoenix.
Montgomery, M., A. Durant, N. Fabb, T. Furniss & S. Mills (2000) *Ways of Reading: Advanced Reading Skills for Students of English*, London & New York: Routledge.

Mooij, J. (1976) 'A Study of Metaphor: On the Nature of Metaphorical Voice and Minority Translation', *Language and Literature* 13(1): 37-54.
Müller, W. & O. Fischer (eds) (2003) *From Sign to Signing [Iconicity in Language and Literature 3]*, Amsterdam & Philadelphia: Benjamins.
Mueller-Vollmer, K. (ed) (1985) *The Hermeneutics Reader*, New York: Continuum.
Mukařovský, J. (1964) 'Standard Language and Poetic Language', in P. Garvin (ed), 17-30.
Munday, J. (2001) *Introducing Translation Studies: Theories and Applications*, London & New York: Routledge.
Myerson, J. (2003) *Something Might Happen*, London: Vintage.
Nänny, M. & O. Fischer (eds) (1999) *Form Miming Meaning [Iconicity in Language and Literature 1],* Amsterdam: Benjamins.
Nash, W. (1986) 'Sound and the Pattern of Poetic Meaning', in T. D'haen (ed), 128-151.
Newmark, P. (1995) *A Textbook of Translation*, London: Phoenix.
New Scientist, 26.11.2005.
Nida, E. (1964) *Toward a Science of Translating*, Leiden: Brill.
------ & C.R. Taber (1974) *The Theory and Practice of Translation*, Leiden: Brill.
Nord, C. (1997) *Translating as a Purposeful Activity: Functionalist Approaches Explained*, Manchester: St. Jerome.
Ohala, J.J. (1984) 'An Ethological Perspective on Common Cross-Language Utilization of F° in Voice', *Phonetica* 41: 1-16.
Ohmann, R. (1962) *Shaw: The Style and the Man*, Middletown: Wesleyan University Press.
Olson, D. (1994) *The World on Paper: The Conceptual and Cognitive Implications of Writing and Reading*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ortega Y Gasset, J. (1992) 'The Misery and Splendor of Translation', tr. E. Miller, in R. Schulte & J. Biguenet (eds), 93-112.
Ortony, A. (ed) (1993) *Metaphor and Thought*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Orwell, G. (1987) *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, London: Secker & Warburg.
Osers, E. (tr) (1977) *Selected Poems. Rose Ausländer*, London: London Magazine Editions.
Pänke, H. (tr) (2001) *Kein Engel so rein*, Augsburg: Weltbild.
Parks, T. (1998) *Translating Style*, London: Cassell.
Peirce, C.S. (1960) *Collected Papers II: Elements of Logic*, eds. C. Hartshorne & P. Weiss, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Pennebaker, J. & L. King (1999) 'Linguistic Styles: Language Use as an Individual Difference', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 77(6): 1296-1312.
Percival, M.O. (1970) *William Blake's Circle of Destiny*, New York: Octagon Books.

Perthegella, M. & E. Loffredo (eds) (2006) *Translation and Creativity: Perspectives in Creative Writing and Translation Studies*, London & New York: Continuum.

Phillips, H. (2005) 'How Life Shapes the Brainscape', *New Scientist*, 20 Nov 2005: 12-13.

Piaget, J. (1968) *Genetic Epistemology*, tr. E. Duckworth, Columbia: Columbia University Press.

Pilkington, A. (1996) 'Introduction: Relevance Theory and Literary Style', *Language and Literature* 5(3): 157-162.

------ (2000) *Poetic Effects: A Relevance Theory Perspective*, Amsterdam & Philadelphia: Benjamins.

Piller, I. (1999) 'Iconicity in Brand Names', in M. Nänny & O. Fischer (eds), 325-341.

Pinker, S. (1994) *The Language Instinct: The New Science of Language and Mind*, London: Penguin.

Pope, A. (1963) *The Poems of Alexander Pope*, ed. J. Butt, London: Methuen.

Popova, Y. (2002) 'The Figure in the Carpet: Discovery or Re-Cognition', in E. Semino & J. Culpeper (eds), 49-71.

Porter, R. (1997) *The Greatest Benefit to Mankind*, London: Harper Collins.

Pound, E. (ed) (1964) *Ernest Fenollosa: The Chinese Written Character as a Medium for Poetry*, San Francisco: City Lights Books.

------ (2003) *Poems and Translation*s, New York: The Library of America.

Prasad, G.(1999) 'Writing Translation: The Strange Case of the Indian English Novel', in S. Bassnett & H. Trivedi (eds) *Post-Colonial Translation*, London & New York: Routledge, 41-57.

Pratt, M.L. (1977) *Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Preminger, A. (ed) (1974) *Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Püschel, U. (1980) 'Linguistische Stilistik', in H.P. Althaus, H. Henne & H.E. Wiegand (eds) *Lexikon der Germanistischen Linguistik*, Tübingen: Niemeyer, 304-313.

Quale, P. (1998) *From St. Jerome to Hypertext: Translation in Theory and Practice*, Manchester: St. Jerome.

Radford, A., M. Atkinson, D. Britain, H. Clahsen & A. Spencer (1999) *Linguistics: An Introduction*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Reiners, L. (1990) *Stilfibel*, Munich: Beck.

Reiß, K. (1976) *Texttyp und Űbersetzungsmethode. Der operative Text*, Kronberg: Scriptor.

------ (1981) 'Type, Kind and Individuality of Text: Decision Making in Translation', *Poetics Today* 2(4): 121-131.

------ & H.J. Vermeer (1984) *Grundlegung einer allgemeinen Translationstheorie*, Tübingen: Niemeyer.

Richards, I.A. (1924) *Principles of Literary Criticism*, London: Routledge.

------ (1936) *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

------ (1942) *How to Read a Page*, Boston: Beacon Press.
------ (1970) *Poetics and Sciences*, New York: Norton.
------ & F. Steen (2002) 'Literature and the Cognitive Revolution: An Introduction', *Poetics Today* 23(1): 1-8.
Ricks, C. (1963) *Milton's Grand Style*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Riffaterre, M. (1959) 'Criteria for Style Analysis', *Word* 15: 154-174.
------ (1960) 'Stylistic Context', *Word* 16: 207-218.
------ (1970) 'Describing Poetic Structures', in J. Ehrman (ed) *Structuralism*, New York: Anchor, 200-242.
Ringbom, H. (ed) (1975) *Style and Text: Studies Presented to Nils Erik Enkvist*, Stockholm: Språkförlaget Skriptor.
Robinson, D. (2002) *Western Translation Theory from Herodotus to Nietzsche*, Manchester: St. Jerome.
Rosenbaum, R. (1998) *Explaining Hitler: The Search for the Origins of His Evil*, London: Macmillan.
Ross, H. (1982) 'Hologramming in a Robert Frost Poem: The Still Point', in The Linguistic Society of Korea (eds) *Linguistics in the Morning Calm*, Seoul: Hanshin Publishing, 685-691.
------ (unpublished) 'Gleamings'.
Sadowski, P. (2001) 'The Iconicity of English GL-Words', in O. Fischer & M. Nänny (eds), 69-88.
Sandig, B. (1971) *Syntaktische Typologie der Schlagzeile*, Munich: Max Hueber.
Sapir, E. (1949) *Selected Writings in Language, Culture and Personality*, ed. D. Mandelbaum, Berkeley: University of California Press.
Schiavi, G. (1996) 'There is Always a Teller in a Tale', *Target* 8(1): 1-21.
Schlant, E. (1999) *The Language of Silence: West German Literature and the Holocaust*, London: Routledge.
Schlegel, F. von (1968) *Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms*, trs. E. Behler & R. Struc, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Schleiermacher, F. (1938) *Sämtliche Werke*, Vol 2, Berlin: Reimer.
------ (1977) *Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts*, trs. J. Duke & J. Forstman, Missoula: Scholars Press.
Scholes, R. (1989) *Protocols of Reading*, New Haven & London: Yale University Press.
Schopenhauer, A. (2002) 'On Language and Words', tr. D. Robinson, in D. Robinson (ed), 245-249.
Schulte, R. & J. Biguenet (eds) (1992) *Theories of Translation: An Anthology of Essays from Dryden to Derrida*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Scott, C. (2000) *Translating Baudelaire*, Exeter: University of Exeter Press.
Searle, J. (1969) *Speech Acts*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
------ (2004) *Mind: A Brief Introduction*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sebald, W.G. (2003) *On the Natural History of Destruction*, tr. A. Bell, London: Penguin.

Seidensticker, E.G. (tr) (1976) *Murasaki Shihibu: The Tale of Genji*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Sell, P. (ed) (1991) *Literary Pragmatics*, London & New York: Routledge, 9-26.
------ (1994) 'Introduction: the New Interdisciplinarity', in R. Sell & P. Verdonk (eds) *Literature and the New Interdisciplinarity*, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 9-26.
Semino, E. (1997) *Language and World-Creation in Poems and Other Texts*, London: Longman.
------ (2002) 'A Cognitive Stylistic Approach to Mind Style in Narrative Fiction', in E. Semino & J. Culpeper (eds), 95-122.
------ & J. Culpeper (eds) (2002*) Cognitive Stylistics: Language and Cognition in Text Analysis*, Amsterdam & Philadelphia: Benjamins.
------ & K. Swindlehurst (1996) 'Metaphor and Mind-Style in Ken Kesey's "One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest"', *Style* 30(1): 143-166.
Sereny, G. (2000) *The German Trauma: Experiences and Reflections 1938 – 2000,* London: Penguin.
Setton, R. (1999) *Simultaneous Interpretation: A Cognitive-Pragmatic Analysis*, Amsterdam & Philadelphia: Benjamins.
Shamma, T. (2005) 'The Exotic Dimension of Foreignizing Strategies: Burton's Translation of "The Arabian Nights"', *The Translator* 11(1): 51-67.
Sheldrake, R. (2003) *The Sense of Being Stared At and Other Aspects of the Extended Mind*, London: Arrow Books.
Shields, A. (tr) (2004) 'Anne Duden: "Winter. Reise"', *Smartish Pace* 11: 120-125.
Short, M. (1986) 'Literature and Language Teaching and the Nature of Language', in T. D'haen (ed), 152-186.
------ (1996) *Exploring the Language of Poems, Plays and Prose*, London: Longman.
Simone, R., ed. (1994) *Iconicity in Language*, Amsterdam & Philadelphia: Benjamins.
Simpson, P. (2004) *Stylistics: A Resource Book for Students*, London & New York: Routledge.
Sinclair, J.M. (1975) 'The Linguistic Basis of Style', in H. Ringbom (ed), 75-89.
Slobin, D.I. (1987) 'Thinking for Speaking', *Proceedings of the 13th Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society* 30: 435-444.
------ (1996) 'From "Thought and Language" to "Thinking for Speaking"', in J.J. Gumperz & S.C. Levinson (eds) *Rethinking Linguistic Relativity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 70-96.
------ (2003) 'Language and Thought Online: Cognitive Consequences of Linguistic Relativity', in D. Gentner & S. Gocklin-Meadow (eds) *Language in the Mind: Advances in the Study of Language and Thought*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 157-192.
Smith, N. & D. Wilson (1992) 'Introduction', *Lingua* 87: 1-10.
Snell-Hornby, M. (1995) *Translation Studies: An Integrated Approach*, revised edition, Amsterdam: Benjamins.
Sperber, D. & D. Wilson (1995) *Relevance: Communication & Cognition*, Oxford: Blackwell.

Spitzer, L. (1948) *Linguistics and Literary History: Essays in Stylistics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Spivak, G.C. (2004) 'The Politics of Translation', in L.Venuti (ed), 397-416.
Spolsky, E. (1993) *Gaps in Nature: Literary Interpretation and the Modular Mind*, Albany: SUNY Press.
------ (2002) 'Darwin & Derrida: Cognitive Literary Theory as a Species of Post-Structuralism', *Poetics Today* 23(1): 43-62.
Spyri, J. (1896) *Heidi*, New York: William Morrow.
Steen, G. (1994) *Understanding Metaphor in Literature: An Empirical Approach*, London: Longman.
Steiner, G. (1992) *After Babel: Aspects of Language and Translation*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stockwell, P. (2002a) *Cognitive Poetics: An Introduction*, London & New York: Routledge.
------ (2002b) 'Miltonic Texture and the Feeling of Reading', in E. Semino & J. Culpeper (eds), 73-94.
Tabakowska, E. (1993) *Cognitive Linguistics and Poetics of Translation*, Tübingen: Narr.
------ (1997) 'Translating a Poem, from a Linguistic Perspective', *Target* 9(1): 25-41.
------ (1999) 'Linguistic Expression of Perceptual Relationships: Iconicity as a Principle of Text Organisation (A case study)', in M. Nänny & O. Fischer (eds), 409-422.
------ (2000) 'Is (Cognitive) Linguistics of any Use for (Literary) Translation?', in S. Tirkkonen-Condit & R. Jääskeläinen (eds), 83-95.
Teleman, V. (1975) 'Style and Grammar', in W. Ringbom (ed), 90-100.
Tennyson, A. (1894) *The Works of Alfred Lord Tennyson, Poet Laureate*, London: Macmillan.
The Holy Bible (1939) *Authorised King James Version*, London & New York: Catlins.
Thomas, R.S. (1990) *Counterpoint*, Newcastle upon Tyne: Bloodaxe.
Thomson, C.C. (2004) '"Slainté, I Goes, and he Says his Word": Morvern Callar Undergoes the Trial of the Foreign', *Language and Literature* 13(1): 55-71.
Thornborrow, J. & S. Wareing (1998) *Patterns in Language: An Introduction to Language and Literary Style*, London & New York: Routledge.
Threadgold, Y. (1988) 'Language and Gender', *Australian Feminist Studies* 3: 41-70.
Thwaite, A. (1996) *Emily Tennyson: The Poet's Wife*, London: Faber & Faber.
Tirkkonen-Condit, S. (ed) (1991) *Empirical Research in Translation and Intercultural Studies*, Tübingen: Narr.
------ & R. Jääskeläinen (eds) (2000) *Tapping and Mapping the Processes of Translation and Interpreting*, Amsterdam & Philadelphia: Benjamins.
Toman, J. (1999) *The Magic of a Common Language: Jakobson, Matthesius, Trubetzkoy, and the Prague Linguistic Circle*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

Tompkins, J. (ed) (1980) *Reader-Response Criticism: From Formalism to Post-Structuralism*, London: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Tourniaire, C. (1999) 'Bilingual Translation as a Re-creation of the Censored Text: Rhea Galanaki in English and French', in J. Boase-Beier & M. Holman (eds), 71-80.
Toury, G. (1980) *In Search of a Theory of Translation*, Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University.
------ (1985) 'A Rationale for Descriptive Translation Studies', in T. Hermans (ed), 16-41.
------ (1995) *Descriptive Translation Studies and Beyond*, Amsterdam & Philadelphia: Benjamins.
Traugott, E.C. & M.L. Pratt (1980) *Linguistics for Students of Literature*, New York etc.: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich.
Travers, M. (ed) (2001) *European Literature From Romanticism to Postmodernism*, London: Continuum.
Trotter, D. (1992) 'Analysing Literary Prose: The Relevance of Relevance Theory', *Lingua* 87: 11-27.
Tsur, R. (1992) *Toward a Theory of Cognitive Poetics*, Amsterdam: Elsevier.
------ (2002) 'Some Cognitive Foundations of "Cultural Programs"', *Poetics Today* 23(1): 63-80.
Turner, G. (1990) 'Sharing, Shaping, Showing: The Deep Uses of Language', in L. Hickey (ed) *The Pragmatics of Style*, London & New York: Routledge, 15-27.
Turner, M. (2000) *Death is the Mother of Beauty: Mind, Metaphor, Criticism*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
------ (1991) *Reading Minds: The Study of English in the Age of Cognitive Science*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Tytler, A.F. (2002) 'The Proper Task of a Translator', in D. Robinson (ed), 209-212.
Ullmann, S. (1964) *Language and Style*, Oxford: Blackwell.
Ungerer, F. (1999) 'Diagrammatic Iconicity in Word-Formation', in M. Nänny & O. Fischer (eds), 307-324.
Van den Broeck, R. (1981) 'The Limits of Translatability Exemplified by Metaphor Translation', *Poetics Today* 2(4): 73-87.
Van Peer, W. (1986) *Stylistics and Psychology: Investigations of Foregrounding*, London: Croom Helm.
------ (ed) (1989) *The Taming of the Text: Explorations in Language, Literature and Culture*, London & New York: Routledge.
------ (1993) 'Typographic Foregrounding', *Language and Literature* 2(1): 49-61.
------ (1995) 'The Empirical Study of Literary Texts', in G. Rusch (ed) *Empirical Approaches to Literature*: *Proceedings of the 4th Biannual Conference of the International Society for the Empirical Study of Literature*, Siegen: Lumis, 313-318.
Vendler, H. (1995) *Soul Says: On Recent Poetry*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Venuti, L. (1995) *The Translator's Invisibility: A History of Translation*, London

& New York: Routledge.
------ (1998) *The Scandals of Translation*, London & New York: Routledge.
------ (ed) (2000) *The Translation Studies Reader*, London & New York: Routledge.
------ (ed) (2004) *The Translation Studies Reader* [Second Edition], London & New York: Routledge.
Verdonk, P. (1988) *How Can We Know the Dancer From the Dance? Some Literary Stylistic Studies of English Poetry*, Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam Press.
------ (ed) (1993) *Twentieth-Century Poetry: From Text to Context*, London & New York: Routledge.
------ (1999) 'The Liberation of the Icon: A Brief Survey from Classical Rhetoric to Cognitive Stylistics', *Journal of Literary Studies*, 15(3/4): 291-304.
------ (2002) *Stylistics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Vermeer, H. (1978) 'Ein Rahmen für eine allgemeine Translationstheorie', *Lebende Sprachen* 23: 98-102.
Vickers, B. (1988) *In Defence of Rhetoric*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Vinay, J.-P. & J. Darbelnet (1995) *Comparative Studies of French and English: A Methodology for Translation*, Amsterdam & Philadelphia: Benjamins.
Vine, B. (1988) *The House of Stairs*, London: Penguin.
Von Flotow, L. (1997) *Translation and Gender: Translating in the "Era of Feminism"*, Manchester: St. Jerome.
Von Törne, V. (1981) *Im Lande Vogelfrei: Gesammelte Gedichte*, Berlin: Wagenbach.
Wales, K. (2001) *A Dictionary of Stylistics*, London: Longman.
Watson, L. (1995) *Dark Nature*, London: Hodder & Stoughton.
Watts, R.J. (1991) 'Cross-Cultural Problems in the Perception of Literature', in P. Sell (ed), 26-43.
Weber, J.J. (ed) (1996) *The Stylistics Reader*, London: Arnold.
------ (2005) 'From "Bad" to "Worse": Pragmatic Scales and the (De)construction of Cultural Models', *Language and Literature* 14(1): 45-63.
Weissbort, D. (ed) (1989) *Translating Poetry: The Double Labyrinth*, London: Macmillan.
Welsh, I. (1994) *Trainspotting*, London: Minerva.
Werth, P. (1999) *Text Worlds: Representing Conceptual Space in Discourse*, London: Longman.
Whorf, B.L. (1956) 'An American Indian Model of the Universe', in J. Carroll (ed) *Language, Thought and Reality: Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 57-64.
Wierzbicka, A. (1997) *Understanding Cultures through Their Key Words*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wilhelm, W. (tr) (1975) *William Blake: Lieder der Unschuld und Erfahrung*, Frankfurt: Insel.
Williams, J. & A. Chesterman (2002) *The Map: A Beginner's Guide to Doing Research in Translation*, Manchester: St. Jerome.

Williams, R. (2002) *The Poems of Rowan Williams*, Oxford: The Perpetua Press.

Wilss, W. (1996) *Knowledge and Skills in Translator Behaviour*, Amsterdam & Philadelphia: Benjamins.

Wimsatt, W. (ed) (1954a) *The Verbal Icon*, University of Kentucky Press: Lexington.

------ (1954b) 'The Intentional Fallacy', in W. Wimsatt (ed), 3-18.

------ & M. Beardsley (1954) 'The Affective Fallacy', in W. Wimsatt (ed), 22-39.

Winograd, T. (1983) *Language as a Cognitive Process*, London: Addison-Wesley.

Winters, M. (2004) 'German Translations of F. Scott Fitzgerald's *The Beautiful and Damned*: A Corpus-Based Study of Modal Particles as Features of Translators' Style', in I. Kemble (ed) *Using Corpora and Databases in Translation*, Portsmouth: University of Portsmouth, 71-88.

Wolff, E. (1971) 'Der intendierte Leser', *Poetica* 4: 141-157.

Yao, S.G. (2002) *Translation and the Languages of Modernism: Gender, Politics, Language*, London: Palgrave.

Zwaan, R.(1993) *Aspects of Literary Comprehension: A Cognitive Approach*, Amsterdam & Philadelphia: Benjamins.

Index

A

Abrams, M.H. 84
Adès, T. 81, 92
ambiguity 13, 14, 30, 36, 47, 58, 59, 63, 69, 78, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 109, 110, 113, 117, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 131, 132, 141, 143, 144, 146
Anderson, E.A. 102, 107, 108, 142
Appiah, K.A. 37
Arendt, H. 101
Aristotle 10, 12, 72, 90, 95, 96, 97, 104, 105, 109
Arndt, W. 115
Arnold, M. 11
Assman, A. 14
assonance 93, 106, 131, 132
Ausländer, R. 51, 85, 86, 119, 120, 134

B

Baker, M. 1, 5, 51, 53, 64, 65, 66, 67, 70, 79, 95
Bakhtin, M. 27, 67, 133
Barnstone, W. 31, 146
Barry, P. 7
Barthes, R. 7, 21
Bassnett, S. 10, 16, 31
Bath, M. 41, 83, 86, 90, 140
Baudelaire, C 36, 37, 41, 62, 68
Bayley, J. 24
Beardsley, M.C. 8, 33, 76
Beaugrande, R. de 6, 24, 35, 96
Bell, A. 26, 80, 115
Bell, R. 24, 95
Bellay, J. Du 10
Belloc, H. 68
Ben-Ari, N. 25, 146
Benjamin, W. 25, 36, 42, 89
Berman, A. 78
Bex, T. 96
Bible (translation) 56, 57, 79, 82, 134
Biguenet , J. 75
Birch, D. 8
Blakemore, D. 20, 40
Blake, W. 100, 102, 104, 107, 142, 143, 144
Bloom, H. 41
Boase-Beier, J. 4, 14, 27, 38, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 47, 54, 62, 63, 65, 66, 67, 69, 71, 74, 76, 79, 82, 83, 84, 85, 97, 99, 103, 106, 113, 114, 115, 117, 121, 122, 133, 137, 144, 146
Bodkin, M. 102
Booth, W.C. 38
Bradford, R. 13
Brooks, C. 13, 36
Bullock, M. 78, 128, 129
Burton, D. 8, 9, 17
Butler, L. 20

C

Carston, R. 19, 34, 41
Carter, R. 10, 17
Catford, J.C. 9, 14, 16, 22
Causley, C. 99
Celan, P. 85, 86
Chamberlain, L. 39
Chapman, R. 9, 16
Chatman, S. 38
Chesterman, A. 1
Chomsky, N. 8
Chinese 105, 136
choice 1, 3, 4, 5, 11, 21, 29, 33, 34, 36, 38, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 69, 70, 72, 73, 79, 84, 104, 107, 109, 112, 113, 114, 146, 147
Cicero 1, 10
cognitive 2, 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18,

19, 20, 21, 26, 30, 32, 35, 38, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 54, 63, 66, 67, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 88, 90, 91, 92, 94, 96, 97, 99, 100, 101, 103, 104, 105, 108, 110, 112, 113, 114, 116, 118, 120, 122, 123, 124, 127, 128, 129, 130, 135, 144, 145, 147
effects 49, 59, 63, 78, 91, 94
linguistics 10, 19, 32, 71, 72, 73, 83, 95, 96, 103
metaphor 99, 101, 134, 136, 137
poetics 32, 72
rhetoric 12
turn 71
cognitive stylistics, see stylistics
Cohen, S. 71
Cicero 1, 10
Cluysenaar, A. 31
cognitive metaphor, see metaphor
conceptual metaphor see metaphor
compensation 93, 105
connotation 11, 36, 51, 61, 82, 86, 87, 107, 120, 127, 136, 142
Conrady, K.O. 88, 130
contextualization 2, 3, 9, 16, 32, 112, 127
Cook, G. 19, 26, 27, 37, 77, 91
corpora 67, 79
covert translation 28, 29, 57, 58, 113
Crane, H.T. 71
Crisp, P. 48, 97, 98, 99, 105
Critical Discourse Analysis 17, 51, 54, 65, 67, 80, 109, 112
Croft, W. 73
Crossley-Holland, K. 81
Cruse, D. 73
Crystal, D. 11, 17, 21
Culler, J. 7, 16, 21
Culpeper, J. 71, 73, 104
culture-specific 3, 22, 75, 147
Czech 89

D

Dahlgren, M. 10, 44, 63, 79
Damasio, A. 71
Damon, S.F. 100
Darbelnet, J. 24, 52, 65, 68
Dawkins, R. 27, 89
Dawson, J. 95
defamiliarization/defamiliarizing 25, 68, 69, 89
Denham, J. 11, 45, 54
Dennett, D. 71, 124
Derrida, J. 7, 17, 83
Descriptive Translation Studies 5
descriptive use 44
D'haen, T. 16, 17
diagesis 101, 104
Diaz-Diocaretz, M. 31, 35, 38, 39, 40, 74, 110, 112
Dolet, E. 10
domesticating 46, 57, 67, 68, 69, 90, 113, 133
Dowling, W. 33, 36, 37, 40, 47
Downes, W. 81, 96, 108
Dunn, D. 83, 86

E

Eagleton, T. 17, 112
Eckert, P. 103
Eco, U. 7, 35, 41, 68
Edwards, M. 44
Eichenbaum, B. 7
Elsworth, B. 28
Emmot, C. 72
Empson, W. 8, 85, 90, 108
English 13, 24, 28, 33, 36, 44, 45, 46, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60, 61, 65, 67, 68, 77, 79, 80, 84, 85, 86, 88, 89, 91, 92, 94, 99, 101, 104, 119, 120, 121, 122, 126, 127, 128, 129, 132, 133, 134, 136, 137, 138, 142, 144, 145
Epstein, E.L. 102
Erkazanci, H. 46, 61, 102

Ervin, S.M. 23
Erlich, V. 103

F

Fabb, N. 26, 71
Fahnestock, J. 12
Fairclough, N. 80
Fairley, I. 32
Fauconnier, G. 72, 97
Felstiner, J. 85
Fischer, A. 102, 105
Fischer, O. 102, 103, 105, 106
Fish, S. 33, 35, 72, 73, 81
Fónagy, I. 105
foregrounding 14, 19, 68, 86, 87, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 110, 116, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 137, 139, 143
foreignizing 2, 14, 23, 46, 68, 69, 105, 113, 130, 133
Fowler, R. 8, 9, 12, 13, 17, 18, 19, 22, 26, 45, 51, 53, 54, 56, 60, 73, 76, 80, 81, 89, 90, 98, 110, 112, 146
Freeman, D. 8, 98, 102, 103
Freeman, M. 93, 101
French 25, 37, 61, 65, 87, 91, 120
Freud, S. 20, 37, 94
Frye, N. 82, 85
Furniss, T. 41, 83, 86, 90, 140

G

García, I. I. 4, 102
Garvin, P. 7, 26, 89
Gavins, J. 103
generative grammar 8, 19, 20, 54, 103
German 18, 23, 25, 37, 50, 51, 53, 55, 56, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 68, 77, 78, 80, 84, 85, 86, 92, 99, 100, 101, 102, 104, 107, 108, 115, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 125, 126, 129, 132, 133, 134, 136, 138, 143, 145
Gibbs, R. 96, 97, 99
Goldsworthy, P. 14, 15, 81, 92
Goll, Y. 78, 128, 129
Graham, J. 71, 75, 103, 104
Grandin, T. 88, 89
Grant-Adamson, L. 106
Gurney, I. 92, 93, 104
Gutt, E.-A. 9, 10, 11, 20, 27, 28, 30, 34, 41, 43, 44, 45, 47, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 65, 68, 71, 72, 74, 82, 90, 92, 112, 130, 146

H

Halliday, M.A.K. 9, 18
Hamburger, M. 24, 28, 62, 146, 148
Hardy, T. 26, 61, 106
Harvey, K. 93
Hasan, R. 9
Hatim, B. 41, 44, 95
Havránek, B. 7, 89
Hebrew 28, 64, 79
Hermans, T. 5, 6, 63, 64
Hernandi, P. 27, 89
Heywood, T. 107, 108
Hinton, L. 102
Hiraga, M. 97, 98, 103
Holland, N. 71
Holloway, J. 99
Holzman, H. 52, 53, 69, 130
Horace 1, 10
Hughes, T. 33, 48, 97, 98, 106
Hutchinson, P. 83
Hyde, G. 22, 23, 25

I

iconicity 2, 14, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 110, 113, 124, 125, 128, 138, 139, 140, 142, 143, 144, 145
implicature 40, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 51, 60, 63, 69, 74, 79, 81, 86, 108, 109, 113, 114, 139, 145

implied author 38
implied reader 38, 76
inferred author 31, 38, 50, 54, 60, 76, 79, 85, 113, 147
Ingarden, R. 37, 43, 73, 96
intentional fallacy 11, 33, 34
interpretive use 59, 146
intersemiotic translation 15, 105
Iser, W. 37, 38, 39, 43, 47, 63, 73, 76, 77, 85, 88, 108, 112, 113
Italian 23, 83, 86

J

Jääskeläinen, R. 24, 71
Jackson, W.D. 133, 134
Jakobson, R. 1, 7, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 22, 25, 26, 32, 33, 35, 61, 73, 90, 91, 102, 105, 130
Jin, Di 74
Johnson, M. 96, 97, 99, 104, 110, 134, 136, 137
Jonasson, K. 71
Jones, F. 32

K

Kaiser, R. 52, 54, 55, 130
Kant, I. 80
Kaschnitz, M.-L. 88, 89
Katz, J. 36, 40, 45, 47
Kiparsky, P. 82
Kirsch, S. 84, 86, 88, 100, 101, 120, 133, 144
Kloepfer, R.C. 95
Knight, M. 62
Korsak, M. P. 25, 28, 79
Krings, H.-P. 71
Kuhn, E. 128, 132

L

Lakoff , G. 10, 47, 71, 72, 73, 96, 97, 103, 134, 136, 137
Landers, C. 89
Lecercle, J.-J. 20, 22, 34, 36, 37, 69, 89, 105, 112
Lee, D. 71, 103
Leech, G. 9, 17, 53, 64, 85, 89, 90, 91, 95, 97, 102
Lefevere, A. 10, 11, 17, 18, 31, 54
Lemon, L. 7, 89
Levin, S. 96
Levine, S.J. 14
Levý, J. 16, 61, 62, 63
Lowell, R. 65
Lyons, J. 106

M

MacKenzie, I. 11, 40, 41, 42, 43, 47, 51, 62, 69, 75, 82
Malinowski, B. 96
Malmkjær, K. 1, 5, 10, 11, 14, 22, 44, 64, 65, 66, 67, 79
Marco, J. 4, 5, 66, 102
McCully, C. 14, 92, 107
Meier, H. 106
Meister, E. 45, 46, 55, 56, 62, 116, 117, 118, 121, 126, 137, 144
metaphor 1, 13, 14, 19, 30, 47, 58, 73, 78, 82, 83, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 103, 104, 105, 110, 113, 115, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138
  conceptual 97, 98, 99, 100, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138
  cognitive 99, 101, 134, 136
metonymy 13, 95, 99
Millán, J. 101
Millán-Varela, C. 5, 65, 66, 67, 79
mimesis 68, 69, 101, 104, 125
mind style 18, 19, 23, 29, 38, 44, 45, 54, 60, 76, 77, 79, 80, 107, 112, 115, 116, 119
Miner, E. 14, 81
minimax 39, 42, 48, 62
Mithen, S. 34, 71, 75, 97
Montgomery, M. 36, 38, 39, 40, 113

Mooij, J. 95
Morgenstern, C. 62, 79, 114, 115, 136
Müller, W. 102
Mueller-Vollmer, K. 21, 75
Mukařovský, J. 7, 26, 90
Mulford, W. 84
Munday, J. 1, 56, 95

N

Nänny, M. 102, 103, 105, 106
Nash, W. 102, 103
New Critics/ New Criticism 8, 13, 16, 33, 76
Newmark, P. 63, 72, 95, 96
Nida, E. 9, 35, 56, 56, 63, 74, 79, 113
Nord, C. 5, 27, 28, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 72, 90

O

Ohala, J.J. 104
Olson, D. 84
onomatopoeia 68, 102, 105
Osers, E. 51, 85, 8, 120
ostraneniye 89
otherness 2, 14, 94
overt translation 25, 28, 29, 58, 113

P

Pänke, H. 107
parallelism 14, 91, 92, 104, 139, 140, 141
Parks, T. 1, 48, 102
Peirce, C.S. 101
Phillips, H. 71, 73
Pilkington, A. 7, 25, 27, 42, 47, 48, 53, 57, 62, 63, 69, 77, 81, 87, 110, 112, 113
Piller, I. 105
Pinker, S. 22, 23
Plath, S. 101
Plato 84, 102
Poethen, J. 130
poetic effects 30, 43, 44, 48, 77, 81
poetics 10, 12, 13, 14, 19, 20, 32, 71, 95, 103, 104
Polish 91, 94
Pope, A. 11, 45, 102, 105
Popova, Y. 83, 146
Postmodern/postmodernism 14, 15, 109
Poststructuralist/poststructuralism 14, 15, 17, 19, 109
Pound, E. 25, 97, 105
Prasad, G. 80
Pratt, M.L. 16, 26, 113
Pushkin, A. 48, 81, 115

R

Radford, A. 13, 103
Reader-Response Theory 3, 20, 35, 37, 39, 40, 47, 63, 72-73, 76, 77, 109, 112, 113, 124, 125
Reiß, K. 7, 9, 24, 26, 31, 41, 50, 54, 55, 56, 58, 60, 89
Reis, M. 7, 89
Relevance Theory 3, 19, 20, 35, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 47, 50, 63, 68, 69, 77, 82, 85, 90, 109, 112, 113, 117, 124, 125, 141
remainder 20, 69, 89, 105
repetition 25, 30, 48, 91, 92, 93, 94, 100, 104, 106, 107, 128, 132, 139, 140, 143, 146
rhetoric 10, 12, 69, 72, 95, 96, 103
rhyme 14, 91, 92, 93, 94, 100, 115, 124, 128, 143, 145
Richards, I. A. 8, 9, 10, 13, 18, 33, 39, 95, 96, 97
Richardson, A. 15, 34, 71
Riffaterre, M. 7, 16, 35, 42, 90, 93
Robinson, D. 10, 11, 23, 54, 84, 146
Ross, H. 93, 102, 104, 105
Russian 1, 7, 14, 18, 22, 23, 68, 69, 89, 120

S

Sadowski, P. 104
salience 89, 90, 91, 94, 122, 131
Sapir-Whorf hypothesis 21, 22, 23, 24
Saussure, F. de 7, 13, 102
schema(ta) 77, 78, 91, 97, 98, 128
Schleiermacher, F. 11, 23, 37, 41, 68, 75, 82
Schopenhauer, A. 23
Schulte, R. 75, 78, 128, 129
Scott, C. 31, 32, 36, 37, 41, 62, 68, 114
Searle, J. 71
Sebald, W.G. 26, 80
Semino, E. 15, 19, 21, 71, 73, 76, 82, 96, 104
sense-for-sense 10, 74
Setton, R. 71
Sheldrake, R. 76
Short, M. 9, 26, 53, 64, 81, 90, 102, 113
simile 2, 95, 98, 99, 136
Simone, R. 102
Sinclair, J.M. 103
skopos 7, 27, 55, 56, 72
Slobin, D. 23, 24, 25
Snell-Hornby, M. 1, 9, 33, 35, 67, 95
Spanish 58, 87, 101, 136
Sperber, D. 19, 26, 32, 42, 43, 46, 51, 59, 63, 78, 82, 92, 112
Spitzer, L. 75
Spivak, G. 69
Spolsky, E. 88
Steen, G. 71, 97, 98, 103
Stockwell, P. 6, 20, 26, 32, 39, 68, 71, 72, 73, 76, 90, 97, 98, 99, 103, 111, 113, 114, 116, 125, 129, 132, 136
structuralism 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 19, 20, 21, 32, 34, 42, 61, 68, 83, 89, 90, 95, 96, 103, 109
stylistics 75, 77, 90, 95, 97, 102, 110
cognitive 3, 5, 10, 12, 13, 18, 19, 21, 26, 32, 34, 38, 47, 71, 72, 73, 74, 77, 83, 85, 90, 96, 103, 104, 105, 108, 109, 112, 121, 124, 136, 143, 147

T

Tabakowska, E. 1, 10, 13, 19, 22, 53, 67, 71, 72, 73, 90, 91, 95, 99, 105, 112, 113
Taber, C. 56, 58, 63, 74, 79, 113
Tennyson, A. 76
tenor 95, 97
think-aloud 24, 71
Thomas, R.S. 43, 47, 59, 63, 127, 139, 143
Thompson, F. 91
Thornborrow, J. 51, 67, 112
Tirkkonen-Condit, S. 24, 71
Tourniaire, C. 17
Toury, G. 5, 6, 16, 42, 59, 61, 64
translation theory 2, 3,9, 12, 43, 44, 63, 64
translationese 25, 89
Tsur, R. 73
Turkish 46, 58, 61, 83, 102, 120
Turner, G. 38
Turner, M. 10, 12, 47, 71, 72, 73, 96, 97, 103
Tytler, A.F. 11, 84, 146

U

Ullmann, S. 107
Ungerer, F. 105
universal 2, 3, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 54, 57, 58, 59, 60, 67, 69, 72, 73, 75, 81, 82, 83, 92, 94, 96, 98, 99, 100, 101, 104, 109, 110, 111, 113, 134, 136, 138, 147

V

van den Broeck, R. 95, 96

van Peer, W. 14, 24, 68, 89, 90, 91, 93, 94
Vendler, H. 81
Venuti, L. 9, 14, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 47, 56, 67, 68, 69, 73, 89, 90, 94, 105, 113, 130
Verdonk, P. 4, 17, 34, 50, 51, 73, 77, 92, 110, 112, 122
Vermeer, H. 5, 6, 7, 9, 26, 41, 54, 55, 56, 58
Vinay, J.-P. 24, 52, 65, 68
visible/visibility 8, 55, 64, 67, 89, 95, 98, 123, 125
Vivis, A. 84, 137
voice 2, 25, 41, 45, 47, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 76, 79, 80, 101, 133, 146, 147, 148
von Törne, V. 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 88, 89, 98, 109, 122, 124, 126, 127

W

Wales, K. 4, 7, 32, 41, 52, 82, 83, 96, 97, 116
Wareing, S. 51, 67, 112
Werth, P. 96
Wierzbicka, A. 14, 22, 23, 25, 120
Williams, J. 1
Williams, R. 11, 143
Wilson, D. 19, 26, 32, 42, 43, 46, 51, 59, 63, 78, 82, 92, 112
Wilss, W. 31, 35, 47, 61, 71, 74
Wimsatt, W. 8, 11, 13, 33, 34, 76, 104
Winograd, T. 19, 20, 47, 73
Wolff, E. 76
word-for-word 10, 74

Z

Zwaan, R. 24, 26, 71